New Zealand's 'overstaying Islander' : a construct of the ideology of 'race' and immigration by Ross, Tamara Brigid
NEW ZEALAND'S 'OVERSTAYING ISLANDER': 
A CONSTRUCT OF THE IDEOLOGY OF 'RACE' AND IMMIGRATION. 
by 
Tamara Brigid Ross 
Submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington 
in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
in History 
Victoria University of Wellington 
1994 
page ii 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the development of a 'race ' /immigration ideology 
within New Zealand and attempts to explore the processes through which 
this ideology has expressed and reproduced itself in New Zealand's past. 
In order to determine this process, this thesis analyses , as a case 
study, the causes , patterns and consequences of the politicisation of 
Pacific Island immigrants in New Zealand during the 1970s . 
Pacific Island immigrants were negatively categorised according to 
traditional New Zealand beliefs about 'race' and the immigration of 
' alien' peoples, and the stereotypes that arose out of this process 
justified racist immigration campaigns in the 1970s. The targeting of 
Pacific Island migrants through these immigration campaigns, and the 
deliberate scapegoating of Pacific Islanders in the 1975 general 
election, compounded and entrenched existing negative stereotypes thereby 
justifying the further politicisation of Islanders in the 1980s . It is 
argued that this historical process needs to be understood as the 
outcome, among other things, of the 'race' /immigration ideology. 
Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the politicisation of Pacific 
Islanders during this period was but part of a cycle in a larger process 
of the generation and reproduction of racism. While the 
'race' /immigration ideology is analysed here with Pacific Islanders 
The historical campaigns against Pacific Islanders are examined in detail 
so as to illuminate the broader process of racialisation in New Zealand's 
past, and to explore the possible form that the 'race' /immigration 
ideology may assume both in the present and in the future. 
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II ameTER ONE II 
INTRODUCTION 
In March 1974, in a campaign to crackdown on illegal immigrants, New 
Zealand police and immigration department officials began a series of 
night raids on the Auckland homes of Tongans. Tongan migrants were taken 
from their beds and required to produce passports, and any who could not 
do so were taken to the Auckland Central Police Station. 1 
Those who were picked up ... and who didn't have their passports had 
good reasons. But they weren't even given a chance to dress 
properly before they were put in police vans. Many appeared in 
court without shoes. Others had to be loaned clothing to cover 
singlets. 2 
In the following year, the Citizens Association for Racial Equality 
(CARE) investigated further raids on Tongans in the Auckland area. 
At one house it was pointed out to the policemen and the 
immigration officer present that most of the passports were in the 
possession of a travel agency. Nevertheless, those who could not 
immediately produce a passport were ordered into a police van in 
the clothes they stood up in and were taken into custody at the 
police station. Two people were held for a couple of hours, and one 
person all night, but were then released without being charged upon 
documentation being made available. 3 
Similar raids were repeated in 1976 when the minister of immigration, Mr 
Frank Gill, renewed his promise to "eradicate" migrants who had 
overstayed their permits, people he described as "troublemakers that the 
1 Joris de Bres, Rob Campbell and Peter Harris, Migrant Labour in 
the South Pacific, (Auckland, 1974) , Part 3, pl. 
2 ibid., Part 3, p2. 
3 Joris de Bres and Rob Campbell, The Overstavers. Illeoal Migration 
from the Pacific to New Zealand, (Auckland, 1976b), p22. 
----- ------
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country could well do without". 4 This time, the net was widened to 
include other Pacific Island migrants as well as Tongans, and as well as 
continuing the night raids, police and immigration officials also 
embarked on a campaign of 'random street checks' in which Pacific 
Islanders were stopped in the streets and questioned about their 
immigration status. 
These immigration campaigns of the early 1970s were unprecedented in 
their almost exclusive concentration on migrants from the Pacific Islands 
and they revealed a growing political hostility towards Pacific Island 
migrants at this time. The New Zealand economy had begun a decline from 
1973 and Pacific Islanders had become a scapegoat as Pakeha sought to 
identify a cause. 5 Pacific Islanders became stereotyped as lawbreakers 
and undesirables. They were identified as straining public services and 
threatening the employment opportunities of 'real New Zealanders', and 
they were held responsible for such varied contemporary problems as the 
deterioration in law in order and the social problems of the major 
cities. 
The negative label of 'overstayer' also became synonymous with Pacific 
Islanders at this time. Although migrants from other countries than the 
Pacific region made up a substantial proportion of illegal residents in 
New Zealand, in line with the notion that Pacific Islanders were a social 
and economic 'problem', the term 'overstayer' was politicised in the 
1970s to the point where it became almost exclusively associated with 
Pacific Islanders. 6 
4 ibid., p24. 
5 Paul Spoonley, 'Racism, Race Relations and the Media', in Paul 
Spoonley and Walter Hirsh (eds), Between the Lines. Racism and the New 
Zealand Media, (Auckland, 1990b), p28. 
6 Paul Spoonley, Racism and Ethnicity. Critical Issues in New Zealand 
Society, (Auckland, 1988) , pl5. 
Introduction p3 
As unemployment grew, albeit slowly, pressures increased for both 
economic and racial reasons for migration from the Pacific to be 
curtailed, and deliberate attempts were made to link in people's minds 
Pacifi.c immigration and crime, Pacific immigration and unemployment. 7 
The activities of politicians, the police, and the Department of 
Immigration, unfairly created an image of Pacific Islanders as 
'overstayers', at a time when overstayers were cast as a substantial 
problem for New Zealand. The media, in repeating rather than challenging 
the highly inaccurate public image, seriously contributed to producing 
a blanket anti-Pacific Islander feeling amongst many Pakeha. 8 The 
belief that New Zealand (or at least the North Island!) was being 
over-run by Pacific Islanders was deliberately encouraged, even 
though it ... [bore] no relation to the actual facts of the 
situation. 9 
Hence, emerging out of the 1970s economic downturn was a "much more 
public and significant racist discourse" within which Pacific Island 
migrants became the scapegoats of both hostile public and political 
attention. 10 
The stereotypes given political significance during this period, such as 
'overstayers' and 'violent Islanders', however, did not appear out of 
thin air. They were social constructs; products of both a long and 
continuous ideological process, as much as a particular set of historical 
and material circumstances. While grounded firmly in and shaped by events 
7 Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy. New Zealand in 
the World Since 1935, (Auckland, 1993) , p262. 
a Spoonley, ( 1990b) , p32. 
9 Joris de Bres, 
Review, Vol.57, No.177, 
'Government Immigration', 
( 1976a) , pl. 
New Zealand Monthly 
10 Paul Spoonley, 'Racism and Ethnicity', in P. Spoonley et al (eds), 
New Zealand Society: A Sociological Introduction, (Palmerston North, 
1990), p89, quoted in Patrick Ongley, 'Migrant Labour in New Zealand: The 
Political Economy of Maori and Pacific Island Labour Migration', MA 
Thesis, (Victoria University of Wellington, 1990), pl89. 
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particular to the 1970s, the campaigns against Pacific Island migrants 
were not new - the rhetoric and stereotypes had been laid down long 
before the events described here. The 'overstayer' campaigns echoed and, 
indeed, borrowed from the racist discourse of earlier New Zealand 
historical events, particularly from immigration campaigns against other 
migrant groups in New Zealand's past. Moreover, the images and 
stereotypes created in the early 1970s became in turn a major influence 
on subsequent public perceptions and have provided the conditions for the 
further generation and reproduction of racism in New Zealand. 11 Thus, 
the ' overstayer's crisis ' of the 1970s can be seen to be but part of a 
cyc le of 'race' /immigration concerns in New Zealand history. Hence, this 
thesis examines the 'overstayer' campaigns of the 1970s both as a case 
study of a particular set of historical circumstances, and as a micro-
study of a deeper ideological process - the historical generation and 
reproduction of racism within the migration context. 
RACIALISATION - AN IDEOLOGICAL PROCESS 
Racism is an ideology a set of beliefs, often incomplete and 
inconsistent, held by groups or individuals which provides the basis for 
their attitudes and actions. 12 It is not only handed down, from one 
class or generation to another, but is also being constantly created and 
recreated by people in response to the world as they experience it . 13 
It provides a manageable definition of reality, legitimates certain 
social structures and it justifies the taking of a particular moral 
11 Ong ley, ( 19 9 0 ) , p 18 9 . 
12 David Pearson, A Dream Deferred. The Orioins of Ethnic Conflict 
in New Zealand, (Wellington, 1990), p11, and Judith Macdonald, Racism and 
Rental Accommodation. A Report for the Office of the Race Relations 
Conciliator, Auckland, New Zealand, (Auckland, 1986), p5. 
13 Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea, White Man's Country: Racism in 
British Politics, (London, 1984), p9. 
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position. 14 
While each individual is free to devise his or her own set of attitudes 
and beliefs, the most powerful and effective ideologies are those 
circulated by a dominant group, especially one that has the power to 
impose its ideology on others, whether it is to their advantage or not. 
Particularly when societies are in a state of uncertainty or change, as 
New Zealand was economically in the 1970s, and members of that society 
desire explanations, especially ones which apportion 'blame' to others, 
and remedies for their altered circumstances, a strong ideological lead 
is welcome. 15 Whether an ideology is correct or moral is not relevant 
to the holder, if it explains a person's place in their world in 
accordance with the beliefs of the dominant group, it will stand until 
another powerful group provides or allows a redefinition. 16 
Ideology is not fixed in a given form, but has to be produced and 
reproduced, with the implication that its content and its object is 
subject to change. In the nineteenth century the object of 
'race' /immigration debates was the Asian immigrant, whereas during the 
1970s, the ideology of racism was reproduced by politicians and the media 
in a form which had, instead, as its particular object - Pacific Island 
migrants. 
Ideology is reproduced in many ways, most notably through the 
dissemination of information which reinforces and/or alters subtly the 
prevailing ideology. The creation of stereotypes of ideologically 
acceptable or unacceptable people and attitudes is an effective part of 
this process . 17 Stereotypes are ready-made attitudes which can be 
14 Judith Macdonald, (1986), p5 . 
15 Judith Macdonald, ( 1986) , p5. 
16 ibid. 
17 Judith Macdonald, (1986), p6. 
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applied as needed for easy categorisation in a whole variety of 
circumstances. Like the ideology from which they spring they can change 
but while they are current the have a certain potency. 18 
Stereotypes provide simple and convenient pigeonholes into which 
the individual can sort his or her society without necessarily 
having knowledge of its component parts. 19 
Through the use of appropriate stereotypes particular interpretations of 
social events can be given. Events and facts can be linked to existing 
attitudes and stereotypes to evoke a specific meaning, and in so doing 
reinforce that attitude or stereotype. 20 In New Zealand in the 1970s, 
the fact of 'overstaying' was related to negative stereotypes already 
associated with Pacific Island immigrants in New Zealand, and hence these 
were not only reinforced but given new form in the stereotype of the 
'violent overstaying Islander taking our men's jobs'. Once stereotypes 
such as this one were accepted and believed, many people reacted to the 
stereotype, believing it to explain the main cause of society's ills. 
To have any authority an ideology must be shared to some degree, and this 
occurs when it serves the interests of certain groups. The more powerful 
the group, the more likely it is to be in a position to impose its 
ideology on other groups, but any segment of society may acquiesce to a 
dominant ideology if they find it to be useful. 21 
The role of the state is significant in reproducing and disseminating 
ideology. In establishing its legitimacy to represent a particular 
society, it must take account of all those ideas and values, including 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid. 
20 Ongley , (1990), p184. 
21 Judith Macdonald, ( 1986) , p9 . 
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ideologies, which are considered important in that society. 22 Hence, 
the state reflects and appeals to commonly held values to varying 
degrees, such that if racism is part of New Zealand society, then it 
would be unusual not to find it represented within the state. It is 
important to recognise, though, that the state does not merely reflect 
prevailing perceptions but, by means of selection and distortion, also 
shapes the content of ideologies and thereby influences the intensity of 
their expression. 23 
The media, too, play an important role in the reproduction of ideology. 
In modern society the media have become the key means by which the world 
is represented to us, and in the production of ideas, images, routines 
and practices, the media shape our view of the world in particular 
ways. 24 The media not only publish material about the world, but also 
construct it, often so as to reinforce dominant worldviews and 
ideologies. It is the appearance of being factual that makes the 
'reality' the media represent so ideologically powerful. 25 
This is not to say that ideology is imposed from above upon an 
unsuspecting public. Rather, ideology is reproduced within a dialectical 
relationship between powerful groups such as the state and those 
institutions which reflect dominant or official ideologies such as the 
media, and the general populous. Racism appeals to the working-class 
because it explains their material and political circumstances. Hence, 
racism became an important part of working-class consciousness when it 
22 Alan Blackburn, 'Political Symbols and Propaganda: The New Zealand 
National Party and the 1975 Elections', MA Thesis, (University of 
Waikato, 1977), pp2-3. 
23 Ong ley, ( 19 9 0) , p 18 4 . 
24 Steve Maharey, 'Understanding the Mass Media', in Paul Spoonley 
and Walter Hirsh (eds), Between the Lines. Racism and the New Zealand 
Media, (Auckland, 1990), pp16, 19. 
25 ibid., pp18-19. 
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became the obvious 'common-sense' explanation for, in New Zealand, an 
existing shortage of adequate housing and a deteriorating economy. The 
potential existed for the working-class to conclude that those migrants 
who joined that particular environment would make it more difficult for 
them to escape those conditions, if not to conclude that the migrants, 
especially where they were seen to be of a different 'race' , that is as 
inferior human beings, had actually helped to create them. 26 Where these 
same conclusions were made by politicians or the media this constituted 
a confirmation of those racist beliefs for some, and for others it 
provided an interpretation which suddenly 'makes sense', especially in 
the absence of information and/or a political perspective which pointed 
to different conclusions. 27 Significantly, it also clearly removed the 
responsibility for the situation from the state and the majority of the 
population. 
By repeating certain events or facts over a period of time a social 
'reality' is created. 28 This 'reality', which is integral to the 
reproduction of ideology, can then in turn be used to interpret 
subsequent events. In New Zealand, during the 1970s, the two major 
political parties arrived at a political consensus of sorts in their 
handling of the same issue. By each tightening controls on Pacific 
immigrants, both political parties were by implication accepting that 
Pacific Island immigration to New Zealand was a problem, more 
particularly, a 'racial problem'. A 'race'/immigration 'reality' was 
thus produced, and it was to be instrumental in shaping the public and 
political perceptions of subsequent events involving Pacific Island 
immigrants in the 1980s. 
'Race' Ideology 
26 Miles and Phizacklea, (1984), p51. 
27 ibid. 
28 ibid. 1 p6 • 
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The ideology of racism stems from the now disputed imperial concept of 
'race', an idea which assumes that phenotype or group physical 
characteristics are an appropriate means of classifying people into 
social groupings, and that differences in phenotype are synonymous with 
variations in intellect and abilities. 29 
Racism exists where certain groups' characteristics are ascribed negative 
values, and where one group views its cultural values, lifestyle and 
socio-economic self-interest as superior to or having priority over those 
other groups . 30 
The concept of 'race' itself, however, is an arbitrary social 
classification. It describes an idea and not a biological reality. 
Races exist only in so far as people think and believe they exist. 3 1 
Only certain physical characteristics are thought to indicate a different 
'race'. Within any group there are differences of hair colour, height, 
weight, colour of eyes, length of arms and so on. When a person is 
identified as being of a different 'race' it involves a process of 
selective perception - 'races' do not naturally exist, they are socially 
created by human beings. 32 
Stereotyping or categorisation on the grounds of race is based on 
physical characteristics, but can also be on the grounds of ethnic 
identity and therefore based on cultural characteristics. 
Discrimination by either categorisation varies only in form; to say 
that another ethnic group has a different way of life (by 
implication, they can't cope with a European lifestyle) sounds more 
rational than saying blacks have smaller brains but either approach 
29 Spoonley, (1988), p2, and Michael Banton, The Idea of Race, 
(London, 19 7 7 ) . 
30 Judith Macdonald, (1986), p8. 
31 Miles and Phizacklea, (1984), pl3. 
32 ibid. 
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can equally be used to justify discrimination. 33 
Moreover, according to the 'race' ideology all cultural characteristics 
are determined and can therefore be explained by 'race type' , hence 
arguments about fixed cultural or ethnic difference can be fundamentally 
racist. 34 
While the idea of 'race' cannot be defined with any accuracy, and has 
indeed no scientific justification, it continues to be commonly used. 35 
It continues to be employed to structure social and political 
relationships. 36 Hence, what are defined as 'race relations' are not 
naturally occurring relations but certain sets of relations which are 
socially defined and reproduced in a particular ideological form. 3 7 
When the ideologies of 'race' and 'race relations' are generated and 
reproduced, this process can be called racialisation. 38 The analytical 
task here is to identify and explain why certain sorts of situations and 
relations at particular times in the past were socially structured as 
'race relations' . 39 While the primary focus of this study is the 
33 ibid. 
34 Banton, (1977), p47. 
35 Paul Spoonley, 'Legitimising Racism: The Use of 'Race'', Sites, 
Vol. 9, ( 1984b) , pp63 -64. 
36 Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea, 'Some introductory observations 
on race and politics in Britain' , in Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea 
(eds), Racism and Political Action in Britain, (London, 1979), p2. 
37 Robert Miles and Paul Spoonley, 'The Political Economy of Labour 
Migration: An Alternative to the Sociology of 'Race' and 'Ethnic 
Relations' in New Zealand' , Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Sociology, Vol.21, No.1, (1985), p21. 
38 See generally Robert Miles, Racism and Migrant Labour, (London 
1982) . 
39 Miles, (1982), p43. 
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racialisation of Pacific Islanders in the 1970s, it is hoped that by 
examining the process of racialisation some of the patterns of that 
historical process will also be illuminated. 
Any explanation of the position of Pacific Islanders in social relations 
in recent New Zealand history must, however, be historically and 
materially grounded. That is, it requires an examination of the economic 
structure of New Zealand society as well as an examination of the way in 
which political and ideological relations have been constructed and 
reproduced. This is not to say that racism is economically determined -
it has conditions of existence which are political and ideological as 
well as economic - but only to acknowledge that it does not occur in a 
vacuum nor exist independently of its material context. 40 Hence, this 
study will examine the ideological reproduction of racism in New Zealand 
within the context of the large-scale migrations of Pacific Islanders to 
New Zealand in the latter part of the twentieth century. 4 1 
THESIS OUTLINE 
The remainder of this thesis attempts to analyse the causes, patterns and 
consequences of the racialisation of Pacific Island migrants in the 
1970s. Chapter Two examines the ideological context within which Pacific 
Island labour migration has occurred, focusing primarily on the 
reproduction of racism in New Zealand leading up to the 'overstayer' 
campaigns of the 1970s. This chapter also discusses the development of 
the 'race' /immigration ideology, examining the parallels between the 
racial categorisation of Pacific Island labour migrants in the twentieth 
century and the categorisation of other immigrants, particularly Asians, 
nearly a century before . Chapter Three discusses the political framework 
of labour migration to New Zealand and the role of the state in 
determining a particular pattern of immigration, looking specifically at 
40 Ongley, (1990), pl72. 
41 See generally Miles, and Ongley. 
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New Zealand's immigration policies and legislation, and at the 
circumstances that shaped Pacific Island and other labour migrations to 
New Zealand. Chapter Four examines how the state responded, both 
politically and ideologically, to the general economic downturn of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s . Chapter Five analyses in detail the role of 
political organisations in reproducing an ideology of racism by 
scapegoating Pacific Island migrants, focusing especially on the 
propaganda of the 1975 general election. Chapter Six explores the 
political and ideological processes that shaped the 'overstayer' 
campaigns of 1976, while Chapter Seven develops these themes by analysing 
the patterns and consequences of the symbols created during these 
campaigns. It discusses the continued racialisation of Pacific Island 
migrants in the 1980s, specifically examining how the reproduction of 
racism in this period reflected the political and ideological context of 
the 1970s. Chapter Eight further develops these themes and examines the 
general historical pattern of the 'race' /immigration ideology, a nd the 
form it has assumed in the 1990s. 
As with any work of this nature the scope of the study is in some ways 
limited. It is a matter of regret that this work has little to say about 
Pacific Islanders' political consciousness or action . It is not that 
this is considered unimportant or irrelevant, but simply that it is a 
discussion which deserves more detailed treatment than can be given here. 
It is not the intention of this work, however, in emphasising only one 
side of events to suggest that Pacific Islanders were the passive victims 
of forces beyond their control. Rather , within the structural and 
ideological boundaries of the period under examination, Pacific Islanders 
actively sought to shape and control their own lives. A more thorough 
consideration than is possible here would reveal the diversity of Pacific 
Island protest and compromise. 
Another problem that needs to be acknowledged at the outset is the basic 
problem of how groups in this work ought to be identified. Firstly, 
groups do not become Pacific Islanders until they arrive in New Zealand. 
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It is a term that has been imposed by Pakeha and, in strictly logical 
terms, it does not make a lot of sense . New Zealanders , whether Pakeha, 
Maori, Samoan or Tongan, are all Pacific Islanders . 42 Secondly, it is 
a term that blurs the different experiences of the people to whom it 
refers, encompassing as it does people from different islands and 
different regions with different histories and often vastly different 
cultures and different languages. It is generally a label that is 
unacceptable to people of Pacific origin, therefore, wherever possible, 
individuals and groups are referred to by their particular island group's 
identity . However, while acknowledging the problems associated with the 
label ' Pacific Islander ', there are simply those instances where there 
is no authoritative and adequate term to replace it. Moreover, it also 
reflects the mindset within New Zealand during the period studied . 
42 Karl Pulotu-Endemann and Paul Spoonley, 'Being Samoan: Samoan 
Ethnicity in New Zealand', in A.D. Trlin and P. Spoonley (eds), New 
Zealand and International Migration: A Digest and Bibliography , Number 
Two , (Palmerston North, 1992), p82. 
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II CHAPTHR >WO II 
AN OVERVIEW OF RACISM IN NEW ZEALAND 
Racism in New Zealand has been reproduced in various forms. The focus 
here is upon those forms which were to be of significance in the 
reproduction of racism towards Pacific Island migrants in the 1970s. The 
symbols and stereotypes of 'other' which were reaffirmed and 
reconstructed to justify discrimination against Pacific Islanders at that 
time were the ideological legacies of two earlier significant forms of 
racism: that which was expressed towards other immigrant groups in New 
Zealand, and that which was directed toward Maori. a e th ferms remained 
in the form of negative imagery and rhetoric and were reinterpreted to 
target Pacific Islanders during the 'overstayer' campaigns in the 1970s. 
IMMIGRANTS AND RACISM 
Stereotypes and the ideologies from which they come are not simply 
abstract concepts, unrelated to real social conditions, but are in fact 
useful strategies in given situations, both for explaining particular 
individuals' or groups' experiences of the world, and for protecting 
those groups' interests. 1 At various times in the past people adopted 
racism as a defence mechanism against real or apparent threats to their 
conditions. 2 In New Zealand there has been protest against almost every 
group of immigrants to the country. 3 
1 Judith Macdonald, ( 1986), p10. 
2 Stephen 
Immigration in 
(1972) 1 p17. 
Castles and Godula Kosack, 'The Function of 
Western European Capitalism', New Left Review, 
Labour 
No. 73, 
3 Keith Sinclair, A Destinv Apart. New Zealand's Search for National 
Identity, (Wellington, 1986) , p90. 
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Both the New Zealand Chinese and Dalmatian communities in particular were 
made the targets of political and popular hostility in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. 4 Often the cause of prejudice was the fear of 
economic competition - they were vilified for extracting wealth from the 
colony and supposedly threatening the livelihood of New Zealand workers. 5 
A high correlation existed between adverse economic conditions in the 
colony and the prevalence of anti-Chinese sentiments, for instance. 6 In 
the recession of the 1880s the Chinese became a convenient scapegoat, 
anti-Chinese demonstrations became a common occurrence, and the working 
class in particular welcomed a scapegoat on whom they could vent their 
displeasure at the hardships they had endured through economic 
recession . 7 The intensity of this prejudice was mediated primarily by 
contemporary ideas about 'race' . 8 
The apparent physical and cultural differences of these small communities 
were highly visible in the confined locations in which they tended to 
congregate, and as a result they were immediately identified as being 
separate from other 'New Zealanders', as 'alien', as being of a different 
'race' . 9 Of course, this racialisation of the Chinese and Dalmatians 
made them easier targets for scapegoating on economic grounds, but it 
4 See S. Sothi Rachagan, 'Asian Immigration to New Zealand. A Study 
of Attitudes and Legislation', MA Thesis, (University of Otago, 1972), 
and A.D. Trlin, Now Respected Once Despised. Yugoslavs in New Zealand, 
(Palmerston North, 1979) 
5 Rachagan, (1972), pBS, Trlin, (1979), pp69-74, and Paul O'Connor, 
'Asian Immigration to New Zealand 1896 to 1899: The attempts by the New 
Zealand Government to enact legislation to halt Asian immigration and the 
role of the Imperial authorities in curbing and modifying this 
legislation', MA Thesis, (University of Otago , 1972) p70. 
6 O'Connor, (1972) , p6 . 
7 Rachagan, ( 1972) , pp10, 141. 
8 Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, Immiorant Workers and Class 
Structure in Western Europe, (London, 1985), p7. 
9 Pearson, (1990), p96. 
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also provided the justification for such victimisation. In order to lay 
claims of right or privilege to certain resources, other New Zealanders 
had to establish themselves as distinct from those groups they wished to 
exclude. The ideology of 'race' not only provided for a readily 
accessible categorisation of difference, it also provided the 
justification for exclusion in that, according to this particular 
ideology, it was the 'British race' which was held to be superior in all 
respects, and therefore the British who had more and greater rights than 
other 'inferior races' . 10 Indeed the premier, and earlier governor, Sir 
George Gray argued before parliament in 1879: 
To preserve, therefore, the Anglo-Saxon race in its full 
purity ... is not a mere selfish instinct .... It would, therefore, 
hardly be an exaggeration to say that the future of the Islands of 
the Pacific Ocean depends upon the inhabitants of New Zealand being 
true to themselves, and preserving uninjured and unmixed that 
Anglo-Saxon population which now inhabits it, and the pure-bred 
descendants of which ought to inherit these islands for all time. 11 
The racist and xenophobic hostility that the Chinese and Dalmatian groups 
encountered was based not only on New Zealanders' fears about economic 
competition, but also on these groups' apparent strangeness, and the 
threat they were seen to represent to cultural homogeneity. 12 Cultural 
homogeneity was one of the hallmarks of colonial society, and with it 
came a striking degree of intolerance towards cultural minorities and a 
strong sense of Anglo-Saxon superiority over 'alien' and coloured 
peoples. 13 Both the Chinese and the Dalmatians were considered 
unsuitable migrants because they did not fit the British mould. They 
10 See Donald G. Baker, Race, Ethnicity and Power, p23, cited in 
Pearson, (1990), p30. 
11 Sir George Grey, quoted in W. D. Barrie, Immigration to New Zealand 
1854 - 1938, (Canberra, 1991), pl70. 
12 Ongley, (1990), p183. 
13 Jeanine Graham, 'Settler Society', in Geoffrey W. Rice (ed), The 
Oxford History of New Zealand, (Auckland, 1992), p116. 
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were seen as unassimilable . 14 Much of the anti-Chinese feeling of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century was based on their separatism, 
which was as much a result of discrimination as it was a cause of it. 
Little thought was given to the fact that New Zealand's immigration 
policies forced the Chinese into such a position. 15 They showed all the 
signs of refusing to assimilate , of failing to settle with their 
families, of demonstrating their lack of allegiance to the new nation by 
their habit of sending accumulated savings back to China . 16 Likewise, 
the Dalmatians tended not to settle permanently, they maintained too 
strong ties with their homelands, they lived in separate communities and 
had little to do with outsiders, and they gambled , lived frugally and 
spoke little English. 17 
When confronted with such an apparent cultural 'threat' the dominant 
group in New Zealand found recourse to racist ideologies as a means for 
responding to such 'threats' . These groups' differences were thus 
categorised in racial terms, with all the associated judgements of 
inferiority and undesirability. New Zealanders convinced themselves, for 
example, that the Chinese people were debauched and drug-ridden, inclined 
to the worst vices and perversions. 18 
Above all, though, the issue was one of 'racial purity'; the preservation 
of not only the cultural but also the biological British character of 
society. 19 The Chinese were perceived throughout the period as a threat 
14 Pearson, (1990) , p96. 
15 ibid. 
16 Pearson , (1992), p80. 
17 ibid. 
18 P.J. Gibbons, 'The Climate of Opinion' , in Geoffrey w. Rice (ed), 
The Oxford History of New Zealand , (Auckland, 1992) p310. 
19 Gibbons, (1992), p310, and Rachagan, (1972), pp77-80. 
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to white womanhood and the purity of the Anglo-Saxon race. 20 The 
apparent racial threat to New Zealand society was seen not only to come 
from those already in New Zealand, but also from those yet to come - the 
'Yellow Peril': the countless millions believed to be waiting to swarm 
down from Asia to the thinly populated lands of the South Pacific. "The 
yellow race doubled itself once in every forty years," one newspaper 
cried, "whereas it took the white race one hundred years to do likewise. 
The Asiatic nations must expand and where would they go? "21 The 
Dalmatians presented a similar 'race' threat. Numerous letters, articles 
and editorials advanced racial arguments for the exclusion of the 
Dalmatians from New Zealand. 22 
Figure 2.1 The Yellow Peril, Goodall, Truth, 1907. 23 
20 Gibbons, (1992), p310. 
21 New Zealand Herald, 27 Sept 1920, cited in Angela Ballara, Proud 
to be White? A Survey of Pakeha Prejudice in New Zealand, (Auckland, 
1986) , pl06. 
22 ibid., p75. 
23 Reproduced in Ian F. Grant, The Unauthorised Version. A Cartoon 
History of New Zealand, (Auckland, 1980), pl28. 
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Throughout all of this , the concept of 'race' had not only descriptive 
but also explanatory significance, and was presented as the central 
element of a complex ideological package. The identification of 'race ' 
became strongly associated with conflict and various problems. Concern 
centred on 'race relations' and the solution was proposed in the limiting 
of migration. The immigration control solution was articulated in 
conjunction with the idea of 'race' in such a way as to appear as a 
logical and common sense solution to problems . 24 Notions of racial 
purity were mixed with heavy doses of nationalism and Chinese and 
Dalmatian immigrants became the subjects of both legislative restrictions 
on their access to New Zealand, and restrictions on their work and living 
conditions once in New Zealand. 25 Thus, an additional set of meanings -
immigration control - was added to the already dominant stereotypes and 
images of 'race', and in this way, the ' race' /immigration 'prob l em' 
became a new ideological construct . 
MAORI AND RACISM 
In the nineteenth century , settler domination over Maori , both materially 
and culturally was justified and explained by New Zealanders in racial 
terms and the Maori population was generally defined as a backward and 
inferior race . 26 Significantly, New Zealand ' s subsequent colonial 
relations in the Pacific mirrored these same paternalistic, ethnocentric 
and racist attitudes . 27 
This expression of racism towards Maori increased in the twentieth 
24 Robert Miles, 'The Riots of 
Construction of 'Race Relations' as 
Immigrants and Minorities, Vol.3, No.3, 
1958: Notes on the 
a Political Issue 
( 1984b) ' p264. 
Ideological 
in Britain ' , 
25 See Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion of New Zealand's 
past immigration policies and legislation. 
26 Miles , (1984a), p238. See also Angela Ballara, (1986) . 
27 Pearson , (1990), pll6 . See also Angus Ross (ed), New Zealand's 
Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century, (Auckland, 1969) . 
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century with the labour migration of Maori to urban, largely Pakeha-
dominated areas, and it became clear that Pakeha attitudes continued to 
be marked by perceptions of 'racial ' difference and negative stereotypes 
of Maori character. 2 " A few key characteristics constantly recurred in 
studies of attitudes and prejudices toward Maori. They were considered, 
in various combinations and degrees , to be 'lazy' , 'unambitious', 
'lacking in application and perseverance', 'irresponsible', 'unreliable', 
' improvident' , 'violent', 'dirty', and content with sub-standard and 
overcrowded living conditions. 29 Even the apparently positive 
attributes, such as being 'easy-going' and 'happy-go-lucky' were not 
regarded as conducive to success in an individualistic capitalist 
society, and was in many respects a 'polite' way of depicting laziness, 
unreliability and improvidence. 30 
These stereotypes clearly reflected a particular interpretation of the 
material position of Maori, originating in their economic marginalisation 
prior to the Second World War, and reinforced by the inferior economic 
position occupied after subsequent large scale urban migrations. 31 They 
were employed in a narrow range of positions in production relations 
which bore the burden of short-term economic fluctuation and 
uncertainty. 32 They were (and continue to be) prevented by social, 
institutional and economic barriers from moving into the primary 
workforce and were thus stuck in _unskilled jobs with low wages, poor 
working conditions and unstable tenure. The negative connotations of 
such material disadvantage, however, came to be strongly associated with 
Maori, and was, over time , incorporated into the existing negative 
28 Ongley, ( 1990) 1 pl88. 
29 ibid. 1 pl85. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid. 1 pl86. 
32 Katherine Gibson, 
Migration: The Case of 
Geographer, Vol . 39, No.1, 
'Political Economy and International Labour 
Polynesians in New Zealand' , New Zealand 
(1983) 1 p33 • 
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stereotypes. 33 Thus, the characteristics of the Maori came to be seen 
as the cause of this phenomenon, rather than the prevailing socio-
economic conditions which in fact produced it. For instance, 
descriptions of Maori 'uncleanliness' and deliberate 'overcrowding', 
descriptions which were given authority by the 'race' ideology, came to 
provide 'common sense' explanations for living conditions which were 
primarily the result of housing shortage and urban decay. 3 4 
The Hunn report of 1961 illustrates another aspect of racism toward 
Maori, which also echoes those forms reproduced to explain New 
Zealanders' experiences of earlier immigrant groups. 35 In his report on 
the Department of Maori Affairs, J.K. Hunn highlighted 'problems' 
increasingly associated at this time with Maori; unemployment, limited 
educational achievement, the growth of urban 'ghettos', and high crime 
rates. Assimilation into the Pakeha society ('integration') was proposed 
as the solution for meeting these 'Maori problems' . Hunn and his 
departmental co-authors looked at communities of Maori and saw only a 
mass of social and economic problems. They sought to solve these through 
the imposition of conformity. 36 
Significantly, the future of 'race relations' in New Zealand was seen to 
hinge on the 'Maori problem'. Public and political attention was focused 
on the Maori, their character traits, educational deficiencies, low 
occupational status and standard of living, and their high crime rate. 37 
The future of 'race relations' depended on whether the Maoris became 
Pakehas rapidly enough, and the solution lay in the elimination of 
33 Miles, (1982), pp169,17l. 
34 ibid. 1 p186 • 
35 J.K. Hunn, Report of the Maori Affairs with Statistical 
Supplement, AJHR, G .10, ( 1961) . 
36 ibid., pl35. 
37 Richard Thompson, Race Relations in New Zealand: A Review of the 
Literature, (Christchurch, 1963), p51. 
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difference. New Zealand was marked at this time, as before, by an 
excessive concern for uniformity; there seemed to be a deep distrust of 
non-conformity, and an inability to visualise a plural society. 38 
THE RACIALISATION OF PACIFIC ISLANDERS 
Pacific Islanders entering New Zealand in increasing numbers in the late 
1950s and in the 1960s and 1970s encountered similar prejudice. 3 9 Almost 
immediately they were attributed the negative characteristics of the 
Maori. Pakeha projected an image based on their experience with Maori 
onto each new Polynesian group to arrive in New Zealand. 4 0 Migrants came 
to be seen at times as an homogenous group, despite their distinct 
cultural and island origins, and the problems that had been identified 
previously as 'Maori' became to be seen more generally as Polynesian, 
that is, as a 'brown problem' 
The influx of Pacific Island immigrants in New Zealand coincided with the 
gradual decline in living standards which resulted from economic 
recession, and their presence quickly came to be seen as a 'common sense' 
explanation for this downturn. 4 1 Pacific Island immigrants were thus 
racialised, in that they were categorised as different and inferior 
according to ideas about 'race', and they were politicised, in that they 
were deterministically associated with social problems ranging from 
drunkenness and violence to overcrowding. Significantly, these problems 
were increasingly explained with reference to a 'race' ideology. 
JS ibid. 1 p54 • 
39 Ballara, (1986), p153. 
40 T.D. and N.B. Graves, 'As Others See Us: New Zealanders' Images 
of Themselves and Immigrant Groups', in David Thomas (ed), Patterns of 
Social Behaviour: New Zealand and the South Pacific. Psychology Research 
Series No .17, (Hamilton, 1984), p30. 
41 Ongley, ( 1990) , p194. 
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Pacific Island groups were early associated with drink and drunkenness 
when in the 1960s it was suggested that they were especially susceptible 
to the influence of liquor. 42 A research survey of cases involving 
Islanders before the court in one year highlighted the 'problem' when it 
found that, of seventy-two cases, fifty-nine were caused by 
drunkenness . 43 
The correlation between Pacific Islanders and alcohol in the public mind 
also came to include the suggestion of violent crime . In 1967 there was 
considerable publicity of the need for bar wardens among Islanders in 
Auckland. Civic, community and social workers stated that special Island 
wardens were needed to control drunk and brawling Islanders in inner-city 
hotels. One barman in a hotel in Karangahape Road said that Islanders 
were the most troublesome people in his bar. 44 In the early 1970s, the 
media highlighted the comments of a Supreme Court judge who , in 
sentencing a Tongan man for manslaughter, drew attention to the 
connections made between Islanders , drink and violence . He read 
statistics in court revealing that out of nine cases of death for that 
year, in six cases the convicted person had been a Pacific Islander , "as 
opposed to a native-born New Zealander", and in four of those cases 
liquor had been the major contributing factor. Further, of sixteen grave 
assaults, the offender had been seriously affected by liquor in fourteen , 
according to the judge, and seven of them had been Pacific Islanders. "It 
is the duty of the Court," the judge said, "to inform the public of the 
present social scene in so far as it is reflected in the incidence of 
major crime and to raise a voice of protest." Not surprisingly, during 
the early 1970s, it was Pacific Islanders who held the public attention 
42 Ballara , (1986), p154 . 
43 R . L. Challis, 'The Pacific Islanders in Urban Environments', in 
B . M. Brown (ed), New Zealand in the Pacific, (Wellington, 1970), p111. 
44 Evening Post, 'Bar wardens for Islanders' , 22 July (1967). 
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on charges of drunken brawling and assault. 45 
Newspaper headlines sustained the belief that Polynesian immigrants were 
a problem by asserting that they committed a disproportionate level of 
crime . An article in the Sunday News 1966, headlined 'Colour Crisis' and 
subtitled ' Polynesian Crime Plunge Must Be Halted Now', stated that the 
incidence of crime among Maoris and Islanders was 'skyrocketing', 
painting a grim picture of the irresponsibility and lawlessness of the 
Polynesian population. 46 The article made no attempt to consider whether 
this 'skyrocketing' was relative to population increases, to the total 
increase in crime in New Zealand, to an increase in the number of petty 
offenses relative to serious crime, or even to an improvement in police 
efficiency. 4 7 Implicit in this account and others was the perception 
that this could be explained simply in terms of 'race' . Even more 
conservative papers reinforced the negative racial stereotypes of 
criminality with headlines such as 'Today' s Backgrounder CRIME 
They're Polynesians', or 'Gang Crime by 200 Children - A gang of about 
200 Island children had built a formidable list of crime in the central 
Auckland area ... ' . 48 Pacific Islanders were negatively categorised as 
criminal both by being associated with stereotypes of Maori crime and by 
the persistent belief (generally unfounded) that immigrants , as opposed 
to 'New Zealanders', commit more crime . 49 
45 A.D. Trlin, 'Immigrants and Crime: Some Preliminary Observations', 
in Stephen D. Webb and John Collette (eds) , New Zealand Society. 
Contemporary Perspectives, (Sydney, 1973), p398. 
46 Sunday News, 25 September, 1966, cited in L.S.W . Duncan, 'Crime 
by Polynesians in Auckland. An analysis of charges laid against persons 
arrested in 1966', MA Thesis, (Auckland University , 1970) pl. 
47 L. S. W. Duncan, 'Racial Considerations in Polynesian crime' , in 
Graham Vaughan (ed), Racial Issues in New Zealand, (1972), p36. 
48 Auckland Star, June 1970 cited in Duncan , ( 1972) , p36, and New 
Zealand Herald, 'Gang Crime By 200 Children', 18 September , (1969). 
49 Trlin, (1973), p397. 
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The media reinforced negative views about Pacific Islanders generally by 
the way in which they presented information. A media survey in New 
Zealand found that words which described the ethnicity of Pakeha were 
infrequently used when compared with the use of labels such as Maori, 
Pacific Islander or Polynesian. The latter were used three to four times 
than the former in newspapers. This was particularly true for reporting 
of violent and sexual offending, the survey found. Even when allowance 
was made for the disproportionate number of Maori and Pacific Islanders 
involved in such offences, the newspapers still exaggerated their 
involvement by the frequent use of ethnic labels when the perpetrator was 
Polynesian. 50 Similarly, Harry Dansey, a newspaper journalist bef~re 
becoming Race Relations Conciliator, raised the point of the negative 
presentation of minority groups in the 1970s when he observed that "'news 
showing [minority groups] in a poor light is accentuated, but stories 
showing them in a positive or good light are played down or not published 
at all. "' 51 
It is clear that the media's influence in shaping 'race' stereotypes was 
significant. 52 In 1974 the Auckland Task Force, a special law 
enforcement squad, was established in response to public fears about 
Polynesian violence in Auckland's inner-city streets, despite the fact 
that statistics discounted claims that Auckland was a violent city. 5 3 
These fears were based instead upon the repeated statements of 
politicians and newspaper editors who had for some time lent weight to 
50 Spoonley, (199Gb), p33. 
51 H.D.B Dansey, Report of the Race Relations Conciliator for the 
Year Ending 31 March 1977, (Wellington, 1977), pl2, cited in Bernard 
Kernot, 'Race-tagging: The Misuse of Labels and the Press Council', in 
Paul Spoonley and Walter Hirsh (eds), Between the Lines. Racism and the 
New Zealand Media, (Auckland, 1990), p53. 
52 Ellis Cashmore and Barry Troyna, Introduction to Race Relations, 
(London, 1983), p210. 
53 Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination (ACORD), Task 
Force. A Failure in Law Enforcement. A Disaster in Community Relations, 
(Auckland, 1975), pl. 
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the belief that the streets were not only violent, but that this violence 
was primarily due to the actions of one segment of the community. 5 4 
"Islanders [were] at constant risk over crimes of violence" according to 
one prominent Auckland newspaper. 55 
Racially-biased news about crime even influenced stereotypes held by the 
police. Police Inspector James Morgan, in his own study of stereotypes 
held by police in Auckland , found Islanders to account for four and a 
half percent of a cross-section of offenders in 1971 . When he checked 
the impressions of a number of fellow policemen to see what they believed 
the percentage of Islanders involved in crime would be, their replies 
ranged from three to more than seven times the actual total, illustrating 
the potency of the negative characteristics that were being ascribed to 
Pacific Islanders. 56 
This stereotype of the violent and criminal Pacific Island immigrant 
increasingly skewed towards a focus on violent sexual crime, as a 
particular association was made between Islander males and sexua l 
offending. 57 In an article examining Pacific Island crime in 1976 , the 
Auckland Star quoted figures stating that four Islanders were jailed for 
one week in the month of October, 1975 , for offences involving rape, and 
went further to say that "in a number of other rape and assault reports 
i .n recent months the consistent description has been that the suspect is 
Polynesian, probably an Islander. "58 Aided by further comments made by 
public figures and the police, rape became a racial act, and Pacific 
54 ibid . 
55 Auckland Star, 'Bewildered young men who go wrong ' , 22 January 
(1976) . 
56 ibid . 
57 Spoonley, (1988) , p17. 
58 Auckland Star, 'Bewildered young men who go wrong ' , 22 January, 
( 1976) . 
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Islanders were yet again categorised as the cause of social problems. 5 9 
Another 'problem' which was associated with Pacific Island immigrants, 
and which therefore came to be defined as a 'racial problem', was in the 
area of housing. High rents and their exclusion from more desirable 
properties forced migrants to settle in areas of decline, where they were 
welcomed by landlords for creating demand where demand for housing had 
been falling. 60 Although the preconditions for and the actuality of 
urban decline in these areas were in evidence before Pacific Island 
migrants settled them, and their forced concentration in these areas only 
highlighted existing social deprivation, racism defined them as its 
cause. 6 1 As it had been with Maori, the cause of depressed housing was 
explained by the presence of Pacific Islanders, and not by the function 
of age and state of decay in inner-city housing areas. In Auckland and 
Wellington, these areas became identified as 'problem' areas - sites of 
poor housing, overcrowding, depressed physical environments, and the 
implied correlates of poverty, unemployment, and more specifically, 
street crime, vandalism and violence. 62 As the state built new suburbs, 
Otara in Auckland and Porirua in Wellington, these too became seen as 
symptomatic of the urban malaise associated with Pacific migrants. 63 One 
correspondent, writing on the subject of Samoan immigration in 1973, 
complained that "Auckland .. . is· beginning to look like a huge ghetto. " 6 4 
As a result there arose a tendency to associate colour with low social 
59 Spoonley, (1988), p17. 
60 Spoonley, ( 1988) , p15, and Judith Macdonald, ( 1986) , p88. 
61 J .R. McCreary, Housing and Welfare Needs of Islanders in Auckland. 
A Report to the Minister o f Island Territories, (Wellington, 1965), p26, 
Judith Macdonald, (1986), p88, and Annie Phizacklea and Robert Miles, 
Labour and Racism, (London, 1980), pp42-57. 
62 Spoonley, (1988), p15, and Phizacklea and Miles, (1980), p42. 
63 Spoonley, (1988), p15 . 
6 4 Truth, 1 May 1973, cited in Ballara, (1986), p154. 
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status and undesirable social traits , and there was a general concern 
among sectors of the Pakeha community that the arrival of Islanders in 
a street or neighbourhood would cause property values to depreciate, as 
TtJell as bring about more general moral and social decay. 6 5 One 1976 
study of the attitudes of landlords in Auckland highlighted the 
prevalence of negative stereotypes about Pacific Islanders, with seventy-
seven percent of respondents claiming that Islanders, as either renters 
or buyers of houses, lowered the value of neighbouring properties. 66 
Many of the original residents in the central parts of Auckland 
subsequently thought in terms of selling their property and moving away, 
their attitudes summed up in the words of one Auckland pensioner : "of 
course we don ' t believe in any discrimination, we just don't want too 
many Islanders in our street". 67 
This sort of racism was partly a response to perceived economic and even 
physical threats. Pacific Islanders ' physical presence in large numbers 
"introduced a brown wedge into the cosy, homogenous , white society in 
which many European New Zealanders wished to believe". 68 It was also a 
response to a perceived cultural threat, as can be seen in the debate 
about overcrowding. Pacific Island migrants presented (like the 
urbanised Maori before them) a visibly different family structure, the 
extended family , which challenged the New Zealand ideal of the nuclear 
family. Houses with large families were not the accepted norm, and 
Islanders were criticised and stereotyped for overcrowding their homes. 
Racist stereotypes provided a convenient means of reinforcing the 
prevailing ideologies about family size and living arrangements, while 
at the same time absolving individuals from having to accept the 
65 P.H. Curson, 'The Cook Islanders', in K. W. Thompson and A.D. Trlin 
(eds) , Immigrants in New Zealand, (Palmerston North, 1970) , p188 . 
66 Auckland Star , 'Putting a roof over their heads is the first 
priority', 22 August (1979) . 
6 7 Curson, (1970), p188 . 
6 8 Ballara, (1986), p154. 
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realities of cultural difference. 69 
In the late 1950s media attention was focused upon the 'prob l em ' of 
Islander health and housing in Auckland, with one newspaper describing 
"gross overcrowding" amongst Islanders in the city. ~ Responding to this 
in 1957, the Auckland City Council called for a large scale investigation 
of the premises occupied by Pacific Islanders. 7 1 The prejudice of those 
involved was revealed by the Council chairman's own words; "it can be 
appreciated that overcrowded houses of this type bring a certain amount 
of stigma to a whole area .... Council views that rather seriously." 72 
The outcome of the sanitary inspectors' investigation in 1957 was 
reported widely in local newspapers, and it was revealed that, contrary 
to expectations : 
overcrowding was no more common among [Islanders) than it is in 
other homes in the same districts . . . Overcrowding within the meaning 
of the present city by-laws occurred in only 4 of the 161 
dwellings. 73 
However, after several meetings, the council recommended that the 
criteria for overcrowding be re-examined by all local authorities, 
implying that if Pacific Islanders would not comply or conform to Pakeha 
attitudes of what constituted a desirable number to have living in the 
same house, then the local bodies' standards must be raised . 74 Pacific 
Islanders offended more against Pakeha cultural standards than they did 
69 Judith Macdonald, (1986), p6 . 
70 New Zealand Herald, 'Lured to City by Hope of Accommodation', 11 
April ( 1956) . 
71 A . B . Hooper, 'Social Relations Among Cook Islanders in Auckland ', 
MA Thesis, (University of Auckland, 1958), p38 . 
72 ibid. 
73 Auckland Star, 24 July 1957, cited in Hooper , ( 1958) , p41. 
74 Hooper, (1958), p41. 
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against the legal minimum health standards set by authorities. 7 5 
Despite the results of the sanitary inspectors survey, the stereotype 
that Pacific islanders overcrowded their houses persisted. Subsequent 
to the survey, one Auckland sanitary department official ventured the 
opinion that, "All these people are the same - once one of them gets into 
a place the whole :Q£ follows them. "76 
In another study into Pacific Island housing in the 1960s, in response 
to continued criticisms about sub-standard housing and overcrowding, it 
was found that there was overcrowding in only 4.59 percent of the 305 
houses surveyed. 77 Yet, in a series of articles purporting to inform its 
readers about Pacific Islanders in 1976, the Auckland Star, not only 
reinforced the stereotypes about Islander overcrowding but went on to 
associate that stereotype, yet again, with criminality: 
It's overcrowded, the evidence is that it's unhealthy, and it 
produces social problems. One is child bashing: If you're a 
Pacific Islander's child you stand nine times more chance of 
becoming a child abuse statistic than a European child, according 
to "Child Abuse in New Zealand", a definitive study. 7 8 
Although the article did admit that child bashing was not just an 
'Island' problem, it did so on the grounds that Maori bash their 
children, too; "That familiar Maoritanga word aroha doesn't save Maori 
children either. They run six times the risk of abuse of European 
children. " 79 The implication made was that only Polynesians abused their 
children. 
75 ibid. 
76 Quoted in Hooper, (1958), p43. 
77 McCreary, (1965), p29. 
78 Auckland Star, 'The gold isn't paving the streets -but they know 
it's here in Auckland', and 'Packed in to pay the rent', 21 January 
( 1976) . 
79 Auckland Star, 'Packed in to pay the rent', 21 January (1976). 
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More importantly, along with being held responsible for various social 
problems in New Zealand, Pacific Island migrants, like the Chinese and 
Dalmatians before them, were also labelled as 'not-New Zealanders' . 
Significantly, although in some instances Pacific Islanders had been 
categorised along with Maori in the group , 'brown Polynesian', in this 
instance they were distinctly set apart from them . Whereas, Maori had 
been incorporated into the Pakeha idea of the nation, that same sense of 
nationalism categorised Pacific Islanders as 'outsiders' . 8 0 Regardless 
of the fact that many were New Zealanders, that is, citizens (many New 
Zealand-born) or permanent residents, they were seen as aliens, and were 
often typified as a threat to the New Zealand way of life . They had been 
portrayed as being responsible for violence and lowering the residential 
standards of housing . They were also seen as lowering the standard of 
employment in some areas. The recruitment of Fijian migrants for the 
purpose of scrub-cutting in the Gisborne area , for instance, after 
attempts to recruit local unemployed failed, was opposed at the time by 
the local Trades Council on the grounds that: 
The use of this type of labour could put a heavy damper on efforts 
to improve the image of farm employment and would be a menace to 
the health , ethnic and employment standards of the whole 
district. 81 
Moreover , they were seen to be disadvantaging New Zealanders ' access to 
social services. The Auckland Star reported that : 
Bobby has school problems and his mother puts it dpwn to those 
"Island children in the class . . . . Every week there's another one, 
some can hardly speak English at all , and the whole class is held 
back because they can't cope. " 82 
80 Sinclair, (1986), p204. 
81 Auckland Star, 'Opposition to Islanders on farms', 22 February 
1969, cited in A.D. Trlin, 'Social Distance and Assimilation Orientation: 
A Survey of Attitudes towards Immigrants in New Zealand', Pacific 
Viewpoint, Vol.12, No.2, (1971) , p144 . 
82 Auckland Star , ' Like it or not, it's an issue for us all', 20 
January (1976). 
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The same paper also wrote that poor health and disease amongst Islanders 
put undue pressure on New Zealand's health and social services 83 : 
The most recent survey of Auckland's A and E service showed that 
11.2 % of patients seeking attention were non-Maori Polynesians. 
Comments the associate professor of general practice at the School 
of Medicine, Prof. J.G. Ackards: "This represents considerably more 
than their population in the Auckland urban area." And, he adds, 
this figure plays a significant part in the difficulties that this 
overworked department experiences . 84 
This general feeling of displacement by Islanders was summed up by the 
letter of one correspondent to an Auckland newspaper: 
Auckland alone is overrun by Islanders. Try walking along 
Karangahape Road any busy day or night; it is we New Zealanders who 
have to step off the footpath into the gutter out of their way. 85 
Such prejudice against immigrants was, and continues to be, a powerful 
instrument in maintaining dominant groups' interests. Immigrants took 
on the function of scapegoats for the deficiencies of a capitalist 
society, which was unable to provide adequate living conditions and to 
guarantee security to the whole of its working population. 86 Part of 
New Zealand's ideology has been that the responsible citizen should hold 
a job and provide a house for his family. If he was unable to do this, 
racist ideologies and stereotypes allowed him to blame the scapegoat 
group for his predicament rather than the government or any other 
powerful interest group . 87 The visibility of Pacific Islanders enabled 
people to identify and categorise them as a separate 'racial' group . 
Attention was subsequently focused upon them in the public mind through 
83 Auckland Star, 'Squalid life in a sick society', 21 January 
( 1976) . 
84 Auckland Star, 'Packed in to pay the rent', 21 January (1976) 
85 Truth, 9 November 1976, cited in Ballara, ( 1986) , p154. 
86 Castles and Kosack, (1985), p459. 
87 Judith Macdonald, (1986), p10. 
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stereotyping, and once those stereotypes were accepted and believed, 
Pacific Islanders came to be seen as the main cause of society's ills. 
The identification of the presence of Pacific Island immigrants as the 
origin of 'race relations problems' meant that 'they' were made the 
object of political attention. Debates were concentrated on what needed 
doing for or to 'them' . Thus, the scapegoating of Pacific Island 
immigrants for New Zealand's social and economic problems, was invariably 
accompanied by threats to send them home or prevent more coming. 88 The 
Auckland Star, in 1976, argued that New Zealand had admitted too many 
Islanders in the past ten years, and that it was time to restrict their 
entry. Likening Islanders to the 'problem' migrants of America, they 
warned of the threat of Polynesian immigration to New Zealand society: 
New York's Puerto Rican problem began much the same way - with 
small-scale migration of people who, like the Cook, Niue and 
Tokelau group, had unchallenged right of entry. They went to the 
US with the same problems of language and employment. They settled 
in Harlem which rapidly spread its boundaries to become Spanish 
Harlem with more social problems than ever before. Now, nearly one 
in seven of the city's 8 million population is Puerto Rican. 
Violence, prejudice and squalor are part of their way of life. 8 9 
Implicit in the paper's stance was the perception that Pacific Islanders 
were the cause of New Zealand's problems. Racial tension, violent crime, 
housing shortages and all manner of social problems were all seen to be 
caused by the immigration of Pacific Islanders. The solution was 
convenient and simple - send them home. Thus the reproduction of racist 
ideologies in the case of Pacific Island migrants, as for earlier 
migrants, became inextricably entwined with debates about immigration. 
The ideological consequence of this 'race' /immigration dualism was that 
the two notions became interchangeable. When immigrants became the 
centre of debate, reference in fact was to 'coloured people', and not to 
88 Ballara, (1986), pl53. 
89 Auckland Star, 'It's time- New Zealand will have to be firm', 27 
January (1976). 
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all persons entering New Zealand , and in the 1970s, that reference became 
directed more particularly to Pacific Islanders . 
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II CHAPTER TimEB II 
IMMIGRATION 
NEW ZEALAND POLICY AND PACIFIC ISLAND 
LABOUR MIGRATION 
The underlying objective of New Zealand immigration policy until very 
recently has been to maintain a homogenous society in terms of ethnic 
composition. 1 Government rationale has been to encourage immigration of 
only those people who could be absorbed into New Zealand society without 
strain, by implementing selective policies which fostered immigration 
from Great Britain, and which placed severe controls on non-British 
migrants. 2 Along with this desire to preserve British ' racial' and 
cultural superiority in New Zealand, a desire to increase or at least 
maintain New Zealand living standards has also contributed to the 
formation of selective immigration policies. 3 Legislation to control 
immigration has been introduced by the government in response to public 
pressure when either the volume or ethnic composition of migrant flows 
I 
to New Zealand have been perceived to threat ~n these living standards . 
Similarly, selective policy has also been intr~duced when either lack of 
manpower or particular occupational skills has retarded the desired 
growth of living standards. 4 
1 See Chapter Eight for an illustration of the extent to which this 
has changed. New Zealand has, since the late 1980s, placed more of an 
emphasis upon economic considerations such that Asian immigrants have 
much less restricted entry to New Zealand than that of former years. 
Wayne Hegarty , 
Experience', MA Thesis , 
'New Zealand Immigration Policy: The 
(University of Canterbury, 1977), p5. 
Tongan 
3 Lai Chee Hun , 'New Zealand's Immigration Policy Towards Asians 
1960-1974: A Policy of Rational Exclusion? ', MA Thesis, (University of 
Canterbury, 1974), pl. 
4 Hegarty , (1977), p7. 
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Selectivity in New Zealand' immigration policy has been generally 
exercised in two ways; firstly, by discouraging large-scale non-British 
migration by legislation, as well as through administration (especially 
since 1920) of a flexible immigration policy, and secondly, by 
encouraging British migrants through specific legislation and state-
assisted immigration schemes. 5 
THE DESIRE FOR A 'WHITE NEW ZEALAND' 
Although restrictive legislation was not enacted until the 1880s, New 
Zealand had not been, before then, advertised as a destination for all-
comers . Early assisted immigration schemes, operated as effective forms 
of selection and exclusion, and in the main, reinforced existing ethnic 
and cultural patterns in New Zealand. Tnt overwhelming majority of 
migrants to the country were from Englan~.' Scotland and Ireland. 6 
Subsequent immigration policy and legislation was designed to maintain 
this initial pattern of ethnic homogeneity. 7 \ 
' \ 
Initially, immigration from China was the ~ocus of restrictive 
legislation in New Zealand and between 1881 and 192~, at the will of both 
the New Zealand government and public, successive racist statutes 
established what was, "if not literally a 'white New Zealand policy', at 
..--·· 
least one which wa~'" carefully designed effectively to prevent the 
settlement of Asians." " 
In 1881 the New Zealand government passed the restrictive Chinese 
5 ibid. 
Jeanine Graham, in 
'Patterns of Settlement', 
(Wellington, 1976), p55. 
Rice, (1992), 
in Ian Wards 
pl14, 
(ed), 
and Raewyn Dalziel, 
New Zealand Atlas, 
7 W.T. Roy, 'Immigration Policy and Legislation', in Thompson and 
Trlin, (1970), p15. 
" P.S. O'Connor, 'Keeping New Zealand White, 1908-1920', New Zealand 
Journal of History, Vol.2, No.1, (1968), p41. 
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Immigrants Act which required every (and only) immigrant Chinese to pay 
a ten pound poll tax upon entry to New Zealand and placed a quota of one 
Chinese per ten tons of cargo on ships carrying any Chinese immigrants. 9 
These restrictions were increased in subsequent legislation so that by 
1896 the poll tax had been raised to one hundred pounds, and the quota 
had been further restricted to one Chinese person for every two hundred 
tons of cargo. 10 An act of 1907 imposed on Chinese the additional test 
of reading to the satisfaction of customs officials a hundred words of 
English. Similarly, a 1908 amendment made it mandatory for all Chinese 
leaving New Zealand to provide a thumbprint, to theoretically prevent one 
Chinese immigrant leaving and another assuming his name to enter New 
Zealand and avoid the poll tax. 11 
Figure 3.1 Still They Come, J.Blomfield, Free Lance, 1905. 12 
9 Rachagan, (1972), pp139 - 133. 
1 0 P.S. O'Connor, (1968), p42. Note that although these acts were 
replaced by the subsequent 1920 legislation, the poll tax remained in 
force, and while it was not levied after September 1934, it was not 
abolished until 1944. 
11 Lai Chee Hun, (1974), p5, and P.S. O'Connor, (1968), p45 . 
12 Reproduced in Grant, (1980), p74. 
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Although the Chinese were the primary target of selective immigration 
policy during this period, legislation was passed to exclude other non-
British groups also. Restrictive measures were passed in successive 
Kauri Gum Industry Acts from 1898 to 1910, for instance, to stem the flow 
of temporary Dalmatian immigrants . 13 Controls of increasing severity, 
directed at the exclusion o f all 'Asiatics', were introduced but these 
failed to receive Royal Assent, mainly because the term included Indians, 
and as they were British subjects their exclusion on the grounds of 
'race' ran counter to the doctrine of free movement of all British 
subjects within the Empire. 14 A compromise, along the lines of 
legislation passed by Natal was suggested by Joseph Chamberlain at the 
Imperial Conference in 1897 and was incorporated in the Act of 1899. 15 
This became the principle means of excluding 'alien' groups before 1920 
and declared as prohibited immigrants those who, not being of British or 
Irish parentage, could no t write out in any European language an 
application form as set out in an attached schedule. 16 
Renewed protest at increasing 'alien' immigration after World War One, 
however, led to the introduction of further legislation in the form of 
the 1920 Immigration Restriction Amendment Act which replaced the Act of 
1899 . 17 This legislation gave the government a more flexible instrument 
for immigration control than any that had been previously fashioned in 
New Zealand, and, perhaps more importantly, it established an important 
principle which was to remain in effect until the early 1970s. 18 This 
13 See A.D. Trlin, ( 1979) . 
14 W.T. Roy, 'Immigration Policy and Foreign Relations', in Stephen 
Levine (ed), New Zealand Politics. A Reader, (Melbourne, 1975), p448. 
15 ibid . 
16 P.S . O'Connor, (1968), p44. 
17 Rachagan , (1972), pp260-272. 
18 A.D . Trlin, 'New Zealand ' s Admission of Asians and Pacific 
Islanders', in James T . Fawcett and Benjamin V. Carino (eds), Pacific 
Bridges. The New Immigratio n from Asia and the Pacific Islands, (New 
a 
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principle was to allow free entry to all persons of exclusively British 
(including Irish) birth and descent, to require all persons of non-
British origin to obtain entry permits by application, and to invest the 
minister of customs (later the minister of labour and immigration) with 
sole discretionary power to approve or disallow such applications and 
hence entry to New Zealand. 19 
Several factors underlay the demand for restrictive legislation on ethnic 
criteria over this period. Working-class fears of cheap labour 
depressing an already uncertain income level was a dominant factor, and 
was compounded by middle-class fears of similar competition in the sphere 
of retail business. 20 Moreover, politicians, some of whom, such as W.P. 
Reeves and R.J. Seddon, were outspoken racists, were not above making 
political capital of these fears, even to the point of reinforcing public 
fears if they showed inconvenient signs of waning. 21 Above all else, 
though, these attitudes were a reflection of British convictions of 
racial superiority and the hostile stereotype of all persons not of 
British origin. n 
The 1920 Act marked the development in New Zealand of a virtual unanimity 
about the virtues of staying 'white'. 23 Racial prejudice was the 
determinant factor shaping early immigration legislation, and indeed, the 
1920 Act fixed the 'white New Zealand' ideology in policy such that it 
strictly regulated not just Asian but all 'alien' immigration to New 
York, 1987), pp201 - 202. 
19 ibid. 
20 Roy, (1970), p16. 
21 Roy, (1970), p16, and P.S. O'Connor, (1968), p42. 
22 W.T. Roy, 'On Remaining British', Landfall, Vol.21, No.4, (1967), 
p374, and Roy, (1970), p16. 
23 P.S. O'Connor, (1968), p64. 
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Zealand until long after 1945. 24 
Figure 3.2 The Alien Wave, Ellis, Free Lance, 1920. 25 
The aim of maintaining a basically homogenous population, both culturally 
and racially , remained basic to immigration policy after the Second World 
War. 26 In place of ethnic background as criteria, migrants' abi 
lity to assimilate and integrate with the host population became the 
major criterion on which entry was based. While the racial biases of 
this approach were not as explicit as in previous policies, the 
underlying racial prejudices and assumptions were essentially the same. 
For, although the entry of non-British migrants increased in the post-war 
era, the assimilation and integration principle effectively limited their 
24 Pearson, (1990), p155. 
25 Reproduced in Grant, (1980) , p128 . 
26 Hegarty, (1977), p15. 
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entry so as not to alter New Zealand ' s predominantly Anglo-Saxon and 
Maori population. 27 
It is c lear that underlying the rhetoric about the "great quest i on of 
•' 
assimilation and integration" were assumptions based on the idea of 
'race' . 28 Those immigrants who were categorised as 'racially' different 
were assumed to have less ability to assimilate . 
they simply would not make good New Zealanders: 
It was believed that 
I 
I 
People who share a common heritage of language and tradition 
integrate very quickly . The greater and more obvious the 
differences between the immigrant and the average New Zealander, 
the longer and more difficult the period of assimilation, and the 
greater the tendency of immigrants to hive off into little colonies 
which become self-sufficient and resistant to the process of 
assimilation. 29 
Asians, along with Southern and Eastern Europeans, and some Pacific 
Island immigrant groups, were among those cited as presenting "more 
difficult problems of assimilation". 30 Accordingly, policy provisions 
were intended to limit the immigration of such groups to numbers that 
experience suggested could be absorbed without detriment to the "racial 
balance" of the country and its harmonious intergroup relationships. 3 1 
The general policy of successive governments was to selectively admit to 
New Zealand only those people who could make a worthwhile economic or 
cultural contribution to the community, who would be readily assimilated, 
27 ibid . 
28 NZPD, Vol.339, (1964), p2085, and T . Shand , 'New Zealand and 
Immigration', in Dominion, 1 July (1968) . 
29 T. Shand in Dominion, 1 July (1968). 
30 NZPD, Vol.340 , (1 964), p2715, and T . Shand in Dominion, 1 July 
(1968) . 
31 Trlin, ( 1987) , p206 . See also Department of Labour, A Look at New 
Zealand ' s Immigration Policy, (Wellington, 1970), pp4 - 6, and J.R. 
Marshall , 1971 speech reprinted in 'Opening Speech', New Zealand Journal 
of Public Administration , Vol.34 , No . 1, (19 71), plO . 
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and, most significantly, who would be accepted and welcomed by the 
community in general. 32 
Consequently, while immigration legislation was exercised to exclude 
undesirable immigrants, state-controlled immigration schemes were 
initiated to encourage those immigrants who were acceptable, that is, 
British and Irish migrants . If Australians, Canadians and white South 
Africans were counted as British, then in 1961 only two percent of all 
immigrants born outside New Zealand were 'aliens' , and of that two 
percent more than a third were Dutch immigrants who had entered New 
Zealand under a special arrangement between the New Zealand and 
Netherlands governments. 33 By setting preferences for immigrants with 
specific occupational skills and by funding assisted passage from 
selected countries, the state was able to determine the type of immigrant 
who could enter New Zealand . 
Before 1950 the assisted passage scheme was confined solely to migrants 
from Great Britain . After 1950, as the demand for migrants in New 
Zealand exceeded the number wanting to emigrate from the United Kingdom, 
the selection field was widened to include selected European countries . 34 
However, although small numbers of Danish , Austrian , Swiss and German 
nationals , and a more significant proportion of Dutch migrants entered 
during the 1950s as assisted immigrants, New Zealand's schemes continued 
to favour British (that included white Commonwealth immigrants) entry to 
the point of virtual exclusion of all others. 
A second immigration scheme, the subsidy scheme, introduced in the early 
1960s, was also initially restricted to British migrants, and even when 
it was widened to include other 'white' countries in the late 1960s the 
vast majority of subsidised migrants continued to come from the United 
32 Department of Labour, (1970) , pl. 
33 Ballara, (1986), p156. 
34 Dalziel, (1976), p55. 
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Kingdom. Significantly, at least 89 ~ of the immigrants entering New 
Zealand under the subsidy scheme during the 1969-1976 period were 
British. 35 Indeed, the majority of incoming migrants to New Zealand in 
the whole of the post-war period were British, and the bulk of the 
remainder came from a small group of other traditional source 'white' 
countries. 36 
THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR 
In the face of labour shortages after 1945 it was asserted that "if the 
country was to reach its full development potential more people and 
skills were required" . 37 Assisted immigration schemes had provided not 
only the means to regulate the ethnic composition of the population but 
also came to provide the means to acquire the labour necessitated by 
economic expansion. 
The scope of the schemes was widened or narrowed according to fluctuating 
economic conditions. In the early 1960s, for instance, the annual target 
of assisted migrants was set at 4,000 and eligibility criteria were eased 
to facilitate that target. However, the economic downturn of 1967-1968 
prompted the government t o reduc e this number t o an annual target of only 
1, 500 and tougher eligibility qualifications were imposed. 39 In 1970, 
as a result of the combined effects of economic upturn and contemporary 
net migration losses, New Zealand faced a dramatic change in its 
employment situation; 5,595 vacancies and 1,818 unemployed at the end of 
January 1970, compared with 3,533 vacancies and 4,641 unemployed a year 
35 From annual reports, Department of Labour, AJHR, (1969) - (1976). 
36 Pearson, (1990), p114. 
37 Department o f Labour, Labour and Emolovment Gazette, Vol.6, No.3, 
(1956 ) , p43, cited in Hegarty, (1977), p2 9 . 
39 Annual Reports, Department of Labour, AJHR, Vol.2, H.11, (1965), 
p7; Vol. 2, H .11, ( 1966) , p7; Vol. 2, H .11, ( 1968) , p8; and Vol. 3, H .11, 
(1969)' p11. 
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earlier. 39 Important changes were subsequently made in the conditions 
for recruiting migrants under the immigration schemes. 40 Limitations on 
the subsidy scheme, including the maximum number of immigrants allowed 
to New Zealand annually, were removed and the scheme was extended to the 
United States, Belgium, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands with 
proposals to extend it even further so as to meet the increased labour 
demand. 41 After 1969 the subsidy scheme became the major mechanism of 
assisted immigration to New Zealand, and between 1969 and 1976 more than 
30,000 people entered new Zealand under this scheme. 42 
More importantly, whereas previous immigration policy had continually 
emphasised preference for British migrants, the demand for labour in the 
expanding economy in the late 1960s required the state to look to other 
less traditional sources for workers. Increasingly, as a result, the 
gaps in the semi-skilled and unskilled part of the labour market were met 
not only by British migrants, but also by migrant workers from the 
Pacific Islands. 
PACIFIC ISLAND LABOUR MIGRATION TO NEW ZEALAND 
Prior to the Second World War there were few Pacific Islanders in New 
Zealand only 1,000 at the time of the 1936 census. 43 Poor 
communications and regional transportation, and limited external labour 
demand, among other things, had inhibited migration. However, World War 
Two proved to be a watershed in the history of migration for Pacific 
Islanders, as much as it had been for rural Maori, stimulating 
39 Annual Report, Department of Labour, AJHR, Vol. 3, H.11, (1970), 
p12. 
40 ibid. 
41 Annual Reports, Department of Labour, AJHR, Vol.3, H.11, (1970), 
p12, and Vol.3, H.ll, (1971), p14. 
42 Annual Reports, Department of Labour, AJHR, (1970) - (1976). 
43 Pearson, (1990), p116. 
I 
Immigration p45 
significant urban migration within island groups and international 
migrations between them, including New Zealand . 44 
Like New Zealand Maori, Pacific Islanders formed a convenient and cheap 
labour reserve for industrial expansion in post-war New Zealand, and the 
demand for unskilled labour to work in the manufacturing industries in 
Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand's two main cities) was increasingly 
met at this time by Island Polynesian sources. 45 
In 1945 \ there were less than 2,000 Pacific Island Polynesians in New 
\ 
Zealand. By 1956 there were over 8, 000; ten years later there were 
26,000, with the great majority in urban residence, and most of those in 
jobs employed in the manufacturing industries. 46 Overall these 
Pacific Island Polynesians accounted for almost 2 . 0 percent of the total 
population compared with 0.12 percent in 1945 . 47 
While the incorporation of Pacific Island labour into the New Zealand 
economy , like that of Maori and European migrant labour, arose out of 
economic expansion, creating excess labour demand in New Zealand's urban 
secondary industries, labour demand alone cannot fully explain this 
phenomenon. •• The rapid post - war growth of the resident Pacific Island 
population must be explained with regard also to the historically uneven 
economic development between the migrants ' countries of origin and New 
Zealand, and the political and ideological context within which migration 
occurred. 
44 ibid 0 
45 Richard Bedford, 'The Polynesian Connection: Migration and Social 
Change in New Zealand and the South Pacific' , in R. Bedford (ed), Essays 
on Urbanisation in South East Asia and the Pacific, (Christchurch, 1984), 
ppl15, 118 0 
46 ibid . , pllB. 
47 ibid 0 
48 See Ongley, (1990) . 
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The Historical Background: New Zealand and the Pacific Islands 
The pool of island migrant labour available to New Zealand industry after 
1945 was the consequence of the "development of underdevelopment" in the 
Pacific Islands as a result of the historical patterns of capital 
accumulation. 49 Underdevelopment in the Pacific resulted in a growing 
dependency on economic opportunities elsewhere, so that today, 
labour migration is an integral and perhaps irreversible feature 
of most Pacific Island economies. Indeed, in some cases the export 
of labour constitutes the mainstay of the economy. 50 
Following World War Two this labour supply found a ready market in the 
swelling New Zealand economy where entry was facilitated by legal and 
political obligations arising out of a history of colonial domination and 
economic exploitation in the Pacific region. 5 1 
New Zealand - Pacific Islands Historical Relations 
In 1901 the Cook Islands and Niue were annexed by the New Zealand 
government and the resident islanders granted New Zealand citizenship . 52 
In 1914, largely by military accident, New Zealand 'conquered' the German 
colony of Western Samoa and later gained jurisdiction over it through a 
League of Nations mandate in 1918. 53 In 1925 the Tokelau Islands were 
transferred to New Zealand administration by the British, and New Zealand 
subsequently established less direct influence over other island groups 
4 9 Ongley, (1990), p48. 
50 Ongley , (1990), p69. 
51 ibid. 
52 S.D. Wilson, 'The Record in the Cook Islands and Niue 1901-1945', 
in Angus Ross, (1969), p24 . 
53 See Malama Meleisea, The Making of Modern Samoa. Traditional 
Authority and Co lonial Administration in the History of Western Samoa , 
(Suva, 1987), pp102-125 . 
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such as Tonga and Fiji. 54 
This colonial history led to specific legal and/or economic arrangements 
with New Zealand that were to become important in shaping their access 
to that country later in the century. 55 The Cook Islands and Niue 
established a relationship of free association with New Zealand , wherein 
Islanders from both countries retain New Zealand citizenship and so enjoy 
freedom of entry to New Zealand. 56 Likewise, Tokelau Islanders also 
have New Zealand citizenship, and therefore unrestricted rights of entry 
and permanent settlement. Moreover, the New Zealand government embarked 
upon a resettlement scheme whereby migrants from the Tokelau Islands were 
assisted to move to prearranged employment and accommodation in New 
Zealand. Prompted by the recognition of problems arising from rapid 
population growth in islands with scarce resources, this resettlement 
scheme involved about 500 migrants during the period 1966-1975. 5 7 
Immigration from Western Samoa, Tonga and Fiji, however, in accordance 
with New Zealand's racially-determined policy, has been, to varying 
degrees, restricted. Western Samoa, although granted independence from 
New Zealand in 1962, did have a colonial history with New Zealand and 
this resulted in Western Samoans being accorded a more favourable 
immigration status than the Pacific states of Tonga and Fiji. Under the 
1962 Treaty of Friendship Western Samoans received a permanent quota for 
migration to New Zealand, which in 1970 was set at 1, 500 persons a 
year. 58 Migrants under this quota were still required to meet the 
normal immigration requirements regarding age and family size, and the 
54 Pearson, (1990), p116. 
55 Pearson , (1990), p116 . 
56 Steve Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, 
(Sydney, 1992) pp73-75. 
57 Trlin, (1987), p203. 
58 ibid. 
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possession of acceptable guarantees of accommodation and employment. 
Significantly, these migrants, unlike others entering New Zealand 
permanently, were not granted full residential rights, but were admitted 
initially on a temporary basis, for a period of six months, with the 
possibility of extending their permits for a further four and a half 
years . During this period of five years 'continued residence' Samoan 
migrants were required to demonstrate that they were satisfactory 
citizens, prepared to accept New Zealand laws and social mores. 59 
Furthermore, for a short time, 1969 to 1970, single Samoan women entering 
New Zealand were also subject to pregnancy tests , but this practice was 
regarded as discriminatory and dropped. 60 
Although there were no formal ties between Tonga and New Zealand of the 
kind described above, there was a tradition of co-operation in the fields 
of education and missionary endeavour especially. Tonga was never a 
'colony' of any European power and New Zealand, as its nearest 
metropolitan neighbour and a country with close associations with other 
parts of the Pacific , naturally became a favoured destination for Tongans 
seeking work . 6 1 Likewise, although New Zealand had no formal 
administrative links with Fiji there had been considerable co-operation 
between the two countries, and small numbers of Fijians had been entering 
New Zealand from at least the 1920s. 62 However, because of the 
perceived 'large intake' of immigrants from other Pacific Islands, it was 
deemed necessary to place restraints upon the entry of unskilled migrants 
from Tonga and Fiji. 63 Accordingly, with few exceptions on humanitarian 
59 T . Shand , ' New Zealand and Immigration', reproduced in Dominion, 
1 July (1968) . 
60 Linda Hamilton, 'The Political Integration of the Samoan 
Immigrants in New Zealand', MA Thesis , (University of Canterbury, 1974), 
p5. 
61 Bedford, ( 1984) , p119 . 
62 ibid. 1 p120. 
63 Department of Labour, (1970), p5. 
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or occupational grounds, permanent entry of Tongans and Fijians, as well 
as those Western Samoans not included in the annual quota, was restricted 
to the fiances , fiancees, husbands, wives, and children of New Zealand 
residents. 64 
Provision was also made for temporary migration from those island groups 
with restricted entry, as a form of aid by New Zealand to assist Pacific 
Island development, but this was influenced usually by New Zealand ' s own 
economic self- interest. 65 Various official temporary migration schemes 
allowed for the migration of Pacific Islanders to New Zealand as contract 
labourers for limited lengths of time, usually during expansionist 
periods in the New Zealand economy. 
For Fijians, a scheme was set up during the 1960s, when local labour was 
scarce under conditions of full employment, whereby farmers could obtain 
through the Department of Labour temporary workers for such rural 
activities as scrub cutting, tussock eradication, market gardening, and 
tobacco picking. 66 This scheme was automatically adjusted to New 
Zealand employment conditions . Entry was on condition that employment 
was available, and unemployed New Zealanders available and willing to do 
the work had to be employed before Fijian labour. 67 
In 1966 a sponsorship system was established for Tongans, whereby they 
could enter the country as visitors if they provided evidence of means 
of support for a three-month period in New Zealand - either $200 a month 
or a letter of guarantee signed by a New Zealand citizen or permanent 
64 Trlin, (1987) , p203. 
65 ibid . , p204 . 
66 New Zealand Coalition for Trade and Development (NZCTD) , The 
Ebbino Tide. The Imoact o f Migration on Pacific Island Societies, 
(Wellington, 1982), p39 . 
67 W. J. Bowden, 'Some Economic Aspects of Polynesian Migration to New 
Zealand', MA Thesis, (University of Auckland, 1972), p29 . 
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resident covering accommodation and maintenance for their stay in New 
Zealand. 68 This scheme was not widely used until the early 1970s, 
largely because, before that time, Tongans were generally not motivated 
to try to came to New Zealand, and the Tongan population in New Zealand 
was too small to sponsor relatives to the country. 69 Similarly, in 1969, 
the Hutt Valley Chamber of Commerce introduced a scheme to bring in 
Tongan workers, because of the then acute shortage of labour in the area, 
which continued on a small scale until it was subsumed by an official 
government work scheme in 1975. 70 
New Zealand's immigration policy regarding Pacific Islanders was designed 
to ensure that most Pacific Island movement to New Zealand was in 
response to short-term employment opportunities in the New Zealand labour 
market, without this response leading to permanent settlement. 71 In the 
late 1960s, the general climate of public and political opinion favoured 
extensive immigration, and this, combined with the demand for unskilled 
labour in New Zealand's expanding manufacturing sector, contributed to 
a rapid increase in the volume of movement between the island countries 
and New Zealand during the early 1970s. n But it was only temporary 
migrants who found favour New Zealanders wanted Pacific Island 
migrants' labour, they did not want them to stay permanently. From 1970 
to 1975 the increased movement from Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa 
accounted for forty percent of temporary migration to New Zealand but 
only three percent of total permanent migration to New Zealand. 73 
68 Hegarty, (1977), p44. 
69 ibid • 1 p4 5 • 
70 NZCTD, (1982) I p40. 
71 E.M.K. Douglas, 'New Polynesian Voyagers: Visitors, Workers and 
Migrants in New Zealand', in R.M. Prothero and M. Chapman, (eds), 
Circulation in Third World countries, (London, 1985), p420. 
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73 ibid. 
Immigration pSl 
·~TANLEY-!~ ~·. 
. . .. . ... 0 
Figure 3.3 Stanley, Murray Ball, Evening Post, 1976. 74 
The goal of maintaining a predominantly 'white' community continued to 
be instrumental in shaping New Zealand immigration policy with regard to 
Pacific Islanders. Skills or labour were not as desirable as a majority 
with 'white' skin. 75 In 1970 a new immigration card was introduced to 
replace the old format which had required all new arrivals to nominate 
their 'race', ironically because that was seen at that time to hint at 
racial prejudice. 76 However, the new immigration card, a labour 
department spokesman announced, was to drop all mention of a visitor's 
racial origin "except in the case of Polynesians". 77 
New Zealand governments, motivated largely by racist attitudes and 
biases, attempted at different times and with different levels of 
74 Reproduced in Mary Elle n 0' Connor, An Immigrant Nation, (Auckland, 
1990)' p90. 
75 Ballara, (1986), p158. 
76 ibid. 
77 Auckland Star, 14 February 1970, cited in Ballara, (1986), p159. 
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enthusiasm, to limit Pacific Island migration. Their experiences in this 
respect mirror that of many European countries and the same types of 
restrictions were employed, for instance, it was made difficult for 
temporary migrants to bring their families, and restrictions on Pacific 
Islanders became more severe than those applied to other nationalities. 78 
Such restrictions on the immigration of Western Samoans, Tongans and 
Fijians inevitably encouraged attempts to beat the system and flout the 
conditions of entry. 79 
Overstaying 
Prior to the mid-1970s the main means of entry for Tongans and Fijians, 
and that used mostly by Samoans despite their more favourable rights of 
permanent entry, was through temporary non-renewable work permits or non-
working visitor's permits, generally of three to six months duration. 80 
Until the early 1970s, control over the number of temporary migrants was 
lax and no systematic efforts were made to trace or prosecute persons who 
overstayed their permits. 81 Such conditions enabled visitors to easily 
overstay their entry permits. 
Migrants were lured to New Zealand on short - term visitors permits by the 
prospect of comparatively fabulous earnings which would yield a 
substantial sum of savings by the time their permit expired. However, 
in the short three-month period usually permitted, migrants had to earn 
enough to repay their air fares of between NZ$200 and $300, over and 
above housing and food costs in New Zealand, before showing any net 
78 Douglas, (1985), p420, and Peter Brosnan, Pacific Island People. 
Migrant and minority workers in the New Zealand labour market. Paper 
prepared for the conference Migrant Workers, Information and Human 
Rights, Melbourne, 7 - 9 December 1988, (Wellington, 1988), p7. 
79 Trlin, (1987), p204. 
80 Ongley, ( 1990), pp107 - 8. 
81 Trlin, (1987), p204. 
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return on their work. 82 While some were able to accomplish this within 
the legal period of their permits, most could not. Rising living costs 
made the task more and more difficult, and as a result migrants 
overstayed their permits to make more profitable gains than was possible 
within the legal permit duration. 83 In 1974 it was reported that the 
average length of stay for Western Samoans in New Zealand on three month 
permits was in actual fact more than seven months. 84 
Encouraging Pacific migrants to overstay their permits were very real 
factors of unemployment and poverty in the Islands. The remittances of 
migrant workers were not only important to their countries' balance of 
payments, but family and community projects, even their families' 
immediate consumption were often dependant upon the New Zealand 
workers. 85 For instance one New Zealand migrant stated that: 
In Tonga employment for many like me is almost non-existent. 
Without this steady source of income life for me and my family 
would be very grim indeed .... There is no steady source of income 
with which to provide one's family with a decent standard of 
living. I have found myself a steady job [in New Zealand] which 
provides me with a steady source of income that enables me to help 
not only my own family but also my wife's brothers and sisters. 8 6 
Significantly, Pacific migrants were not the only ones with cause to 
flout temporary permits. Their New Zealand employers were usually aware 
that they were overstayers, but given the shortages of labour and the 
prospect of losing a valuable employee, employers often encouraged 
82 Joris de Bres and Rob Cambpell, 'Temporary Labour Migration 
between Tonga and New Zealand', International Labour Review, Vol.112, 
No.6, (1975), p448. 
83 ibid 0 
84 Douglas, (1985), p422. 
as de Bres and Campbell, (1975), pp450-451. 
86 de Bres and Campbell, ( 1976b) , p19. 
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Pacific Island workers to overstay . 67 Pacific Island workers were in 
demand because of their willingness to take on those jobs vacated by the 
local work force in the expanding economy - labour was so short that 
employers paid agencies fifty dollars a head for each Pacific Island 
worker they could recruit. 66 Because they were more focused on short-
term money and large remittances, Pacific Island migrants were 
consequently more pliable, eager and exploitable as a workforce, and more 
prepared to undertake, dirty, tedious jobs in the area of low-paid (in 
New Zealand terms) unskilled labouring. 69 Many industries became 
dependent on Pacific migrant labour with Islanders making up sixty to 
eighty percent of the workforce in some workplaces and thus employers 
encouraged migrants to overstay their permits. 90 Indeed, in 1974 the 
minister of immigration, Mr Fraser Colman, was reported as saying: 
The government had to face the fact that New Zealand industry was 
dependent on illegal island labour. Unless they used such labour, 
production and export targets would not be met. 91 
More importantly, the New Zealand government supported this status quo. 92 
When the demand for semi-skilled and unskilled labour in New Zealand was 
high an almost open-door policy reigned. When work was readily 
available, a willingness to work and a job to go to were counted as 
evidence of support by immigration authorities. 93 The rapid rise in the 
numbers entering New Zealand for supposedly 'non-working' purposes should 
have had obvious implications to the Immigration Department, as should 
67 Brosnan, (1988), p9. 
66 Brosnan, (1988), p9, and Gibson, (1983), p33. 
69 Gibson, (1983), p39. 
90 Auckland Star, 'Working their way up - from factory floor to white 
collar', 23 August (1979). 
91 Tonga Chronicle, 28 April 1974, cited in Hegarty (1977) p47. 
92 Hegarty, (1977), p46. 
93 Douglas, (1985), p422. 
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the upsurge in remittances of money to the Pacific Islands. 9 4 However, 
overstaying, was not only allowed, but encouraged by all concerned -
visitors , the New Zealand government, employers, New Zealand trade unions 
and the Pacific Island governments . 95 Hence, "overstaying became the 
norm , apparently accepted by both employers and government 
authorities. "96 
This situation also owed its existence to the fact that the recruitment 
of migrant labour was advantageous to the New Zealand economy in general . 
It permitted the recruitment of ready-made workers , a gift to capital and 
the state in that the initial costs of social reproduction had been paid 
for in another social formation. 97 Moreover, without denying that 
Islanders and island economies benefitted in some ways from labour 
migration, the benefits were more heavily weighted in favour of New 
Zealand industry . 98 Labour migration, in reality, did little to 
alleviate the economic backwardness of the regions from which migrants 
came , indeed it was more often a hindrance to development. 99 Labour 
migration in that respect can be seen as a form of development aid given 
by poor under-developed nations to wealthier countries. 100 
Significantly, Pacific Island migrant labour was recruited on a contract 
basis. The migrant worker was politically and ideologically defined as 
a 'foreign national', a 'guest' who could be expelled from the 'host' 
94 de Bres and Campbell, (1975), p449. 
95 Douglas, (1985), p422. 
96 Douglas, (1985), p423, and Gibson, (1983), p33 . 
97 Gibson, (1983), p30. 
98 See de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974). 
99 See Joris de Bres, How Tonaa Aids New Zealand. A report on 
migration and education, (Auckland, 1974), and Joris de Bres and Rob 
Campbell, Worth their Weight in Gold, (Auckland, 1976a). 
10
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nation state when that contract was deemed to expire. 101 This provided 
a ready solution to New Zealand's at times contradictory immigration 
goals - to provide the labour required for capital needs, and to maintain 
cultural and racial purity. 'Coloured' migrant workers were made to 
occupy a vulnerable position as a reserve army of labour. Their tenure 
in New Zealand was regulated by the demands of capital, and made 
politically precarious by the fact that they had few or no political 
rights in the host country, and in the case of overstaying, by the fact 
that many were a part of a pool of illegal workers who could be exploited 
because of their illegal status. 102 
That Pacific Island workers occupied a markedly inferior position within 
the labour force and within class relations was, to a considerable 
extent, a legacy of the role which Pacific Island migrant labour was 
required to fulfil in order that accumulation in the expanding secondary 
industries could be sustained in the three decades following the Second 
World War. 103 Their inferior position cannot be explained, however, 
by reference to the labour migration process alone. It was as much a 
product of a distinctive set of ideological and political relations which 
determined not only the terms under which Pacific Island migrants could 
enter New Zealand, but also the status prescribed them once there. 1 0 4 
In other words, Pacific Island migrant groups were racialised. 
Identified as culturally and physically different from the dominant 
population, they were categorised in negative racial terms, in much the 
same way as the Chinese had been in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. 105 
101 Miles, ( 1984a) , p230. 
102 Miles, (1984a), p237, and Castles and Kosack, (1972), p14. 
103 Ongley, (1990), p169. 
104 ibid., p170. 
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A racist ideology was the predominant influence in limiting the numbers 
of Pacific Islanders settling in New Zealand. The same ideology was 
influential in explaining and maintaining the inferior social and 
economic position of those Pacific Island migrants who had settled in New 
Zealand. In the early 1970s, in the face of general economic downturn, 
this same ideology again shaped the public and political response to 
Pacific Island migrants. Their vulnerability as temporary, and for some 
illegal, migrants made them not only the most likely, but also easy 
targets. Pacific Island migrants had long been blamed for a series of 
social and economic problems. Hence, when the economic recession of the 
early 1970s worsened, racist imagery was relatively easily reproduced to 
deflect attention away from the state's management of economic crises by 
constructing immigration and 'race' relations problems out of issues such 
as unemployment and law and order. 1 06 
106 Miles and Spoonley, ( 1985), p13. 
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II CHAPrER FOUR II 
1974 
RECESSION AND DAWN RAIDS 
When the effects of the international oil crisis hit New Zealand in 1973 
the country experienced its worst drop in terms of trade since the 1930s . 
From June 1973 to March 1974 there was a forty-six percent decline, and 
the large surplus in the balance of payments that existed in 1973 was 
rendered, by 1975, into a deficit of $1,300 million . 1 In response, the 
Labour government (1972-1975) stated that it was looking at all 
contingencies that might arise from the oil crisis - the effect the 
crisis might have on the economies of other countries and how that might 
cause problems for the government's policy of maintaining · full 
employment. Immigration, it said, was one of those contingencies. 2 
During the early 1970s there had been an unprecedented flow of migrants 
to New Zealand. 3 In the year ended March 1973, the total migration gain 
to New Zealand (excess of arrivals over departures) numbered 25,475 
migrants . In the following year, ended March 1974, the total migration 
gain increased to a record high of 33, 167. 4 Economic pressures in 
Britain in the 1970s led to particularly high migration levels from the 
United Kingdom. The largest net gain to New Zealand in the 1973-1974 
1 Keith Sinclair , A History of New Zealand, (Harmondsworth, 1991), 
p312, and Gary Hawke , 'Economic Trends and Economic Policy, 1938-1992 ' , 
in Geoffrey W. Rice (ed), The Oxford History of New Zealand, (Auckland, 
1992)' pp417-418. 
2 NZPD , Vol.389, (1974), p473. 
3 de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), p2. 
4 Department of Statistics, New Zealand Statistics: Pooulation and 
Migratio n 1972-73 and 1973-74 . Part B- External Migration, (Wellington, 
1976)' p4 . 
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period was from Britain, with British migrants numbering 20,948. 5 
Similarly, the number of inquiries from prospective British migrants 
received by the New Zealand High Commission in London increased sharply 
in this period to 138,517, compared with 90,328 in the previous year. 6 
In response to these trends, and fears that large immigration gains could 
not be absorbed without straining public services and jeopardizing 
employment opportunities for New Zealanders, in June of 1973 the Labour 
government announced an immigration review. 7 The prime minister, Norman 
Kirk, later explained that: 
The immigration intake had increased greatly in the past year, 
putting considerable pressure on housing and other 
services .... International conditions including those arising from 
the fuel crisis, had reinforced the need for effective control of 
immigration .... New Zealand cannot continue to receive a net 
migration gain of the size that seems likely without serious 
problems in housing, inflation, balance of payments, and possibly 
employment. 8 
The review recommended that future immigration should be controlled as 
to numbers within New Zealand's capacity to provide employment, housing, 
and social services, with a view to promoting stable growth rates in the 
economy and maintaining reasonable living standards for the growing 
population. 9 Particular attention was given to the issue of employment: 
An aim should be to ensure that employment opportunities for the 
New Zealand labour force, whether skilled or unskilled, are not 
jeopardised and that as far as practicable the demand for skilled 
workers should be met by training New Zealand workers. 1 0 
In these concerns, New Zealand reflected an international trend. In 
5 ibid. 
6 Annual Report, Department of Labour, AJHR, Vol.3, G.1, (1974), p10. 
7 NZPD, Vol.389, (1974), pl18. 
B ibid. pp14,15. 
9 NZPD, Vol.391, (1974), p2319. 
10 
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response to the international economic downturn, the industrialised world 
in general was closing its doors to migrant workers at this time . 1 1 
Moreover , these sorts of concerns had always shaped New Zealand 
immigration policy, and in that respect did not herald any change in 
policy objectives. What was new, however, was the way in which those 
objectives were to be met. The review made drastic changes to the 
regulations governing permanent entry . In particular, the era of free 
entry for persons of exclusively British and Irish birth descent, which 
had existed since the Immigration Restriction Act of 1920, came to an 
end. On the 2 April 1974, Kirk announced that all migrants wishing to 
settle in New Zealand from that date would have to obtain entry permits 
in advance of their arrival in New Zealand. 12 Detailed guidelines on 
future permanent immigration policy stated that British migrants to New 
Zealand would be admitted , along with other permanent migrants , in 
accordance with defined criteria, including the requirement that the 
breadwinner should possess skills and qualifications in continuing demand 
in New Zealand . 
Significantly, while the review officially ended British open entry to 
New Zealand, the occupation and family size criteria, and the objectives 
of harmonious settlement and the avoidance of racial tension, meant that 
immigration policy continued to favour British immigrants and to restrict 
Pacific Island immigrants. 13 Similarly, British migrants continued to 
enjoy more generous entry than most other migrant groups. Under the 
policy changes, migrants from the United Kingdom would be able to visit 
New Zealand without making the prior application required of other 
migrants, and permits to stay up to six months would be granted on 
arrival on the usual conditions that visitors had fully paid tickets to 
a country to which they had right of entry and sufficient money to 
11 Pearson, (1990), p122. 
12 ibid. 1 p14 • 
13 ibid., p28. 
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support themselves. 14 The existing assisted passage and subsidy 
immigration schemes were set to continue, and Australian citizens would 
continue to be able to enter New Zealand freely. 15 
DAWN RAIDS 
At the same time that immigration policy was being reviewed by the Labour 
government, immigration officials, assisted by police, began to seek out 
individuals who had overstayed their visas. There had been some attempts 
at finding and deporting overstayers before this, in the years leading 
up to 1974. 16 In 1972 and 1973 attempts to round up and deport illegal 
immigrants had included dawn raids on the houses of suspected overstayers 
from the Pacific Islands. In 1973, following representations by the 
Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE) , the acting minister of 
immigration, Phil Amos, had called for "an immediate review of methods 
used to detect illegal immigrants so that as far as possible no 
inconvenience or embarrassment is caused to innocent people". 17 CARE had 
protested that methods used to detect illegal Polynesian immigrants would 
not be used if they were not Polynesian and said of the dawn raid 
procedures, "that if the person they were looking for was, for instance , 
an American, they would not order everyone in the hotel out of bed" . 1 8 
The Immigration Department denied such charges of racial discrimination, 
but one senior official had stated that "if you have more visitors who 
are Polynesian, then of course the frequency with which these inspections 
are carried out with regard t o their ethnic group would be different from 
other ethnic groups" . 19 In fact the majority of the quarter of a million 
14 ibid., pp17,18. 
15 ibid., pl6. 
16 See NZPD , Vol. 391, ( 1974) , p2325. 
17 Quoted in de Bres and Campbell, ( 1976b) , p21. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid . 
1974 Dawn Raids p62 
visitors who came to New Zealand in 1973 were not Polynesian . More than 
eighty percent of the visitors in that year were from either Australia 
(50.5%), the United States (22.9%) or the United Kingdom (7 . 0%), and yet 
there was little record of migrants from these countries being constantly 
raided in the manner that Pacific Islanders had been. 20 Indeed , a month 
after the minister called for a review of detection methods, a small news 
item in an Auckland newspaper advised that "no change in the procedure 
for finding illegal immigrants is to be made. "21 
Hence , in 1974, in response to the weakening economy and in concert with 
the immigration review already under way, officials launched a more 
systematic campaign to find, arrest and eventually deport overstayers , 
and police targets, as before , were clearly Pacific Island migrants. In 
fact, it was Tongans who bore the brunt of the raids . 
Late at night on 13 March 1974, police and immigration department 
officials began a series of raids on houses in the Onehunga suburb of 
Auckland, and by 2 . 00 or 3.00 a.m. had arrested thirteen Tongans on 
charges of being illegal immigrants or failing to produce a passport. 
Despite protests from anti-racism groups, the night raids continued and 
on 18 March a further 21 Islanders were arrested in the early hours of 
the morning after raids on another six Onehunga houses. The next evening 
a prayer meeting of the Free Church of Tonga was interrupted by the 
police and five more people, including the minister of the church, were 
arrested. 22 
The Dominion subsequently reported that night raids on different Auckland 
addresses were continuing and the number of arrests made was understood 
20 Department of Statistics, (1976) , p4 . 
21 New Zealand Herald, 22 August 1973, cited in de Bres and Campbell 
(1976b) 1 p21. 
22 Evening Post, 'Mr Kirk challenged on 'party' explanation for dawn 
raids', 26 March (1976), and de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), Part 
3, p2. 
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to be more than forty. 23 Pacific Islanders were working to help friends 
and re l atives affected by the blitz on migrant workers, securing houses 
and belongings of those arrested and helping with legal aid and providing 
accommodation for those on bail. One Tongan helper, Tavake Kaho, said 
that the humiliation suffered in the dawn raids was enormous. "It is as 
if these people had committed some ghastly crime- a murder, or rape, " 
he said, "Does any person deserve to be hauled away in the middle of the 
night because he has overstayed a permit? 24 Another Tongan spokesman 
was quoted as saying: 
Many people are in a state of panic. The atmosphere is tense to 
say the least . No-one knows who'll get a tap on the shoulder next . 
I cannot understand why the Immigration authorities should do this 
when they allow planeloads of Tongans to come here on visitors' 
permits. They know the Tongans aren't visitors. They come here 
to work. There aren't 20 Tongans a year who could afford to come 
to New Zealand just as visitors .... Every Tongan at present in New 
Zealand has had, up to now, a clean police record. It is alarming 
that they should come here and run foul of the law through sheer 
economic desperation . What people don't realise is the terrible 
consequences of being convicted as an illegal immigrant. The 
victims immediately become prohibited immigrants, not only in New 
Zealand but every other Commonwealth country. They can't even land 
in Fiji without special permission. They are, in effect, sentenced 
to live forever in their own country. And their only offence , in 
their eyes, is a desire to work and be paid so they can better 
their standard of living and that of their families. 25 
Responding to protests and calls for an amnesty from groups such as CARE, 
the New Zealand Race Relations Council, the Polynesian Panther Party, the 
Auckland Council for Civil Liberties, and the National Executive of the 
Federation of Labour, on 21 March the minister of immigration, Fraser 
Colman, announced that dawn raids were to cease immediately . Explaining 
that they were alien to the New Zealand way of life, he said, "firm 
action is necessary but until we have a concerted plan sporadic raids can 
23 Dominion , 21 March 1974, cited in de Bres, Campbell and Harris , 
(1974), Part 3, p3 . 
24 ibid. 
25 8 O'Clock, 23 March 1974 , cited in de Bres, Campbell and Harris, 
(1974) , Part 3, pp2-3 . 
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only damage New Zealand's image at home and abroad". 26 Significantly, 
in terms of the exclusively Polynesian image of overstaying that was 
evolving, he then proceeded to censure Island workers for breaking the 
law: 
Temporary permits are being openly flouted by Islanders. The 
permit was intended to be used by genuine visitors such as tourists 
only. But there was evidence that Islanders were looking for jobs 
immediately they stepped off the plane in Auckland. 2 7 
Despite Colman's termination of the raids, those migrants already 
arrested were not granted a reprieve, indeed, fifteen Tongans were 
deported by plane on 1 April after earlier efforts to deport them on the 
Ocean Monarch were thwarted by pickets and a threat to walk-off the ship 
by its crew. 28 Moreover, raids continued to be reported. 29 
In the face of mounting protest, on the evening of 1 April, the prime 
minister personally intervened in the controversy and announced that the 
government was suspending immediately the issue of all entry permits for 
Tongans until the government could set up a tighter system of vetting 
applications. Kirk said that this would affect about 6,000 Tongans with 
applications already in the pipeline. At the same time a stay of 
proceedings was announced, with the aim of getting as many overstayers 
as possible to register themselves voluntarily with the Department of 
Labour by 31 May in exchange for immunity from prosecution, for the 
estimated 1, 000 to 2, 000 Tongans illegally in New Zealand. The prime 
minister said that they would be given a chance to declare their presence 
and gain time to earn enough money to go home without arrest and 
26 Quoted in de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), Part 3, p5. 
27 ibid. 
28 Dominion, 2 April 1974, cited in de Bres, Campbell and Harris, 
(1974), Part 3, p9. 
29 Evening Post, ''Tight-lipped silence' on future of Tongans in Mt 
Eden', 1 April (1974). 
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deportation. 30 What had became a de-facto immigration policy, he said , 
would be re-established as an official policy on a basis that would be 
fair, just and non-discriminatory. 31 
Significantly, the government's step of suspending the issue of visitors ' 
permits for Tongans further underlined the fact that it regarded Tongans 
as the only overstayers, a fact that would not have escaped public 
attention. Through its discriminatory actions, the government had 
established and was persistently reproducing a stereotype of the ' Island 
overstayer ' . 
More than 3,000 Tongans registered under the stay of proceedings and in 
the three months following Kirk's announcement, some 1,500 Tongans left 
for home . 32 However, because of transport problems and protests by 
Auckland manufacturers, concerned at the prospect of Tongan labour drying 
up, the permits of a further 2,000 registered overstayers were extended 
from the initial deadline to varying dates through to December 1974. 33 
Mr R.W. Southcombe, secretary of the Auckland Manufacturers Association , 
exhorted the government to delay the removal of key workers , stating that 
Tongan labour was very highly regarded , and any sudden withdrawal would 
seriously affect Auckland industry. 34 The managing director of one 
Onehunga firm said that nineteen of his twenty-six workers would have to 
go back to Tonga and there seemed to be no prospect of more coming. The 
30 Evening Post , 'No more Tongans till labour man is based there', 
2 April (1974) , and Dominion , 2 April 1974, cited in de Bres , Campbell 
and Harris , ( 1974) , Part 3 , p9 . 
31 Quoted in de Bres, Campbell and Harris , (1974), Part 3, plO. 
32 B.K. Macdonald, 'Pacific Immigration and the Politicians', 
Comment. A New Zealand Quarterly Review. New Series, No.1, (1977), pll . 
33 ibid. 
34 Auckland Star, 22 April 1974, cited in de Bres, Campbell and 
Harris , (1974), Part 3, pll . 
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Tongan workers were the "best workers I have ever had , " he said. 3 5 1 
Permanent residence was eventually granted to about 300 of the remaining 
2,000 registered overstayers . The majority of the other 1700 left for 
home when the extensions to their permits expired, though a number failed 
to leave and were subsequently deported or re-registered in 1976. 36 
In conjunction with the overstayers register, the government also 
introduced an interim work permit scheme, which allowed manufacturers to 
sponsor workers from Tonga for three months, to regulate Tongan 
immigration to New Zealand until a new workers' permit scheme was 
finalised. 37 The new scheme was announced in a 'Memorandum of 
understanding on temporary entry from Tonga', issued after meetings in 
October 1974 between the deputy prime minister of Tonga and the New 
Zealand minister of immigration. Under the new scheme the interim 
arrangements operating since June were phased out to end in December 
1974, and operation of the new scheme began 1 January 1975. 38 The scheme 
was based in many of its aspects on the one operated by the Hutt Valley 
Chamber of Commerce in the early 1970s . It provided for work where local 
labour was not available, and was, in the words of the New Zealand 
minister of immigration, self - regulating to the New Zealand economy. 39 
The period of employment was for four months, which could be extended to 
six months, and certain obligations were placed upon the various parties; 
the employer was required, among other things, to advance the costs of 
the worker's return air fare and to arrange accommodation; the home 
governments were required to select the workers according to defined 
criteria; and the workers themselves were required to remain in the 
employment provided and t o depart from New Zealand at the expiry of their 
35 ibid. 
36 Macdonald, (1977), p11. 
37 de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), Part 3, p14 . 
38 de Bres and Campbell, (1975), p451. 
39 NZPD, Vol.400 , (1975), p3619 . 
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permits. 40 Significantly, Air New Zealand played an administrative role 
in the scheme, notifying employers and the Department of Labour of the 
arrival of individual workers as well as of their departure, and the 
Department of Labour held the passports and return tickets for workers 
during the period of their stay. 41 
Similar schemes were negotiated with the governments of Fiji and Western 
Samoa in 1975 with a view to covering Fijian and Samoan workers as 
well. 42 In conjunction with the gradual introduction of these work 
permit schemes, in November 1975, Fijian, Western Samoan and Tongan 
visitors' permits were reduced to one month as part of a package designed 
to protect the official work schemes. 43 
The measures implemented to cut down and strictly control the numbers of 
migrants from the Pacific, however, merely exacerbated existing problems 
and thus encouraged further overstaying. 44 Although the number of 
Tongans entering New Zealand to work illegally on visitors permits 
decreased substantially after 1974, it was still significantly higher 
than for those who entered to work on the official scheme. Figures in 
May 1977 demonstrated that since the scheme had begun, only 501 Tongans 
had entered New Zealand on the official scheme, yet between April 1975 
and March 31 1977 the total short-term arrivals in New Zealand totalled 
5,418 Tongans, 3,304 of whom, or sixty-one percent, gave 
'holiday/vacation' or 'stay with relations' as the reason for their 
40 de Bres and Campbell, (1975), pp452-453, and NZTDC, (1982), pp40-
41. 
41 de Bres and Campbell, ( 1975), p452. 
42 Annual Report, Department of Labour, AJHR, Vol. 3, G .1, ( 1976), 
pl1. 
43 ibid. 
44 NZTDC, (1982), p44. 
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visit. 45 It is made clear by these figures that the work scheme was not 
designed to guarantee the Tongan government a certain reasonable flow of 
workers and hence to remove the risk of grave fluctuations in overseas 
earnings from migrant labour, indeed, in contrast, the scheme achieved 
a dramatic cut-back in the number of migrant workers. 46 
Tongans, rather than use the official scheme, tended to use an extensive 
informal network of kinship contacts in New Zealand to get work in the 
country while visiting on short-term permits. 4 7 Similarly, as far as 
Western Samoans were concerned the scheme did not really get off the 
ground. Samoans preferred to come in under the quota for permanent 
residents, or continued to use the visitor's permit as an avenue for 
finding short-term work. In the latter case, kin resident in New Zealand 
provided assistance with accommodation and found jobs for visitors 
through 'informal' guest-worker schemes. 48 Employers in New Zealand 
continued to allow their resident Samoan employees to bring new workers 
into the factory even though temporary work without approval on entry was 
illegal. 49 
In actual fact, a series of mechanisms within the new work scheme 
functioned as disincentives, for both Island migrant workers and 
employers, to use the scheme. One of these was the time-lag between 
applying for a worker under the new scheme and the worker's actual 
arrival in New Zealand to take up the job. Employers had to find 
accommodation and have it inspected by the Department of Labour, the job 
45 Hegarty, (1977), p55. 
46 de Bres and Campbell, ( 1976a), p35. 
47 Bedford, (1984), p125. 
48 See Cluny Macpherson, 'Guest-worker movements and their 
consequences for donor and recipient countries: a case study', in G.W. 
Jones and H.V. Richter (eds) ,Population Mobility and Development: South 
East Asia and the Pacific, (Canberra, 1981). 
4 9 ibid. 1 p261. 
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offer had to be forwarded to the Tongan Overseas Employment Division and 
a worker recruited, and Air New Zealand had to arrange ticketing, which 
it would only do for bookings made seven weeks in advance . The total 
time-lag therefore, between a position becoming available and the actua l 
arrival easily exceeded two months. Unless employers could anticipate 
vacancies that far in advance, they were unlikely to participate in the 
scheme. 50 Similarly, Island workers were usually unwilling to wait the 
lengthy period it took f o r their applications to be processed, 
particularly as in that time a job offer might have lapsed. 51 
The administrative burden placed on employers was a further inhibiting 
factor for employers wanting to employ Tongan labour . The cost of paying 
airfares in advance , finding accommodation, having it inspected and 
making all the necessary arrangements for meeting the workers, settling 
them in and ensuring their departure, made it more attractive to look 
elsewhere for labour, especially when Tongan workers were still able to 
by-pass the scheme and come on visitor's permits. 52 Clearly , as long the 
scheme remained unattractive to both employers and workers, it would be 
avoided. 
Perhaps as a response to this, attempts to seek out overstayers 
continued. By May 1975 the immigration department reported that 
Islanders were appearing in court every day on charges of overstaying 
permits . 53 Then, in August, raids were again reported in the press, and 
although they did not take place in the early hour of the morning, police 
dogs were used instead. According to an investigation by CARE into raids 
on Tongans in the Ellerslie (Auckland) area: 
p22 . 
At one house 2 police dogs were used - one was stationed at the 
50 de Bres and Campbell, ( 1976a), p36 . 
51 Macpherson, (1981), p258. 
52 de Bres and Campbell, ( 1976a) , p36. 
53 Auckland Star, 1 May 1975, cited in de Bres and Campbell, (1976b), 
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back door and one was brought into the sitting room . When one 
resident asked a policeman to show a search warrant one dog was 
moved forward and began snarling. The policeman threatened to set 
the dog on anyone who tried to move away. 54 
Somewhat surprisingly , perhaps, despite these incidents , the Labour 
government's handling of immigration from the Pacific Islands over this 
period provoked relatively little comment . What protest there was in 
1974 was limited to the Pacific Island community and those few groups 
concerned with civil liberties and human rights . The main reason for 
this was that the government had produced a formula which , through its 
stay of proceedings and registration programme, was seen to offer the 
overstayers, the island governments, and the New Zealand government an 
exit from an embarrassing and complex situation . 55 The success of the 
Labour government in limiting censure over their handling of the dawn 
raids had much to do with the goodwill amongst Islanders enjoyed by the 
Labour government and more particularly by the personality of Kirk, not 
simply because he was liked and trusted by Pacific leaders but also 
because he brought a caring image into New Zealand's relations with its 
neighbours . Where his National Party predecessors had projected an image 
of performing their paternalistic duty, Kirk was seen as emphasising 
Pacific relationships because he really believed in them. 56 
To a large extent this was a case of delicately handled public relations, 
but the New Zealand government was also assisted by other factors. 
Pacific Island etiquette rendered any strong protest impolite and Pacific 
Islanders were generally very reluctant to criticise the New Zealand 
government, displaying instead a strong preference for compromise and 
cooperation. 57 Given the Island governments' general sense of dependence 
54 ibid 0 
55 Macdonald, ( 1977) , p11. 
56 ibid . , ppll-12. 
57 Brosnan, ( 1988) , p12, and Hamilton, ( 1974) , pp70-71 . 
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on New Zealand, both in terms of aid and labour opportunities, and the 
feeling amongst migrants that they were somehow privileged to work in 
such an 'advanced' society, that there was only limited challenge to the 
government's immigration campaign is not surprising. sa Moreover, the 
Tongan economy in early 1974 was, in relative terms, enjoying an all-time 
'high' and was thus better able to absorb its returning citizens. Aid 
from New Zealand had increased rapidly in the early 1970s and had 
generated employment as well as goodwill, copra prices had reached record 
levels, remittance income was high and the tourist boom was on. All of 
these factors served to soften the impact of the Labour government's 
measures, and thereby, also, any criticism of its campaign. 
An important ingredient, also, in the reaction to the dawn raids was the 
general mood of the New Zealand public at this time. In a poll conducted 
by the Heylen Research Centre in 1971 on the Western Samoan prime 
minister's campaign to increase the quota of permanent Samoan immigrants 
allowed into New Zealand each year from 1,500 to 2,500, two out of every 
three people in a random sample of all age groups opposed the move. 59 
Moreover, in another Heylen survey in April 1974, 83.9% of those surveyed 
agreed with the government's decision to restrict the number of British 
immigrants to New Zealand. 60 The degree of support for the 
government's measures was evidenced by the fact that there was only a 
limited ideological challenge to the government's assumption that 
immigration restrictions were the 'common-sense' solution to economic 
difficulties. Indeed, in this respect the attitudes of both the 
government and the general public demonstrated the continued strength of 
sa Brosnan, (1988), pl2, and Anthony Haas, 'New Zealand and the South 
Pacific - Opening Address', in T.J. Hearn (ed), New Zealand and the South 
Pacific. The Papers of the 15th Foreign Policy School 1980, (Dunedin, 
1981) 1 pl. 
59 Cited in Hamilton, (1974), pp68-69. 
/ 
6
° Cited in Lai Chee Hun, (1974), p39. 
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earlier beliefs about the social and economic threats of immigration. 6 1 
However, while there seemed to be a degree of unanimity about protecting 
New Zealand's resources and controlling migrant levels in the early 
1970s, the question of why the government's focus was so determinedly 
fixed upon Pacific Island, and more specifically Tongan immigrants is 
left unexplained. Pacific Island migrants accounted for only a small 
proportion of the total immigrant flow to New Zealand at this time. In 
the peak years of immigration, 1973-1974, Fijians, Tongans and Western 
Samoans accounted for a mere 2.7% of all permanent immigrants to New 
Zealand, and only 40.6% of all temporary migrants. 62 The targeting of 
Tongan migrants in 1974 in the dawn raids and other Pacific migrants in 
1975 with immigration policy changes was, in light of the small numbers 
of immigrants actually involved, illogical, but became all the more 
perplexing when compared with figures of other immigrant groups in the 
same period. For the year ending March 1974, Australian immigrants 
accounted for 29.1% of all permanent immigrants, and 32.3% of temporary 
immigrants, and yet controls on Australian immigration remained 
negligible; Australians continued to enjoy free entry to New Zealand. 63 
Hence, in the year ended 31 March 1974, a total of 20,319 permanent and 
long term migrants entered New Zealand from Australia, and 100, 93 9 
tourists. 64 As long as there were no controls on such a large flow of 
immigrants as this, concerns about the effect of immigrants, including 
Pacific Island migrants, on New Zealand's employment and standard of 
living were spurious. 
Moreover, in terms of the threat that immigrants were supposed to 
represent to New Zealand's employment, unemployment at this time was not 
61 See Chapter Two and Three. 
62 de Bres and Campbell, (1975), p446. 
63 ibid. 
64 Department of Statistics, ( 1976) , p4. 
1974 Dawn Raids p73 
only low, it was actually lower than it had been in the late 1960s. 65 
Similarly, it is difficult to perceive of Tongan migrants as a drain on 
the economy when they not only paid taxes like any other worker in New 
Zealand, they withdrew no welfare benefits. For the majority of Tongan 
migrants to New Zealand, the fact that they were not citizens meant they 
had no entitlement to state welfare or health benefits, and relied 
instead upon relatives and members of their island communities for these 
things. British migrants, however, were entitled to welfare benefits, 
and this is significant when it is considered that in 1973, sixty-seven 
percent of the immigrants from the United Kingdom in that year were non-
working dependants, and therefore constituted a much greater strain on 
resources than the predominantly single migrants who came from Tonga. 66 
The reason Tongan migrants were targeted in the dawn raids campaign may 
have been due partly to their political or immigrant status. Because of 
the requirement that Pacific Island visitors obtain visas before they 
arrived in New Zealand (unlike Australian immigrants, or immigrants from 
countries with which New Zealand had visa abolition agreements, such as 
the United States) , the department had a considerable amount of personal 
information about them which made it relatively easier to track them down 
once in New Zealand. Furthermore, the usual requirement for people 
entering New Zealand on short visits was that they be in possession of 
sufficient funds to maintain themselves during their stay. This was 
generally set at a minimum cash level for each month of stay. Special 
arrangements existed, however, under the sponsorship scheme for Tongans 
to enter under a sponsorship guarantee, whereby the cash requirement, 
which most Tongan and other island migrants could not afford, was waived 
in lieu of a guarantee from relatives or friends in New Zealand. Thus 
the department had contact names and addresses for all visitors under 
65 Department of Statistics, New Zealand Official Yearbook. 79th 
Annual Edition, (Wellington, 1974) , p883, and New Zealand Official 
Yearbook. 84th Annual Edition, (Wellington, 1979), p769. 
_;j de Bres and Campbell, (1974), Part 1, p3. 
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this scheme. 6 7 Hence, biases in immigration legislation and policy may 
have been reproduced in the immigration campaign. 
However, the grounds for the campaign's bias lay also in the ideological 
framework which had already implicated Pacific Island immigration as 
problematic. Comments by the minister of immigration, Fraser Colman, 
placing the blame for overstaying wholly on Tongan migrants, and the 
government's suspension of the issue of further visitor's permits to 
Tongans immediately following the raids, underlined the fact that it 
regarded Tongans, rather than New Zealand's immigration policy, as being 
responsible for the situation that had arisen. There was an assumption 
that Pacific Island immigration was inherently troublesome. The Labour 
government's actions in the early 1970s were determined by the 
'race'/immigration ideology in which immigration was defined as being 
responsible for all sorts of problems, immigration cuts as being the 
obvious solution, and wherein Pacific Island immigration was defined as 
the biggest problem of all, and cuts to immigration from that source the 
best solution. The outcome of the governments's actions was to give 
credence to that ideology, and to entrench it further in social belief. 
It is significant that the first event to bring widespread public 
attention to Pacific Islanders in New Zealand was a campaign which 
negatively ascribed Island migrants as criminals, as 'overstayers', and 
as a social problem. By targeting Pacific Island immigrants in 1974, the 
Labour government set these same immigrants up for similar attacks in the 
succeeding years. 
67 See Race Relations Office, Investigation into Allegations of 
Discrimination in the Application of Immigration Laws in New Zealand, 
(Wellington 1986). 
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II ~TER FIVE II 
1975 GENERAL ELECTION 
In its moves to regain power in the mid-1970s the opposition National 
Party sought to show the damage caused to the economy by the Labour 
government's immigration policy. By late 1974 the leader of the party, 
Robert Muldoon, had begun to build his election platform with, as a 
central plank, the promise that a National government would cut 
immigration 'to the bone' . 1 As the 1975 general election campaign 
developed, the problems that National attributed generally to immigration 
were increasingly associated more specifically with Pacific Island 
migrants and in a classic scapegoating manoeuvre the National Party 
managed to portray Pacific Islanders as both a social and economic 
liability. 2 
There was nothing new, in times of economic difficulty, in blaming 
immigrants for shortages in housing, social services, hospital 
facilities, employment and other breakdowns in the system, indeed similar 
political debates had recently occurred in several other western 
countries. 3 Rather than blame all immigrants to New Zealand for the 
country's problems, however, the National Party deliberately attempted 
to place the blame solely on Pacific Island migrants. 4 The political 
scrutiny to which Pacific Islanders had been subjected under the Labour 
government was intensified in 1975 by the National Party, which went to 
1 Macdonald, (1977), pl2. 
2 Cluny Macpherson, 'Pacific Islanders', Pacific Viewpoint, Vol.20, 
No.2, (1979), pll4. 
3 Castles and Kosack, (1985), pp431ff. 
4 de Bres, ( 1976a) , pl. 
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great pain to portray Pacific Islanders as a social threat. In an 
election campaign marked by grave distortions and dishonest appeals to 
latent racism in the New Zealand population, the National Party engaged 
in constructing a moral panic about Pacific Island immigration. 5 The 
immigration of Pacific Islanders was selected out as a threat to the 
social structure and was presented, out of all proportion to its 
actuality, as one of New Zealand's most pressing social problems. This 
depiction was set against a history of concern about Islanders in New 
Zealand, and was based on the numerous, and frequently inaccurate, 
sensationalised and stereotyped stories about Pacific Islanders, which 
had abounded before and during the election. 6 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM: 
THE POLITICISATION OF PACIFIC ISLAND MIGRANTS 
As early as January 1974 the National Party stated its intentions to re-
examine its policies on immigration, and Muldoon (who became the leader 
of the party later in 1974), made clear that it was time for New Zealand 
to start shutting the door: "we have to get tough". 7 Immigration became 
one of the leader's main props for criticising the state of the New 
Zealand economy, and was largely seen as a useful scapegoat for health, 
housing, industrial relations and law and order problems. " The budget 
deficit of $497 million was seized upon by National members of parliament 
(MPs) as an example of how 'New Zealanders' were losing out to 
immigrants. That money, the National Party asserted, had not been spent 
to help the key export industries and thereby to support New Zealanders' 
5 Paul Spoonley, 'Polynesian Immigrant Workers in New Zealand', in 
Clive Moore, Jacqueline Leckie and Doug Munro (eds), Labour in the South 
Pacific, (Townsville, 1990a) , p158. 
6 See Chapter Two. 
7 Evening 
subjects', 18 
(0' Flynn) . 
Post, 'National 
January (1974), 
Party planning new approach to many 
and NZPD, Vol.391, (1974), p1842, 
• Evening Post, Campaign Analysis, 22 November (1975). 
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jobs, nor was it spent to improve the quality of life in New Zealand, 
rather it had been spent providing for the more than 60,000 immigrants 
who had arrived in New Zealand over the previous two years. 9 Moreover, 
according to the party, each immigrant was costing New Zealand $32,000, 
"and for 32,000 immigrants a year that runs into a figure exceeding 
$1,000 million. That is one of the additional burdens placed upon our 
taxpayers, and it must have a terrific impact upon the country's 
economy". 10 Immigration was portrayed as one of the most inflationary 
pressures on the economy, and the key to New Zealand's housing shortage 
problems . 1 1 
The first step, therefore, to controlling the economy, according to the 
National Party, was to cut immigration. 12 Significantly, the party's 
election policy, to cut immigration to a target of less than 10, 000 
immigrants a year, was not without appeal to many voters . 13 Many 
electors saw this proposal as both a method of alleviating immediate 
problems, such as unemployment and housing shortages, and as a step in 
the right direction to shaping New Zealand the way they wanted it. 14 
As well as proposing drastic cuts in the numbers of immigrants arriving 
in New Zealand, the leader of the National Party also proposed a 
probationary period for all new immigrants, during which time any 
indications of an inability to fit into the New Zealand way of life would 
9 NZPD, Vol.397, (1975), pl605. 
1 0 NZPD, Vol.398, (1975), p1774. 
1 1 NZPD, Vol.396, (1975), p120 & pp202-203, and NZPD, Vol.401, 
(1975) 1 pp4300,4303-4,4418. 
12 NZPD, Vol.400, (1975), p3521. 
1 3 National Party (New Zealand), National Party 1975 General Election 
Policy, (Wellington, 1975a) , pl. 
14 Stephen Levine, The New Zealand General Election of 1975, 
(Wellington, 1976), p25. 
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result in deportation. 15 This policy targeted, among others, British 
migrants, whom Muldoon held responsible for industrial violence and 
disorder, but it was interpreted more widely as a policy to curtail 
immigration from the Pacific Islands, and to control law and order 
problems among Pacific communities established in New Zealand. 1 6 When 
announcing the probation suggestion, the party leader frequently examined 
it, and the problem of law and order, in relation to Pacific Island 
immigrants. 17 Indeed, from the earliest stages of the National Party 
campaign, the party's focus on immigration had been discussed in 
connection with Pacific Islanders and the problems 'they caused' in New 
Zealand. Early criticisms of the Labour government's immigration policy 
had centred on the problems of law and order, and had been clearly framed 
in the stereotype of Pacific Island violence, by connecting immigration 
to the "thuggery and bashings that [had) been occurring in Auckland" . 18 
Similarly, within the immigration debate, Pacific Island immigrants were 
blamed for placing greater than normal pressure on social services. The 
Auckland Hospital Board, asserted National politicians, had a problem in 
coping with the needs of sick people from the Pacific Islands: 
Disproportionately many patients in Auckland public hospitals had 
come comparatively recently from the Pacific Islands, and many of 
them had complaints which should have prevented their coming to New 
Zealand in the first place. 19 
Increasingly, it became clear that where the National Party talked about 
immigration it was, more specifically, talking about Pacific Island 
immigration. Indeed, in a television interview in 1975, Muldoon 
contested the interviewer's assertion that migration from Britain was the 
15 Evening Post, 'Bad immigrants not wanted by Mr Muldoon', 19 May 
(1975). 
16 Levine, (1976), p25 . 
17 Evening Post, 'Bad immigrants not wanted by Mr Muldoon', 19 May 
(1975) . 
18 NZPD, Vol.391, (1974), p2326. 
19 NZPD, Vol.401, (1975), p4300, and Vol.389, (1974), p784. 
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only immigration problem, emphasising instead that migration from the 
Pacific Islands must be reduced. 20 Correspondingly, National party 
candidates continually answered questions on the general subject of 
immigration with the idea that 'We must provide more aid so that they 
won't want to come here', thus betraying their particular focus on 
immigration from the Pacific Islands. 21 The party even went so far as 
to propose that the immigration of Cook Islanders, who were (and still 
are) New Zealand citizens, should be reduced and, not surprisingly, 
elicited an angry response from the premier of the Cook Islands, Sir 
Albert Henry. 22 
The National Party persuaded formerly neutral New Zealanders that matters 
were more. serious than they had realised and provoked considerable and 
often poorly informed debate about the cost to the country of Pacific 
Islanders' presence. 23 In a National Research Bureau survey of political 
opinion conducted in July 1975 the issue of immigration displaced 
concerns about housing and unemployment, to rank as one of the top ten 
problems concerning electors at that time. 24 Even a newspaper editorial 
which was highly critical of the National Party's proposed immigration 
policies a~reed that immigration was a problem, especially Pacific Island 
immigration. 25 The media implicitly accepted, and thereby failed to 
challenge, the assumptions that were central to the National Party's 
campaign; that immigration was the cause of all New Zealand's problems, 
and that cuts to Pacific Island immigration in particular would solve 
20 de Bres, (1976), pl. 
21 ibid., p2. 
22 National Party, (1975a), pl, and Pacific Islands Monthly, 'NZ's 
Mr Muldoon annoyed Sir Albert', Vol.47, No.1, (1976), pl7. 
23 Macpherson, (1979), pllO. 
24 Evening Post, 'Industrial relations high on list of concerns of 
electors', 19 August (1975). 
25 Evening Post, 'Too harsh on the immigrant', 19 May (1975). 
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these problems. Indeed, some newspapers took the 'race'/immigration 
ideology even further than the National Party. Not long after the 
general election, the Auckland Star, a major Auckland daily newspaper, 
in calling for tougher restrictions on Pacific Island immigration to New 
Zealand, added a new dimension to National's 'send-them home' proposals: 
Where Samoans are involved in crime, we can apply the conditions 
of entry here and good behaviour is one - and revoke their 
permits or not renew them. New Zealand citizenship held by Cook 
[sic), Tokelauans and Niueans prevents deportation in the same way. 
But as New Zealand citizens, they should be subject to local 
probation law. New Zealand citizens sentenced by the Courts can 
be directed under the terms of probation to "live and work as 
directed." It should be made plain to this group of Islanders that 
these provisions apply to them, and that when they break laws, they 
can, and will, be directed to "live and work as directed," back in 
their home islands. 26 
s~ Rob,hes o 
1 Maori fron Sovthkw:J ... 
Figure 5.1 Every fear answered ... , Tom Scott, Listener, 1975. 27 
26 Auckland Star, 'It's time - NZ will have to be firm', 27 January 
(1976) . 
27 Tom Scott, 'Every fear answered ... ', Listener, Vol.80, No.1878, 
(1975), p13. 
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Frequent assertions and incessant innuendos from candidates, news 
reports, and talk-back radio shows all implied that the crux of New 
Zealand's problems (regardless of what those problems were) was migration 
from the Pacific Islands, and in this way the issue attracted an extreme 
amount of attention. 28 People who had been alerted to it by the 
immigration campaigns of 1974, became more aware of it and focused upon 
it. Once the stereotype was established, people believed it to explain 
all of society's ills. The overall mood of the public was such that 
general fear and anxiety could easily be converted into a paranoia 
centred upon Islanders. Particularly in the period of general social and 
economic insecurity and uncertainty that existed at the time, individuals 
seeking explanations and remedies for their altered circumstances, were 
ripe for the strong ideological lead that the National Party provided. 29 
'NEW ZEALAND THE WAY YOU WANT IT' 30 
The 'natural' evolution of political issues is not a common occurrence. 31 
In the modern political process political reality is carefully 
constructed by an elite of political media specialists and politicians. 
In 1975 the National Party ran much of their election campaign using the 
'race' /immigration issues that they had calculatingly defined. 32 These 
issues were at first subtly delineated through the media. As has been 
discussed, while in opposition the party consciously debated immigration 
issues and targeted Pacific Island immigration as a significant problem 
which required their attention. The mass media reported these issues in 
28 de Bres, ( 1976a) , pl. 
29 Judith Macdonald, (1986), p5, and Jane Kelsey and Warren Young, 
The Gangs: Moral Panic as Social Control, (Wellington, 1982), passim. 
30 National Party 1975 general election campaign slogan. 
31 Chris Wilkes, 'Politics and Television. In which Hanna-Barbera win 
an election by giving us what we want, the way we want it', MA Thesis, 
(Canterbury University, 1976), p35. 
32 ibid. 1 p96. 
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the form of news, but were in actual fact conveying the National Party's 
ideological and political agenda to the public. Similarly, Muldoon, the 
leader of the party, deliberately set out to develop a groundswell of 
public opinion by presenting a carefully designed message in his pre-
election speech tour in 1974. The media took up the message as news from 
. 
these speeches, placing his message before the public, and over time the 
issues that had been developed by the party came to be absorbed into the 
community. Moreover, the issues that were, in fact, consciously 
generated and reinforced by the party's propaganda machine eventually 
came to be seen by the public to arise spontaneously from society in 
general. 33 Thus, when Muldoon spoke to the 'problems' that he had had 
a role in defining, he was generally perceived to be accurately 
reflecting the public mood. Unlike his Labour counterparts, he was seen 
to have his finger on the pulse of the nation. 34 Indeed, in this there 
was some truth. 
The National Party's election campaign agenda was based to an extent on 
the voter survey polls which it had started as early as May 1973, and 
which it continued until the end of the election campaign. 35 
Particularly zealous in its market researching, the party was said to 
have "market researched the entire nation and every fear, real or 
imagined, [was) answered somewhere in the National party policy". 36 
The National Party's campaign was based entirely on the anxieties of the 
electorate which had been identified in the polls. After the initial 
surveys the party machine took over and, through propaganda, deliberately 
created problems which appealed to those fears. The solutions provided 
by the party were of the sort to appease anxieties, and provided the 
33 Blackburn, (1977), p217. 
3 4 Blackburn, (1977), pp102,150. 
35 Blackburn, (1977), p150. 
36 Tom Scott, 'Every fear answered ... ', Listener, Vol.80, No.1878, 
( 19 7 5 ) 1 pp 13 - 14 • 
1975 General Election p83 
layperson with the 'just enough' sort of knowledge s/he needed to feel 
informed about the political matters of the day. 37 Consequently, the 
overall image of the campaign was subjective and difficult to pin down. 
The details were only vehicles for the overall image; it was an 
impression and not factual content that was important. The objective of 
the campaign was to keep an overall image in people's minds to support 
particular myths, and the issues were submerged and distorted by symbolic 
images and the secondary reality constructed by the politicians and their 
team of propagandists. 38 
The party developed in this way, for instance, the myth and patriotic 
image of the ideal 'Kiwi bloke' as a campaign tool. They could point out 
that the traditional order of New Zealand society was being eroded a way 
(without being explicit about the reasons why or how this was the case) 
and develop their policies about bringing back and preserving those past 
attributes that made New Zealand great. They used to effect, as Muldoon 
did in his ' Meet the People' campaign late in 1974, the traditional idiom 
of the everyday New Zealander. 39 National represented Muldoon as the 
ordinary 'bloke' in the street, while it's policies were represented as 
being grounded 'fair and square in the issues of the day' . Its campaign 
was aimed at the blue-collar and white-collar worker. According to a 
senior member of the National Party publicity organisation: 
He [Muldoon] was aiming at the worker on the factory floor, 
concerned about threats to his employment and union officials 
seemingly unconcerned about his needs; at the working class urban 
dwellers concerned over law and order, and the influx of Polynesian 
migrants; at the elderly and the solo mothers. 40 
The basic image of the problematic world which the ' ordinary bloke' would 
no t understand was evo ked in the election slogan of "New Zealand the way 
37 Wilkes, ( 1976) , p37. 
38 Blackburn, ( 1977) , p164. 
39 Levine, ( 1976) , p5. 
40 Anonymous interview quoted in Blackburn, (1977), p155. 
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you want it". 4 1 The party's early definition of problems and successful 
use of market research meant that the part of their messages which 
spelled out political problems were already firmly embedded in the minds 
of most voters. National merely repeated back to voters the sort of 
anxieties that research told them were already of common concern . Thus, 
half of their policy was already acceptable to voters and all they had 
to do was to provide some useful looking solutions. 42 
Hence the general public concerns about immigration were translated into 
National's manifesto and electioneering advertisements . Coupled with its 
image of the 'Kiwi bloke' was anti-immigrant sentiment. It had always 
existed in New Zealand, but under National's right-wing propaganda 
machine it flourished and the party exploited it extensively throughout 
their campaign. 43 
THE CAMPAIGN MESSAGE 
In its manifesto guide, the party repeated its commitment to cutting 
immigration to protect New Zealanders' "quality of life and living 
standards" and to deporting immigrants who broke the law . 44 It also 
spelled out the importance of carefully assessing immigrants, and 
promised to review immigration policy so that "procedures will include 
examination of the capacity of the individual immigrant and family to 
adapt to New Zealand society" . 45 It was a thinly veiled attack on 
Pacific Island immigrants and was repeated under other guises elsewhere 
in the manifesto. Under the heading of 'The Economy', the party blamed 
41 Blackburn, (1977), p210. 
42 Wilkes, (1976), p63. 
43 Blackburn, (1977) , pp96-97. 
44 National Party (New Zealand), 1975 National Party Manifesto: A 
Guide to What the Next National Government will do for New Zealand, 
(Wellington, 1975b), p16. 
45 ibid . 
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immigration for unemployment and the strain on development resources, 
claiming that immigrants cost the country around $11 , 000 each, and 
calling for immigration to be cut 'to the bone' . 46 This bid was 
repeated under 'Urban Development ' , and was juxtaposed with the "problem 
of crime and violence in our larger cities", covertly framing the 
discussion once again in the context of Pacific Island immigration. 
We will stop the sprawl .. . tackle the social problems -particularly 
those which have emerged in Auckland .. .. we cannot create a better 
environment when people are pouring into the country faster than 
anybody can provide houses - any kind of houses . Thus immigration 
will be cut from the current rate of 30,000 per year to around 
5, 000. This will give us the breathing space we so desperately 
need . 47 
The role of television was a central one in defining the political 
realities in the 1975 general election . 48 The campaign was very widely 
viewed on television and the average viewer watched a great majority of 
the campaign programmes offered. Television dominated all other sources 
of information about the election . 49 
Much of the material in the National Party campaign was a propagandised 
misrepresentation of everyday life, and this was even more true of their 
television campaign . The television advertisements and campaign 
statements employed by the party were a deliberate distortion of everyday 
life and experience. 50 Instead of a two-way flow of information between 
participants , this part of the campaign was characterised by a one-way 
flow from the television transmitter to the viewer. Instead of a 
position of full accountability between participants, a situation exis t ed 
where there was no accountability . The sort of political knowledge which 
46 ibid. 1 pl. 
47 ibid. 1 p11. 
48 Wilkes, (1976) 1 p84 . 
49 ibid. 1 pp69-72 . 
50 Wilkes, (1976) 1 p84. 
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was represented via this medium was thus able be in the form of half-
truths, lies and exaggerations. 51 The National Party made little attempt 
to reflect political realities, and its manipulation of knowledge made 
the best possible use of the television's lack of accountability, to say 
what they liked, without fear of recrimination. 52 One commentator at the 
time explained that: 
National intends to support the grass-roots kiwi ... with all his 
private and individual motivations which aren't necessarily planted 
in reality, but are securely planted in nationalism and fear of the 
unknown. 53 
National's television campaign took two major forms, the first being 
short political advertisements. These were three minutes in duration and 
received exposure on both television channels on repeated occasions, 
always at peak viewing hours. 54 The messages were succinct, clear and 
unequivocal and provided clear statements of policy in a form the average 
viewer could digest. Once again the party's principal election 
scapegoats, the immigrants, figured prominently. In its advertisement 
on housing, the party blamed the housing shortage on immigration, stating 
that this was why "the average deposit on a house in Auckland jumped from 
$5,000 to $10,000. And why State rental housing lists are now the 
longest in New Zealand's history". 55 National neglected to develop a 
direct relationship between immigrants, housing shortages and the 
development of private capital. This was tied up with tackling the 
'number one cause' of the housing problem which was never really 
51 ibid., pp84-86. 
52 ibid 0 I pB 7 0 
53 Reg Birchfield, National Business Review, 26 November 1975, p5, 
cited in Wilkes, (1976), pBS. 
54 Wilkes, (1976), p56. 
55 Transcript of full text of advertisement, cited in Wilkes, ( 1976) , 
pl21. 
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specified, but immigration was connected vaguely with it. 56 Its policy 
was not designed to solve specific problems, but to offer ambiguous 
statements about general social problems . Similarly, in its 
advertisement about the cities, National blamed immigrants for housing 
shortages, crime and the shortage of social services. 57 Immigration 
supplied a simplistic and 'obvious' answer without the party having to 
enter the more complex issues involved such as the problems of town 
planning in a laissez faire free market economy or, more importantly , the 
responsibility of former National governments for the declining economy. 
Instead, what National based its advertisements on were unsubstantiated 
truisms . 58 
The other major part of the National Party television campaign was in the 
form of cartoons created by the animation team Hanna-Barbera. The 
cartoons mercilessly lampooned Labour's shortcomings and grossly 
exaggerated and distorted the problems besetting New Zealand . 59 The 
whole emphasis in this part of their message was on the emotional sell 
and the resulting cartoons were very controversial . Some of the footing 
on one advertisement on 'Industrial Relations' was sufficiently emotional 
to stop either channel running it without cuts and it was modified before 
showing. 60 A spokesman for Colenso , National's marketing agency, 
explained that if there was nothing essentially logical about the 
product , "we will do it emotionally" . 61 
56 Blackburn, (1977) , p175. 
57 Transcript of full advertisement, cited in Blackburn, (1977), 
pl92. 
p63 . 
58 Blackburn, (1977), p195. 
59 Wilkes, ( 1976), p63. 
60 ibid. 1 p64. 
61 Mike Wall in Listener 2 October 1972, cited in Wilkes, ( 1976) , 
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One television cartoon in particular graphically illustrated National's 
scapegoating of Pacific Island immigrants. It depicted a Polynesian 
character snarling and clawing the air like a tiger, then fighting with 
a Pakeha while a narrator warned that Labour policies had caused 
unemployment, which in turn aroused anger and violence, "especially among 
those who came from other places expecting great things. " 62 An 
investigating officer from the Race Relations Office, which fielded 
protest over the advertisement, accused the party of "climbing on the 
bandwagon of Polynesian violence", and felt that: 
the cartoon obviously referred to Polynesians, and that the 
implication was that Polynesians are violent people, or more 
correctly, are involved in the violence on our streets. More 
importantly, however, the featuring of a Polynesian-type figure 
only in violent situation, in the light of the adverse, negative 
publicity relating to Polynesians and violence, has the net effect 
of stereotyping Polynesians as violent people. 63 
The cartoon was clearly intended to arouse ill-feeling against immigrants 
from the Pacific , and placed the party's other campaign statements about 
immigration firmly within that context . 
So much of the National Party's campaign material was questionable that 
a case could have been made to have had large sections of it removed from 
the campaign. As it was, however, everything but one small section of 
film was shown , and the anxieties which National portrayed, even though 
grossly distorted, were acceptable to a surprisingly large number of 
people. In a survey on the television campaigns, fully fifty-two percent 
of all voters, regardless of their own voting persuasion, made it clear 
that National's was the most effective campaign. 64 While a sizeable 
minority objected to the National Party material, it was National's 
campaign that was likely to remain in the public mind, rather than the 
62 Quoted in Prue Toft, 'Overstayers: A Case of Exaggeration ', in 
Paul Spoonley and Walter Hirsh (eds), Between the Lines. Racism and the 
New Zealand Media, (Auckland, 1990), p112. 
~ ibid., pp112-113 . 
64 Wilkes, (1976) , p72. 
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reasoned views of the other parties, in the years to come. 65 The emotive 
quality of its racist arguments tended to obscure their irrationality and 
to prolong, if not perpetuate, their influence. 66 This was especially 
so as the National Party's campaign, and therefore it's messages about 
Pacific Island immigration, was never effectively challenged. 
The media failed to challenge the party's assumptions about immigration , 
and particularly its message that immigration from the Pacific Islands 
constituted a problem . Instead, the media in general sanctioned the 
fundamental assumptions of the 'race ' /immigration ideology . In fact, 
earlier depictions of Pacific Islanders in the mass media, as some kind 
of aberration or problem, gave the National Party the licence and the 
material with which to further promote negative stereotypes and images. 
Hence media-derived ideas were actually more conducive to the development 
of hostility towards Pacific Islanders than acceptance. 67 
Similarly, the Labour Party failed to challenge the opposition's 
campaign. The emotionalism of National's campaign might have been 
countered if the Labour government had bothered to reply to its blatant 
manipulation of people's fears , but the Labour party made little or no 
effective reply to National's allegations. 68 The Labour Party's campaign 
was lacklustre and its television advertising fell down badly. 69 It did 
not define any problems , instead suggesting that there was little wrong 
with things as they were and that there was, therefore , no need to 
provide any solutions. This did little to reassure voters' fears and 
65 Wilkes , ( 1977), p88. 
66 Roy, (1975), p450. 
67 Cashmore and Troyna , (1983) , p211. See also Spoonley, (1990b) , 
pp31-37 . 
68 R.T . Robertson, 'The Elections and Unemployment', New Zealand 
Monthly Review, Vol.16, No . 174 , (1976), p3. 
69 Evening Post, 'Organisation: that is what National had as Labour's 
faltered', 4 December, (1975). 
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even less to counter National's claims. 7 0 Whereas modern techniques of 
market research and careful attention to the importance of organisation 
played a significant part in the success of National's campaign, Labour's 
organisation staggered along by comparison and showed signs of being 
below strength. 71 
Moreover, the fact the Labour government had already, in 1974, 
constructed Pacific Island immigration as a political problem also meant 
that, far from challenging National's negative portrayal of Pacific 
Islanders and immigration in 1975, the Labour and National parties could 
actually be seen to desire the same thing: controlled immigration from 
the Pacific. 72 Indeed, in 1975 the minister of immigration, Fraser 
Colman, continued to reproduce the same prejudices to which National 
appealed by asserting that "illegal immigrants" (a term which following 
the overstayer campaigns of 1974 was generally perceived to mean Pacific 
Islanders) were taking up employment which would otherwise be available 
to unemployed New Zealand workers. 73 In actual fact, on the issue of 
Pacific Island immigration to New Zealand the Labour Party agreed with 
National's particular formulation of the political problem, and its 
solution. 
Hence, the 'race' /immigration ideology was reproduced and brought to 
greater prominence by the National Party in 1975. A complex interaction 
between grassroots political consciousness and formal political activity 
and propaganda, mediated by newspaper and television coverage that 
acceded to the sort of negative stereotypes that were promoted, saw that 
70 Wilkes, (1976), pp61 - 62. 
71 Evening Post, 'Organisation: that is what National has as Labour's 
faltered', 4 December (1975) . 
72 Yvonne Chan, 'Overstaying challenge followed by change', 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, Vol.11, No.2, (1981), p214. 
73 Fraser Colman, Press Statement, 25 June (1975), cited in Chan, 
(1981) 1 p211. 
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the representation of Pacific Island immigrants as 'problem' was further 
entrenched. One social commentator remarked that 
I would have said that New Zealanders were reasonable, tolerant, 
liberal and fair-minded. I would have expected them to reject the 
election of a party that promoted itself on the platforms of fear, 
such as fear of the immigrant. Instead, the campaign went down 
perfectly. 74 
In fact, the National Party won the election with a remarkable 8.6% swing 
to National and 10.4% swing away from Labour. ~ In a reversal of the 
previous election, the Labour government lost twenty-one seats to 
National, including the seats held by five ministers. 76 The National 
Party had won a political struggle, and more significantly, the 
ideological struggle to ensure that Pacific Island immigration became the 
focus of attention as the cause of all New Zealand's troubles. 77 
The immigration of Pacific Islanders to New Zealand had been successfully 
defined by the party as a pressing political problem and, ominously, on 
the night of election victory, the National Party leader, Robert Muldoon, 
made the statement that immigration would be one of the more immediate 
aspects to which the incoming government would turn its attention in the 
new year. 78 Having firmly established in people's minds strong, albeit 
irrational, connections between Pacific Island immigration and law and 
order problems, housing shortages and unemployment, the National Party 
succeeded, during this period, in readying the public for deliberate and 
74 Brian Edwards, quoted in Vernon Wright, 'If you don't like it here 
why don't you go home?', Listener, Vol.84, No.1928, (1976), p15. 
75 Evening Post, 'Labour government thrown into the wilderness by 
electors in massive upset', 1 December (1975). 
76 ibid., and Alan McRobie, 'The Politics of Volatility, 1972-1991', 
in Geoffrey W. Rice (ed), The Oxford History of New Zealand, (Auckland, 
1992) 1 p391. 
77 Miles and Phizacklea, (1984), p21. 
78 Evening Post, 'Giving back, cutting down, and keeping out are the 
big National issues', 1 December (1975). 
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drastic action in the form of new immigration campaigns against Pacific 
Islanders in 1976. 
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II CHAPTHR SLX II 
1976 DAWN RAIDS AND RANDOM CHECKS 
One of the first actions of the new National government was to move to 
implement its desire to cut immigration to New Zealand 'to the bone'. 
Having been appointed minister of immigration, Frank Gill announced that 
one of his first jobs in the new year would be to travel around the 
Pacific (not, significantly, to other immigration sources) to inform the 
Pacific Island governments of the need to reduce migration. 1 
Gill toured the Pacific in January 1976, significantly, without a press 
entourage, and stepped along a very fine line between the opposing 
responsibilities of appearing to the New Zealand public to make change 
while assuring Pacific Island leaders that things would, more or less, 
stay the same. According to one commentator, Gill's trip had to serve 
two purposes: 
on the one hand , to appear to put into effect a policy of "acting 
tough" on Pacific migration following the National Party's appeal 
to unfounded fears and racist attitudes during the election 
campaign, and, on the other, to tell Pacific Island governments 
that there would be no basic change in policy and possibly even 
some improvements on Labour's record (in preparation for the next 
period of economic expansion when we may need more workers in a 
hurry). 2 
At the end of the tour, in Fiji, Gill stated that there would be very 
little change. "The immigration policy of the new Government," he said, 
"will remain about the same as that of the previous Labour Government." 3 
In New Zealand, on his return, however, he gave a very different version, 
1 Evening Post, ''Come back in February,' British would-be migrants 
to NZ Told' , 13 December (1975) . 
2 de Bres, ( 1976a) , p2. 
3 Fiji Times, 10 February 1976, quoted in de Bres, (1976a), pp2-3. 
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triumphantly announcing new, tighter immigration regulations. The Cook 
Islands government, he said, was to, hence forth, require evidence of 
jobs and accommodation in New Zealand before nationals could enter New 
Zealand. These regulations had, however, already been agreed to by the 
Cook Islanders before the National Party took office. Moreover, 
enforcement of these regulations at the New Zealand end was completely 
impossible without depriving the Cook Islanders of their New Zealand 
citizenship and there were, in fact, no plans to do this. 4 
Gill also announced that visitor's permits for Tongans, Fijians and 
Western Samoans would be cut from three months to one (compared with the 
six months for visitors from other countries), but this also had been put 
in place by the previous government. All Gill did was refuse to change 
the restrictions when asked to do so by Island governments. 5 Likewise, 
the National cabinet adopted the previous government's work permit scheme 
with only minor modification, and although it was extended to Fiji 
(January) and Western Samoa (June) , negotiations for these inclusions had 
begun long before in 1975 under the Labour government. 6 
In actual fact, Labour had done National's job for them. Despite 
National's heavy emphasis on a new immigration policy as a solution for 
everything from inflation to housing and law and order, there was little 
left for them to change. 7 The only substantial change made to policy by 
the new government was the abandonment of the permanent quota for Tongans 
(150 annually) established by the outgoing Labour government, and the 
commitment to halve the Western Samoan permanent quota of 1500 per year 
de Bres, ( 1976a) , p3, and Anthony Haas, 'South Pacific 
Immigration', New Zealand Economist, Vol.38, No.1, (1976), p24. 
5 de Bres, (1976a), p3, and Macdonald, (1977), pl2. 
6 NZPD, Vol. 406, p308 9, and Vol. 4 08, p4694, ( 1976) . See also Chapter 
Three. 
7 de Bres, ( 1976a) , p2. 
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over two years. 8 Yet, during the election campaign, the National Party 
had done its utmost to prove the inadequacies of the Labour 
administration's immigration policies, and it needed to be seen to do 
more than simply adopt and continue those same policies. Having created, 
during their election bid, the bogey of 'brown hordes' descending upon 
New Zealand, they were required to go through the elaborate ritual of 
appearing to put the bogey back in the cupboard. 9 
Consequently, in February 1976, dawn raids resumed. At 6 . 0 0 a.m. on 
Tuesday, 17 February, police and immigration officials descended on the 
Onehunga home of Mrs Telesia Topping, a Tongan married to a New Zealander 
and who had lived in New Zealand ten years. 
At 6 o'clock we were all asleep except for one, who had to be at 
work at seven. He was making breakfast when he saw a policeman 
trying to push up the window. He was pointing towards the door. 
As the door opened, they burst inside. Four were inside, four more 
outside the house. 
A young policeman, about 22 years old, came into my room. I'd just 
opened my eyes because of the noise. I asked him what he was doing 
in my bedroom. He did not answer. I was really frightened. He 
went into the bathroom, inspected it came back and pulled the 
covers off my bed, looked under the bed. I called out to him again 
what he was doing in my bedroom. He ignored me. 
He pulled open the wardrobe, fiddled with the clothing, checked 
everything. The same policeman went into the adjoining room where 
my two nephews, aged 19 and 20 years were asleep. the policeman 
shone the light into their eyes, saying 'get up and get out' . 
Another pol iceman was also there. My nephews were very frightened. 
The police then started dragging them out to their van. 
One of them said they were taking us in because we were illegal 
immigrants and I told them we were not. 10 
Papers were produced to prove that the six were legal immigrants and they 
were allowed to go back inside the house. After further questioning Mrs 
Topping, the police and officials left without apology. All the people 
8 NZPD, Vol.404, (1976), p1512. 
9 de Bres, ( 1976a) , p2. 
10 Auckland Star, 'Dawn raids start again for illegal Tongan 
migrants', 19 February (1976). 
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had legal permits and had in no way breached the Immigration Act. 11 
Further raids were made in Wellington, where the deputy director of 
immigration, D. Bond, claimed that there had been no change in procedure 
and that the raids were simply part of a continuing programme of 
apprehending overstayers. 12 Subsequent statements from the head of the 
Auckland immigration division, A.W. Smith, compounded people's concerns 
when he made clear that checks had not only been intensified since 
Christmas, when the division had apparently been given more staff, but 
also that officials acted on every tip-off, even if it was an anonymous 
phone call. 13 Moreover, he admitted that about half of the raids 
conducted actually yielded nothing . 14 
The immigration minister, Frank Gill, defended the raids, calling them, 
instead, 'visits', and stated that it was simply unfortunate but 
unavoidable that inquiries had to be made at times and places considered 
by some to be inconvenient. 1 5 Significantly, he made clear that Pacific 
Islanders were again the primary targets of the immigration campaign: 
Anyone who enters this country on a work permit or visitor permit 
is made fully aware that he or she must abide by the conditions of 
entry. Most such people, tourists and working visitors alike, from 
most parts of the world, do observe the law. A few, however - and 
most of these unfortunately are from the Pacific Islands - choose 
to ignore it and trust instead to the 11th commandment, 'Thou shalt 
not get caught' . 16 
11 ibid. 
12 Dominion, 'Migrant raids lead to 2 arrests', 20 February (1976). 
13 Auckland Star, 'Dawn raids start again for illegal Tongan 
migrants', 19 February (1976) . 
1 4 ibid. 
15 New Zealand Herald, 'Alternative Sought To Dawn Raids', 25 
February (1976). 
16 Dominion, 'Gill stands up for night 'visits'', 25 February (1976). 
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In March, anti-racism groups and Island community and church leaders 
began making various representations to the government for an amnesty for 
illegal immigrants . Up until this point, developments almost exactly 
paralleled those of 1974, the only difference being that in 1976 all 
Island immigrants, and not just Tongans, were being targeted. However, 
while in 1974 the government dealt with the aftermath of the campaigns 
with little publicity and few problems, further incidents in 1976 caused 
serious embarrassment to the government and ensured that the overstayer 
issue remained highly visible and contentious. 17 
At the end of March Gill stated that refugees from majority rule in 
Rhodesia were the 'kith and kin' of New Zealanders and should be treated 
sympathetically. "We have a sort of affinity with white Rhodesians," he 
said, "they are our sort of people . " 18 This was interpreted as clearly 
meaning that white Rhodesians were regarded as more preferable immigrants 
to Pacific Islanders. 1 9 Furthermore, a remark by the prime minister, 
Robert Muldoon, that the newly independent Tuvalu was eight islands, 
7,000 people and lots of coconuts that nobody wanted was widely reported 
and created considerable anger, especially given Gill's earlier 
statements that Rhodesian refugees would be welcomed by New Zealand. 20 
A Fiji Times editorial commented: 
This is precisely the kind of remark that nobody in the Pacific 
wants, and if Mr Muldoon does not quickly become aware of Pacific 
sensibilities he will all the more quickly be regarded as someone 
who stands for attitudes which have now for some time been regarded 
as unacceptable . 21 
17 Macdonald, (1977), p12. 
18 Quoted in Macdonald, (1977), p12. 
19 ibid. 
20 Quoted in Irene Webley, 'Tonga and the Soviet Union: Problems in 
New Zealand-Tonga Relationships', New Zealand International Review, 
Vol.1, No.5, (1976), ppll - 12. 
21 ibid . 1 p12 • 
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At a meeting in April, Gill firmly secured the disdain of Island 
community leaders and left the New Zealand Pacific Islands community 
almost totally alienated from the government. 22 Pacific Island leaders 
had been particularly keen to obtain from the government a general 
amnesty for all overstayers, which would have regard to the human 
problems and the needs of Pacific Island communities and people involved, 
and with that in mind had arranged a meeting as a dialogue with Gill in 
Auckland, for which Island representatives spent many hours preparing 
submissions for the minister. 23 However, Gill demonstrated that he was 
unwilling to discuss the overstayer problem. He attended the meeting, 
only to read a prepared statement which he had already released to the 
press, in which he announced, without discussion or modification, 
decisions that had been reached in advance regarding a stay of 
proceedings until 30 June and an overstayer register, similar to the one 
implemented in 1974. 24 However, Gill not only made a nonsense of the 
time, money and effort the various Pacific Island groups had put into 
preparing for what they believed to be a genuine consultation, he also 
offended leaders by criticising their estimates of the number of 
overstayers actually in New Zealand. Island representatives had, before 
the conference, carried out a field survey from which they estimated the 
number of Island overstayers to be about 3,500. Gill, however, 
contradicted this with unfounded estimates of at least 10,000 to 12,000 
overstayers, two thirds of whom he asserted to be Pacific Islanders. 25 
Island leaders' immediate reaction was to pass a motion not to co-operate 
with the register. They accused Gill of blatantly disregarding their 
submissions, and made a statement which said that: 
22 B. Macdonald, (1977), pl3. 
23 Amnesty Aroha, 'Submission to Government November 1976', (1976), 
pp7,17 . 
24 ibid. 
25 Auckland Star, 'Overstayer figures inflated to scare Kiwis says 
lawyer', 12 April (1976). 
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Mr Gill had flagrantly abused the mutual respect and alienated the 
council's co-operation by his actions. Mr Gill injured our pride 
and dignity and lowered his stature in our eyes by engineering the 
meeting to appear that his Wellington-made decision, with a little 
slot to accommodate us, was a consensus agreement among all parties 
involved. 26 
Hence, for the first three weeks following the opening of the government 
register in Auckland only thirty people had signed. 2 7 
However, it became clear to Pacific Island community representatives that 
the minister of immigration had no intention of granting a total amnesty. 
After further meetings with Gill had satisfied community leaders that the 
majority who signed the government's register would be granted permanent 
residence, they embarked, in good faith, on a major programme to get 
overstayers to sign the register . 28 The task undertaken by the Island 
community was not made easy by the government. Government publicity 
about the register only began in earnest about two and a half weeks 
before the register closed, and the onus was upon the Island community 
to inform overstayers about the stay of proceedings and help them to 
register. 29 Moreover, in June the Department of Labour began mailing out 
a four-page, twenty-one question application form for permanent residence 
or permit extensions t o those people who had signed the register. The 
forms were written entirely in English and had to be returned, along with 
two references and two photographs, within seven days of posting from the 
department. 30 Given that by that stage almost four thousand people had 
26 New Zealand Herald, 'Island Leaders May Visit Capital', 15 April 
(1976) . 
27 New Zealand Herald, '30 Illegal Immigrants On Register', 2 May 
( 1976) . 
28 Amnesty Aroha, (1976), p18, and Webley, (1976), pl1. 
29 NZPD, Vol.404, (1976), p1044, and Dominion, 'Immigrant details 
won't be published - Gill', 28 May (1976). 
30 New Zealand Herald, 'Big Hurdle Ahead For Overstayers', 29 June 
(1976 ) , and Joris de Bres, 'Naught for our Comfort', New Zealand Monthly 
Review, Vol.17, No.180, (1976b), p8. 
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registered, community and church leaders found that they suddenly had to 
provide literally thousands of references within a week. In the 
resulting panic, the deadline for the return of applications was extended 
two further weeks, but the forms revealed other problems for the 
overstayers. 31 Applicants had to give details of all employment they had 
had in New Zealand, and it was clear that work records would be taken 
into consideration in decisions to grant permanent residence, but in the 
constant struggle to evade detection over time, many overstayers had 
changed jobs regularly and their work records, as a result, suggested 
instability and lack of promotion to skilled work. 32 
Although the numbers coming forward to sign the register tended to 
confirm the estimates given previously by Island leaders, Gill continued 
to assert that there were considerably more overstayers and even revised 
his earlier estimate of 10,000-12,000 upwards. 33 Indeed, when the 
register closed at the end of June, with 4,627 people having registered, 
Gill expressed disappointment with the figure, claiming that there were 
still many more Island overstayers who had failed to sign. 34 Despite 
the assurances of Island leaders that most Island overstayers had 
registered, Gill announced new measures for seeking out unregistered 
overstayers, including the use o f a computer to cross check immigration 
records. 35 As had been the case in almost all of Gill's discussions 
about illegal immigration and overstaying, his statements were couched 
solely in terms of immigration from the Pacific. "The overstayer problems 
must be eradicated," he said, "This is necessary for the good of those 
31 New Zealand Herald, 'Deadline Is Extended', 9 July (1976). 
32 Joris de Bres, 
Review, Vol.17, No.180, 
'Naught for our 
( 1976b) ' p8. 
Comfort', New Zealand Monthly 
33 Evening Post, 'Overstayers are revised - upwards', 17 April, 
(1976) . 
34 New Zealand Herald, 'Still Time to Register', 26 June (1976). 
35 New Zealand Herald, ''Brain' to Catch Overstayers', 10 July 
(1976) . 
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Island people legitimately in this country. " 3 6 
We don't want to do anything clumsy, such as taking arrest 
warrants, but if there were an outcry against efforts to find 
overstayers, this would just have to be lived with in the best 
interests of New Zealand. One way of getting at the problem would 
be to issue all New Zealanders with identity cards, but this should 
be avoided. We hope to avoid these sorts of controls and with co-
operation, we will do s o . If we are going to keep our society 
open, we must put up with the inconvenience of people enquiring 
about overstayers. It's a simple thing to live with. 37 
Figure 6.1 The Gangplank, Minhinnick, New Zealand Herald, 1976. 3 8 
Having placed faith in the government and their credibility on the line 
to persuade overstayers to sign the register, Pacific Island leaders were 
36 New Zealand Herald, ''Brain To Catch Overstayers', 10 July (1976). 
37 Christchurch Press, 10 July ( 1976), cited in Amnesty Aroha, 
(1976), p 20. 
38 Reproduced in Mary Boyd, 
Islands', in Keith Sinclair (ed), 
Zealand, (Auckland, 1990), p315 . 
'New Zealand and the other Pacific 
The Oxford Illustrated History of New 
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dismayed by events that followed its closure. 39 A special department of 
labour committee established to consider the registered overstayers' 
applications was composed exclusively of immigration officials. Their 
terms of reference were not disclosed, and they sat in private, although 
as gesture of fairness they allowed a member of the Inter Church 
Commission on Immigration to sit in as an observer. 4 0 By late August it 
became clear that, contrary to Island community leaders' earlier 
understanding of meetings with the minister, not only were applications 
being rejected but they were being rejected at a rate of about half the 
total number of applications considered. 41 This caused concern not only 
for leaders in New Zealand, but also leaders at home in the islands for 
whom the prospect of a sudden repatriation of workers to already strained 
island economies was deeply alarming. 42 
Even more distressing for Island representatives, perhaps, was the fact 
that Islanders who had signed the register were being arrested - contrary 
to the explicit promise that signing would provide immunity from 
prosecution. In late July a registered overstayer was arrested, on a 
warrant issued sixteen days after Gill had opened the stay of proceedings 
for registered overstayers, and was held overnight in police cells. The 
man's lawyer said that he had already appeared for four others in the 
same situation. 43 Despite Gill's assurances that the charges laid 
against the man would be withdrawn, by mid-August nothing had been done 
to clear up the matter and the man had his second appearance in court. 44 
39 Auckland Star, 'Tongan charged after registered', 24 July ( 1976) . 
40 Amnesty Aroha, (1976), p8. 
41 New Zealand Herald, 'Rejections Upset Samoan PM', 30 August 
( 1976) . 
42 ibid., and Government of Tonga, Government Papers, (1976). 
43 Auckland Star, 'Tongan charged after registered' , 24 July ( 1976) . 
44 New Zealand Herald, ''Satisfied' About Tongan's Case', 16 august 
(1976). 
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Moreover, it was revealed that warrants for arrest had been issued for 
74 people who were registered as overstayers. 45 
By late September 1723 applications had been accepted for permanent 
residence, compared with 1764 who were to be sent home at various dates 
from 31 January the following year. 46 About the same time, the 
government resumed actions to seek out or hunt down overstayers who had 
not signed the register, and Pacific Island community leaders, in some 
cases reluctantly, assented to the resumption of the raids, as long as 
they were done in a humane and dignified manner, in order to protect 
those who had acted in good faith and complied with the government's 
register. 47 The combined result was serious divisions within the Pacific 
community, between registered overstayers who were allowed to stay, 
registered overstayers who were told to go home, unregistered overstayers 
who began to feel that they had done the best thing by not having 
anything to do with the register, legal Pacific Island residents, and 
registered overstayers who, having been told to go home, decided to go 
underground once more in order to remain in New Zealand. 4 8 
Events in New Zealand contrasted starkly with solutions found in Canada 
and Australia during this period. In 1973 the Canadian government opened 
an intensive two - month search for foreigners who were in the country 
illegally - not to get them out but to welcome them in. The purpose of 
the drive was to give illegal immigrants a chance to regularise their 
status and, as one government advertisement phrased it, "to make our 
45 New Zealand Herald, 'Good Faith Move on Overstayers', 18 August 
( 1976) . 
46 NZPD, Vol.406, (1976), p3104, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
'Immigration: Overstayers', New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.26, 
No.6, (1976), p43. 
47 Auckland Star, 'Overstayer gets cold shoulder', 7 October (1976), 
and Amnesty Aroha, (1976), pp23-24. 
48 Amnesty Aroha, (1976), p23. 
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country your country". 49 Any illegal immigrant who had settled in Canada 
with a job, family ties, job prospects, or who, for any other reason, 
could show that they could become established in Canada, were invited to 
become Canadians . The director of the campaign explained: 
What we're really saying is, look, if you're here in Canada, and 
you're generally getting along O.K., we're going to let you stay, 
and we're not going to ask how you got here. 50 
The only criterion was the desire and reasonable ability to become a 
citizen, and tens of thousands of people came forward to claim permanent 
status and citizenship. 51 Similarly, in Australia in 1976, a full 
amnesty was granted to 30,000 overstayers there, solving the problem that 
they were facing in both a humane and expeditious way. 52 
In New Zealand some placatory gestures were made. Muldoon personally 
attended meetings of South Pacific leaders in 1976 and, when discussing 
the issue of repatriation with heads of governments in Suva in early 
October, he held out the possibility of allowing greater numbers of 
overstayers to remain in New Zealand and of phasing the repatriation of 
others. 53 Similarly, Gill announced plans to visit the Pacific later in 
November but, despite these conciliations, the situation in New Zealand 
went from bad to worse. 54 
4 9 Quoted in Amnesty Aroha, (1976), p13. 
50 ibid. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid o 1 p14 • 
53 New Zealand Herald, 'NZ Has Second Thoughts On Islanders', 14 
October ( 1976), and Macdonald, ( 1977), p13. 
54 New Zealand Herald, 'Overstayer Talks Trip', 15 October (1976). 
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RANDC»'' STREET CHECKS 
On 21 October the police began a series of random checks on Polynesian s 
in the streets of Auckland. In an unprecedented move, police teams 
sought out dark-skinned drinkers in pubs, passengers at taxi ranks, and 
pedestrians in Auckland's streets, demanding evidence of their 
citizenship and right to be in New Zealand . 55 After a night in which 
patrols stopped hundreds of Polynesians in the streets, Auckland chief 
superintendent, A.G . Berriman , warned , "Anyone who speaks in a non-Kiwi 
accent or looks as though he was not born in this country should carry 
a passport . " 56 Berriman asserted that the checks were made completely 
at random, yet by his comments it was made clear that Pacific Islanders 
were the targets: 
Naturally we'd look twice at someone we did not think was New 
Zealand born .... Anyone who speaks with a non-New Zealand accent 
must arouse some query or suspicion as a first step . .. . . We went for 
the obvious ones first .... You look at the likely places if you are 
after something . Why would you look in Kohimarama or Remuera? 
[both wealthy, and white, middle-class Auckland suburbs] .. .. It 
would help us and them if Pacific Islanders carried passports 
during this period. 57 
One newspaper described a young Samoan man, Iakopo-Tevaga Sio, wrongly 
arrested while walking down an Auckland street, who spent almost fourteen 
hours sobbing in an Auckland police cell before it was found out that he 
was a legal immigrant. 58 Another wrote that only two of twelve arrested 
during the Thursday blitz appeared later in court on immigration charges . 
Four of the others had been continuing residents in New Zealand for a 
55 Auckland Star, ' Police: 
passport', 22 October (1976), 
streets', the Aucklanders cry ' , 
(1976) I pB . 
56 Auckland Star, 'Police: 
passport', 22 October (1976). 
57 ibid. 
if you don't look like s Kiwi carry a 
and Maurice Dick , ' 'Gestapo in our 
Pacific Islands Monthly , Vol.47, No.12, 
if you don't look like a Kiwi carry a 
58 Christchurch Press , 'Sobbing man wrongly held', 22 October (1976). 
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lengthy period, one had permanent residence, two were registered 
overstayers, and one was Tokelauan and therefore a New Zealand citizen. 59 
Police minister, Alan McCready, gave his full backing to random searches, 
saying that it was just like having to produce a drivers licence. 
"People who look like overstayers will have to put up with a little 
inconvenience," he said. 60 McCready's statements also made explicit the 
racial selectiveness of the random checks. "If you have a herd of 
Jerseys and two Friesians," he said, "the Friesians stand out." 6 1 
1~ lldtsurt, f/4rr'J·-
~ look like plopd 
Ne-.~ kala~dets 
to me! 
Figure 6.2 ... 'Proper' locals, Tom Scott, Listener, 1976. 62 
59 New Zealand Herald, 'Police Action Condemned As Storm Of Protest 
Grows', 23 October (1976). 
60 Auckland Star, 'McCready asks: why should anyone object?' , 23 
October (1976) 
61 ibid. 
62 Tom Scott, ''Natural' leaders, 'proper' locals' , Listener, Vol. 84, 
No.1927, (1976), p13. 
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The media played a prominent role in increasing protest a gainst the 
immigration campaigns by highlighting the racism inherent in the police 
operation. Following the weekend blitz , the Auckland Star sent to the 
prime minister in Wellington six sworn and signed statements spelling out 
the details of random checking of Island overstayers after the prime 
minister challenged reporters to provide evidence of any police 
impropriety. 63 In one statement Auckland-born Samoan, Mila Solomona, 
described having been stopped along with other Polynesians in the street 
and told that "because I did not look like a New Zealander I should carry 
a passport." 6 4 Malu Odaufavea, a Tongan recently granted perman ent 
residence, told how he was stopped three times by three different 
policemen on his way home. Viliami Tui was stopped along with others at 
a taxi stand and was taken to the police station for questioning. Wayne 
Toleafoa, a New Zealand-born Samoan, was stopped along with other 
Polynesians passing by and questioned in the street . Iakapo Tevaga, a 
Samoan resident on a five-year permit, was stopped and asked for his 
passport, and accompanied to his home by police to see it . As it did not 
show his five-year renewal, and his permit was with his lawyer, he was 
arrested and jailed overnight. His wife was denied access to see him and 
bail was refused. When immigration officials the next day confirmed that 
he was a legal immigrant he was finally released. Yet another statement 
detailed how Hinerangi Burney, a Tuhoe Maori, was stopped and question ed 
in an Auckland street . 65 
Condemnation of the checks was swift and widespread. 6 6 Whereas concern 
earlier in 1976 had been largely confined to Pacific Islanders, 
63 Auckland Star, 'Star flies evidence to PM ' , and 'Minister: 1st I 
want the police numbers ' , 27 October (1976) . 
64 Auckland Star, 'Stopped, told to carry passport', 27 October 
( 1976) . 
65 ibid. 
66 Auckland Star, 'Diary of a hunt for overstayers' , 27 October 
(1976). 
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organisations concerned with racial issues, and some sections of the 
Labour opposition, the issue in late 1976 became one of civil rights, and 
there were large demonstrations in protest at the police action. Demands 
were made for the resignations of the ministers concerned and a total 
amnesty was seen by many as the only means of restoring trust between New 
Zealand and its neighbours. 67 Pacific Island leaders declared their 
intent to take civil action against the police minister, while the 
Auckland Pacific Islands Council sent a telegram to the United Nations 
special committee for the elimination of racial discrimination to 
register their complaint. 68 Debates raged in chamber over the raids, 
with the Labour opposition calling for the resignation of both the 
minister of police and the minister of immigration, while government 
ministers, in a counter-offensive, labelled critics of the immigration 
blitz as "police-haters" and accused them of inciting racial 
disharmony. 69 Even National government backbenchers were incensed by the 
police actions and ministerial explanations. 7 0 
The campaign was badly handled by the government, with both the prime 
minister and the minister of police, throughout the blitz, denying that 
it had even taken place. Muldoon categorically denied that police were 
conducting random checks and, even in the face of evidence to the 
contrary, continued to assert that police were acting only where there 
existed prima facie evidence that a person was an overstayer. 71 
67 Macdonald, (1977), pl3. 
68 New Zealand Herald, 'Court Action Decision by Samoans Over 
Arrests', 28 October (1976), and Christchurch Press, 'Telegram to UN', 
28 October (1976). 
69 Auckland Star, 
(1976), and Macdonald, 
70 Auckland Star, 
October (1976) . 
'Shame, fear and anger says Rawling', 27 October 
( 1977) 1 p13 • 
'Rumblings over those checks getting louder', 28 
71 Evening Post, 'No random checks carried out, says Muldoon', 25 
October (1976), and 'Assurance given by PM of no discrimination', 26 
October (1976). 
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Similarly, McCready, having earlier shown support for the checks, also 
denied them, stating that police acted only on information received and 
warrants executed for arrest. 72 And, despite increasing public protest, 
he not only refused to reconsider the methods used in the overstayer 
crackdown, declaring that "the people who are kicking up all the fuss are 
upholding lawbreakers, and we don't uphold lawbreakers", he also lifted 
a ban, imposed by the former Labour government after protest at raids 
under their administration, to allow for further night raids on 
overstayers. 73 Instead of admitting the occurrence of raids, both blamed 
the media for creating protest over nothing, accusing it of "excessively 
emotive news coverage". ~ 
On 25 October, at a crowded Auckland City Council special meeting to 
discuss and protest the campaign, Assistant Commissioner of Police J.W. 
Overton, issued an order to all Auckland police that "random checks on 
the streets and elsewhere will not be part of our policy". 7 5 He asserted 
that random checks were never part of police policy in the overstayer 
campaign, and denied that the campaign had been directed solely at 
Pacific Islanders. The checks had occurred, according to the assistant 
commissioner, because some police had not followed instructions correctly 
and, indeed, had disobeyed their orders in conducting random checks for 
overstayers. 76 
However, subsequent evidence showed that the assistant commissioner's 
72 Evening Post, Editorial, 
overstayers', 23 October (1976). 
'Necessary to think again on 
73 Dominion, 'Reasons for overstayers decision', 25 October (1976), 
and 'Muldoon calls for report on random check claims', 28 October (1976). 
74 New Zealand Herald, 'PM Prefers Word Of Minister And Police', 28 
October (1976). 
75 Auckland Star, 'Police end random checks', 25 October (1976). 
76 ibid., and New Zealand Herald, 'No Reason For Total Amnesty: PM', 
26 October (1976). 
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comments were misleading and suggested, instead, that random checks had 
been mounted as a direct result of instructions given to the Police 
Department by the government itself . 77 The Dominion reported that Gill 
had met with immigration officials on the Monday before the weekend blitz 
and had asked that action against overstayers be stepped up. 7e Gill had 
then discussed the subject with the police minister throughout that week, 
and even wrote McCready a letter to finalise the increased action against 
overstayers, and as a result, on the Thursday, the day the blitz in 
Auckland began, police were asked to assist. 79 Accounts of who devised 
the methods used were less clear. The immigration division was adamant 
that it only asked for help from police because they were better equipped 
and because legislation allowed them to deal with such matters. McCready 
agreed that he had asked the police to co-operate in the campaign, but 
said that police and the immigration division had then worked out a plan 
between them. eo 
In response to comments made by Overton, and in a move that illustrated 
police dissatisfaction with the whole affair, Auckland chairman of the 
Police Association, Sergeant Peri Ngata , leaked to the press a 
departmental memo which clearly instructed police to stop and question 
suspected overstayers "on the streets" . el The memo stated that: 
Police are to round up all illegal immigrants and overstayers of 
all races .... Police will have complete discretion as to the time 
of day/night when arrests may be made .... all members . .. are to take 
part in this operation by questioning persons in custody and on the 
streets and at any places where there are reasonable grounds to 
77 Evening Post, 'Truth of campaign 'should be told' ' , 28 October 
(1976) . 
7
e Dominion, ' Reasons for overstayers decision', 25 October (1976). 
79 ibid., and New Zealand Herald, 'Court Action Decision By Samoans 
Over Arrests', 28 October (1976). 
eo Dominion, 'Reasons for overstayer decision', 25 October (1976). 
e
1 New Zealand Herald, 'Quite Abhorrent' , 26 October (1976). 
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believe they may illegal immigrants or overstayers. 82 
Others confirmed the orders. One Auckland policeman said that the 
message had come down loud and clear - "Go out into the streets and get 
them". 83 Another said, "the whole thing was a botch-up from the word 
go. n 84 Reports circulating amongst police held that the campaign had 
been ill-conceived and ill-planned from the start, and many Auckland 
police felt that officials in government and the Police Department should 
tell the truth and admit that it was "a bad blue". 85 
McCready , some days later, conceded that random checks had indeed 
occurred, although he said that that was the first he had proof of it. 86 
He gave as an example of a situation which could have been mistaken for 
a random check, where a 'bona fide New Zealander' might have been 
arrested for drunkenness and he points at a man and says, 'he's an 
overstayer why don't you arrest him?'. "Is the policeman to go away?" 
he asked . 87 Significantly , he determined that the checks were the result 
of police exceeding their instructions and gave his assurance that such 
action had never been contemplated by the government or the commissioner 
of police. 88 "The checks," he said, "were not sought by the government 
nor are they condoned . " 89 Shortly after, however, an inquiry was made 
82 Dominion, 'Sergeant reveals orders -meat in sandwich claim' , 27 
October (1976) . 
83 Christchurch Press, 'Police call for truth', 28 October (1976). 
84 Evening Post, 'Truth of campaign 'should be told'', 28 October 
(1976) . 
85 ibid. 
86 Auckland Star , 'Muldoon: no total amnesty', 30 October (1976) 
87 Auckland Star, '"Checking" is all PM says ' , 28 October ( 1976) 
88 ibid., and Auckland Star, 'Muldoon: no total amnesty', 30 October 
(1976) . 
89 Dominion, 'Police checks confirmed', 30 October (1976). 
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to investigate the overstayer checks, and its subsequent findings further 
confirmed that the checks had, all along, been the result of cabinet 
instructions. 
. . bvt we weie fold fo 
grab ever~one who dt'dri+-
look or sound /,·ke ~ 
New Zealander.. 
Figure 6.3 But we were told ... , Tom Scott, 1976. 90 
90 Reproduced on the cover of Comment. A New Zealand Quarterly 
Review. New Series, No.1, (1977). 
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POLICE INQUIRY - 'OPERATION IMMIGRATION' 
The full report of the internal police inquiry compiled by Chief 
Superintendent Fleming and Superintendent Silk, upon its completion in 
late December, was never made public. Instead, the minister of police 
released a statement admitting that random checks had been carried out 
but did not attribute blame to anyone for giving the random check 
orders . 91 According to the minister, lack of time and insufficiently 
detailed orders were the culprits . 92 
A closer reading of the complete report, however, gives a somewhat 
different picture. The writers of the report personally interviewed 849 
members of the Auckland police, and determined that in 856 actions, taken 
in the streets, at hotels and dance halls, and at private premises, 201 
had been carried out randomly. 93 They further determined that of the 
forty arrests that had been made during the campaign, as many as sixteen 
of the arrests were doubtful or simply not justified. 94 In the majority 
of the sixteen cases the individuals had been detained at least overnight 
in police cells when, in fact, they were legal residents or registered 
overstayers . 95 The investigating officers said: 
It was obvious that many Officers and N.C.O's were vague on the law 
and the Police powers in the Immigration Act. Their 
misinterpretation of these powers and the subsequent misdirections 
91 Evening Post, 'Probe on overstayers confirms that random checks 
made', 'Overstayer operation reported on', 23 December ( 1976), and 
Auckland Star, 'There were random checks - 201 of them', 'Report doesn't 
put blame on anyone', 23 December (19 76) . 
92 ibid. 
93 Chief Superintendent W.R. Fleming and Superintendent R.P. Silk, 
'Immigration Act 1964. Police Enforcement at Auckland October- November 
1976. Report of the Inquiry', (Wellington , 1976) , p67. [Note that the 
report consulted was a censored copy of the unpublished original.] 
94 ibid. 1 pp43-44 • 
95 ibid. 1 pp45-62 • 
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to subordinates played a major part in the unlawful detention and 
arrest of some persons. 96 
Moreover, they found that in the course of the police operation there had 
been great confusion and ignorance as to the availability and whereabouts 
of the overstayer register. The register had been available for checking 
at all times and outside normal business hours had been held at the 
Auckland Central Police Station. However, in the early stages of the 
operation this had not been widely known by police members. 97 
Furthermore, the register used by police was incomplete. It did not 
disclose the names of all persons who had registered, it was not cross-
indexed, nor were name variations or anglicanised versions included. 
There was a lack of details as to nationalities, dates of birth, 
addresses, next-of-kin and occupations. 98 Many members of the police had 
little or no idea about continuing residence, or the complexities of the 
various passport and permit stamps used to indicate the time of stay of 
persons entering New Zealand, and the non-availability of immigration 
division records and staff, or for that matter, interpreters, to 
establish the status of suspected overstayers led to the unjustified 
arrest of a number of persons. 99 In these respects, according to the 
report, many of the problems experienced in the campaign arose because 
the police were inadequately prepared. The Auckland office had not been 
advised until late on the afternoon of 21 October of the government's 
change in enforcement policy, and, as a result, there was a failure to 
anticipate and appreciate the problems likely to be encountered, and 
little time for a proper evaluation and effective plan to be made for the 
event . 1 00 
96 ibid. 1 p74. 
97 ibid. 1 pp6,80. 
98 ibid. 1 pBO. 
99 ibid. 1 ppB0-81. 
100 ibid. 1 pp78,81. 
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However, contrary to public statements by the minister, the report made 
very clear that the responsibility for the raids rested with the acting 
district commander in Auckland, Chief Superintendent A.G Berriman , if not 
with the commissioner, and the minister themselves. It had become 
apparent that the Department of Labour (Immigration Division) wa s 
experiencing difficulties in coping with the overstayer problem, and the 
police were consequently asked in October to intensify their efforts in 
the enforcement of the Immigration Act, by being given responsibility for 
tracing offenders. For a specified period of three months, beginning 
21 October, police were to take positive action against overstayers, at 
the end of which time active police participation was to be reviewed. 101 
On Thursday, 21 October the district commanders of Christchurch and 
Wellington and the acting district commander of Auckland, A.G. Berriman, 
attended a commissioner's conference in Wellington at which the 
commissioner indicated that he had "acceded to a request from Government 
[my emphasis] for increased Police enforcement of the immigration laws 
in relation to overstayers and illegal immigrants." 102 A subsequent 
commissioner's circular confirmed orders that : 
all District Commanders are to give priority to the seeking out and 
apprehension of overstayers . Immediate action is to be taken . In 
districts where large numbers of illegal overstayers are known to 
be living, staff are to be assigned full - time to the task .. .. there 
is no restriction on the times that Police may visit private homes 
in the course of their enquiries but good sense must prevail in 
this regard. 103 
The subject of casual checks on people in the street was not mentioned 
at this stage, and the method of implementation was left to the 
discretion of the individual district commanders . 104 
lQl ibid • 1 p4 
102 ibid.' p26. 
103 Commissioner's Circular 1976/35 (of 
'Immigration: Overstaying of Permits', quoted 
(1976) ' p23. 
104 Fleming and Silk , (1976), p26 . 
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That same day, upon returning to Auckland, Berriman held a meeting at 
which he briefed divisional commanders, other officers and N.C . O's of his 
meeting with the commissioner . He told those present that cab inet was 
dissatisfied with the Labour Department and was giving police the job of 
enforcing the immigration legislation, under "Operation Immigration" , for 
three months. 105 He asserted that it was essential, given that the 
police had been given a task which had not been successfully carried out 
by another department, for the police to show "early positive 
results" . 106 The enforcement was to be given priority and special squads 
were to be set up in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch . All other 
police, including C. I . B. , were to question all likely overstayers, and 
the questioning was to be carried out on all occasions that the police 
had c ontact with the public in any way [my emphasis] . Police were to be 
given a free hand to go anywhere in an effort to locate persons in breach 
of the Act, including streets, public places and houses, and Karangahape 
Road, where it was late night shopping that night . In addition, certain 
hotels and dance halls, significantly, those known to be frequented by 
Islanders, were nominated as being places where overstayers could be 
found. Police were to round up as many illegal immigrants and 
overstayers as they could possibly get. 107 Significantly, the comment 
was made that although the police were entering a new type of law 
enforcement, "it could eventually prove beneficial in requests to 
Government for equipment, vehicles and possibly a future argument towards 
Police pay". 108 This comment regarding pay was, in fact , later 
communicated to front line staff in the divisions . 109 
Berriman obviously felt pressured to begin operations as soon as 
105 ibid. 1 p5 
106 ibid. 1 p28. 
107 ibid. 1 pp27-30. 
108 ibid . 1 p29. 
109 ibid . 
1976 Random Checks p117 
possible. He told the conference that he had been instructed to urgently 
return to Auckland to set up an operation commencing that day . 110 
Moreover, directions had been given for action to be taken quickly, in 
the police division's own interests, before the news media became 
involved. 111 In reply to recommendations from some at the meeting that 
officers be given time to prepare the operation, he indicated, 
significantly, that "he had no leeway in the matter" and instructed 
operations to commence that evening. 112 Neither Wellington nor 
Christchurch district commanders commenced field operations on the same 
day that they had received their briefing from the commissioner, however, 
the commissioner's circular, and presumably the commissioner's 
conference, had made clear that the onus of this operation was upon 
Auckland police. The commissioner had explicitly stated that it was 
those areas where large numbers of illegal overstayers were known to be 
living that were to be targeted in the police campaign. Consistent with 
the belief that overstayers were all Pacific Island immigrants, the 
police campaign, therefore, was to be focused mostly in Auckland . 113 
In their report, the officers concluded that the acting district 
commander, Berriman, had "given specific oral orders which in substance 
amounted to directions to carry out 'random checks' in the streets and 
in other public places. 11 114 Further, the terminology used by Chief 
Superintendent Berriman at his briefing was interpreted as meaning that 
the police had a free hand to go anywhere in an effort to locate persons 
in breach of the Act, including streets, public places and houses. 1 1 5 
11 0 ibid. 1 p29. 
111 ibid. 1 p27. 
112 ibid. 1 p30. 
11 3 ibid. pp23,69. 
114 ibid. 1 p41. 
115 ibid. 1 ppl6,22,41. 
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Figure 6.4 I Said Wags Not Dogs, Brockie, National 
Business Review, 1976. 11 6 
The investigating officers found these random check orders to be contrary 
to earlier instructions from the commissioner, and as a result seem to 
place the responsibility of the checks implicitly with Berriman. 
However, he was only fulfilling the expectations of his superiors. Both 
the commissioner and the government, who instructed the police 
commissioner to undertake action against overstayers, had asked for 
effective action against Island overstayers. They wanted "positive 
116 Reproduced in Grant, (1980), p221. 
1976 Random Checks p119 
results" . 117 The speed with which Berriman acted in establishing 
'Operation Immigration' and comments he made indicating the demand that 
had been placed upon the Auckland district to get results, suggest that 
the pressure on him from his commissioner, and the government, had been 
considerable. Moreover, while the commissioner, and the government 
ministers instructing him, are unlikely to have desired the highly 
contentious and politically embarrassing campaign that eventually took 
place, it is difficult to see how else the police were expected to 
conduct their campaign. The racist premise of the operation was bound 
to afflict the campaign from its outset. In accordance with the 
government's politicisation of Islanders, the police were asked to 
target, almost exclusively, Pacific Island overstayers. It would have 
been extremely difficult to carry out such a discriminatory agenda 
without the final operation also appearing to be discriminatory. 
Regardless of whether random checks or some other means of targeting 
overstayers were used, the racist premise of the operation was always 
going to influence its ultimate configuration. 
The directives given by Berriman had the effect of a chain reaction, in 
that they were passed directly on to front line police. 118 One constable 
of six years service considered that his instructions were that if a 
person obviously appeared to be a foreigner, for example a Polynesian, 
he should approach him and establish his identity. If the man admitted 
he was a foreigner, request his passport or visa. It the person refused 
to supply the documents, after warning, arrest him, as a good cause to 
suspect would exist. Other N.C.O's and constables placed similar 
interpretations on their briefings. 119 One sergeant interpreted and 
advised his duty staff that good cause to suspect could be a person 
appearing to be a foreigner refusing to speak, for example feigning 
117 ibid. 1 p28 • 
118 ibid., p68. 
119 ibid., p35. 
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illiteracy or otherwise, and should be arrested. 120 The constable was 
also told to act with vigour with regard to locating overstayers, to 
visit hotels, billiard saloons and to stop people in the streets and ask 
for documentation if they appeared to be foreigners. 121 Indeed, it had 
been generally agreed that as inquiries were to be begun that night, then 
the streets were the only place to operate in the early evening, as there 
was insufficient information available to warrant going to houses or 
places of employment. 122 
Clearly, the October campaign, while partly the result of mismanagement 
on the part of the police, was ultimately the result of a direct request 
from the National government . It was entirely in keeping with its 
handling of the whole immigration issue. It had been uncompromising 
about immigration while in opposition, it had promised to get tough on 
immigrants during its election campaign, and it had already implemented 
a controversial immigration crackdown earlier in 1976. There had been 
a continued need to be seen to deal to the immigration bogey that they 
had created, particularly as the dawn raids campaign had withered in a 
protracted and complicated bureaucratic mess. A large number of the 
registered overstayers were being granted , by the immigration committee, 
permanent residence to stay in New Zealand, and for the 'send-them-
homers', to whom the National Party had appealed when constructing its 
immigration scapegoat , this would hardly have been acceptable. Moreover, 
throughout the year, Gill had continually asserted that there were 12,000 
or more overstayers in New Zealand, with the insinuation that they were 
all Pacific Islanders. Given that only about 4, 600 Pacific Island 
overstayers had signed the government's April register, the public was 
left with the impression that there were yet another 8,000 or so errant, 
law-breaking Islanders still at large, and the onus had been on the 
government to do something about it. On the other hand, the suggestion 
120 ibid • 1 p3 9 • 
121 ibid., pp34-35. 
1 H ibid., pp31,38. 
1976 Random Checks p121 
was made that the random street methods had simply been a ruse to "make 
dawn raids on Polynesians' homes - with police teams and trained dogs 
even as acceptable socially as a Sunday school picnic." 123 By 
comparison, the dawn raids would be seen simply as normal police 
practice, where there was cause to believe that the law had been 
broken. 124 
Similarly, the fact that it was Pacific Islanders who were targeted in 
the October blitz, that is the racism of the strategy, also highlighted 
the government's role in the operation. Although, in part, it was 
indicative of the degree to which racist and negative stereotypes and/or 
attitudes were held by individuals in the official bureaucracy, it was 
more specifically the result of the National Party, and later 
government's, explicit attempts to link immigration problems, illegal 
immigration and crime with, as a group, all Pacific Islanders. The 
constant message from the National ranks, whether through explicit 
statements or more indirect, but nonetheless explicit, actions had been 
that Pacific Islanders were 'overstayers', 'criminals', and in short a 
social headache, and that they had to be dealt with. Given the constancy 
of that message, the Auckland immigration blitz was both quite logical 
and inevitable. 
DAMAGE CONTROL 
For the remainder of 1976 and into 1977 the New Zealand government 
attempted to recover lost ground in its relations with its Pacific Island 
neighbours. In November 1976 Gill visited the governments of Fiji, 
Western Samoa, and Tonga, where his reception, especially in Samoa and 
123 Maurice Dick, ' 'Gestapo in our streets' the Aucklanders cry' , 
Pacific Islands Monthly, Vol.47, No . 12, (1976b), p8. 
124 ibid. 
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Tonga was mixed . 125 At an official level, all three governments dealt 
with the overstayer issue in muted tones, a result somewhat of the keen 
awareness of each island nation's dependence upon New Zealand goodwill 
in matters of trade and aid. 126 Unofficially, however, Gill received "a 
very cold reception in the Islands. " 127 According to a journalist in 
Tonga and Samoa at the same time as Gill, at a cocktail party given for 
Gill in Samoa, out of 600 people invited, only 80 attended, and the prime 
minister only then after arriving more than an hour and a half late. 
Apparently, officials avoided the New Zealand minister, and when Gill 
approached a member of the Samoan government and asked him his name, the 
man replied "Is this a random check?" . 128 Deep hostility existed towards 
New Zealand following the immigration campaigns against Pacific 
Islanders, and was still evident in all three island groups when the New 
Zealand Deputy Prime Minister visited them several months later in early 
1977, to the extent that he was compelled to admit publicly that mistakes 
had been made. 129 
On his return to New Zealand late in 1976, Gill reiterated his 
government's opposition to a full amnesty for overstayers but, instead, 
reopened the overstayer register from 20 December to 31 January the 
following year, and promised to review the cases of those people who had 
already registered and had their cases for permanent residence declined 
125 Ministry of Fo reign Affairs, 'The Minister Of Immigration's Visit 
to Fiji, Western Samoa, and Tonga', New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review 
,Vol.26, No.6, (1976), p45. 
126 ibid., Nancy Pollock, private papers, (1977), and Government of 
Tonga, Government Papers, (1976). 
127 Evening Post, 'Mr Gill snubbed on Islands trip says journalist', 
29 November (1976) 
128 ibid. 
129 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Deputy Prime Minister's Visit to 
the South Pacific, 21 January-12 February 1977', New zealand Foreign 
Affairs Review, Vol.27, No.1, (1977), and Nancy Pollock, private papers, 
(1977) . 
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by the special immigration committee. 130 At the same time, however, he 
also announced his intention to increase the numbers of immigration 
department staff, so as to ensure that there were no recurrences of the 
"overstayer problem", and in this respect highlighted the unchanged 
commitment of the government to crackdown on immigration, especially 
Pacific Island immigration. 131 
At the close of the second register in 1977 a further 635 applications 
were forwarded to the special immigration committee. 132 In the final 
analysis 5,381 people registered as overstayers in the 1976/1977 
registers - 2,507 from Tonga, 2,464 from Western Samoa, 336 from Fiji, 
and 74 from other nations. 133 Of that total, 3,712 or nearly seventy 
percent, were provisionally approved for permanent residence, comprising 
3,657 nationals of Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa (69% of the total 
applications for these three countries) 
countries (74 % of 'other' applications) . 134 
and 55 nationals of other 
At about the same time, in response to requests made by the island 
governments on Gill's Pacific tour, the South Pacific Work Permit Scheme 
was altered. Hence, permits were able to be extended to eleven months, 
sponsorship of workers by individuals and organisations such as churches 
was finally made permissable and a special loan fund was established for 
130 Auckland Star, 'Islanders split over pushing registration', 30 
November (1976). 
13 1 ibid . 
132 New Zealand Herald, '892 Overstayers In Second Register', 8 
February (1977). 
133 Annual Report, Department of Labour, AJHR, Vol.5, G.1, (1977), 
p16. 
134 Evening Post, 'Almost 70 % of registered overstayers win right to 
stay on', 8 June (1977), and NZPD, Vol.411, (1977), p1369. 
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employers to help them advance airfares to migrant workers. 135 Despite 
these measures, however, the scheme continued to be unattractive to most 
migrants and employers and numbers entering New Zealand on the scheme 
remained small. 136 Apart from these few concessions, the New Zealand 
government's attention remained fixed on strict immigration controls. 
In 1977, new measures undertaken to keep track of overstaying revealed 
that between 3,000 and 4,000 overstayers were in New Zealand at any one 
time, and that of the 3,641 recorded in New Zealand at the end of 1977, 
all had arrived in New Zealand in that past year. 137 The minister of 
immigration expressed his disappointment and concern at the pressures 
that this must exert on employment "which should be available to New 
Zealand residents", and made clear his intention to prevent the situation 
from escalating . 138 Computer recording had been introduced in 1976 and, 
as another major element in the control programme, specially appointed 
teams of immigration field officers had been established to locate and 
hasten the departure of persistent overstayers. The first field officers 
had begun their activities in March 1977, and had since then made more 
than 7,000 field visits. Significantly, from those 'visits' (not unlike 
the raids of 1974 and 1976) only 419 overstayers had been induced to 
leave and court action had only been taken against a further 202. These 
figures would suggest that, as before, in a majority of cases (more than 
ninety percent) the Immigration Department's 'visits' yielded nothing, 
and yet this information was received with little if any public 
135 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Extension to Pacific Island Work 
Permit Scheme', New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.27, No.1, (1977), 
p65. 
136 NZPD, Vol.411, (1977), ppl048-1049. 
137 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Overcoming the 
Problem', New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.27, No.4, 
55 . 
138 ibid • 1 p55. 
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comment . 139 
Moreover, the National government introduced a law in 1977, in the guise 
of the Immigration Amendment Bill, which made it an offence for visitors 
entering New Zealand to seek work unless they had been authorised to do 
so or for an employer to employ a person s/he had reason to know did not 
have permission to work. The Bill also made it an offence to remain 
beyond the expiry date of a permit even if the migrant was acting on the 
advice of the immigration division or if the division was at fault in 
unduly delaying a decision on a renewal application. As well, the 
legislation gave greater powers to the immigration minister, including 
the power to deport that formerly belonged to the judiciary, the power 
to deport a person for petty offences, and the ability to require a 
deportee to meet his or her own deportation costs. 14 0 
At the close of the government's overstayer debacle, some things had 
changed, while other stayed the same. One of the contributing causes of 
overstaying had been the encouragement offered by legal migrants to 
visitors to remain in New Zealand. At the time the probability of 
detection had been low, the costs of accommodating the overstayers had 
been small, and their potential contributions to migrant kin and non-
migrant kin projects had been considerable. 141 However, as a result of 
the continued economic downturn, that situation had changed 
significantly. The economic position of Pacific Islanders who were not 
New Zealand citizens had begun to deteriorate and this group increasingly 
became a heavy burden for those who must support them when their own 
incomes were falling. 
overstaying disappeared. 
lJ g ibid. 1 p56. 
Hence, one of the contributing causes of 
140 NZPD, Vol.415, (1977), pp4112 ff, and Amnesty Aroha, 'Amnesty 
Aroha and the Immigration Bill', New Zealand Monthly Review, Vol.18, 
No.190, (1977), pp2-3. 
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In spite of, this the government's approach had not changed . It was 
still intent upon clamping down on immigration, consistently categorising 
overstaying as a breach of the law that could not be tolerated . 142 
Moreover, it was still focused disproportionately in this desire for 
immigration control upon Pacific Island immigration . 
The persistently heavy-handed approach of the government to the 
overstaying issue distracted attention from the possible causes of not 
only overstaying but of also the social problems, such as unemployment, 
that the government had linked to it. By encouraging a negative 
perception of Pacific Islanders it also drew public support . While 
Pacific Island immigrants had long been associated in the public mind 
with various social problems , after the campaigns of 1976 the perception 
of Pacific Island immigrants as overstayers was much more widely and 
deeply held. The dawn raids and random checks under the National 
government saw the entrenchment of new stereotypes, wherein old attitudes 
and beliefs were reproduced: overstayers were brown Polynesians; brown 
Polynesians were overstayers; New Zealanders did not look like 
Polynesians; and people who looked like Polynesians were not New 
Zealanders . 143 The old 'race' /immigration ideology was reinforced. 
Indeed, a survey of the many letters sent to a major Auckland newspaper 
in response to the "Operation Immigration" blitz in 1976 found that those 
writing in support of the government ' s crackdown outnumbered those 
expressing concern at the police tactics by two to one . 144 
142 Frank Gill, News Release , 13 June 1978, cited in Chan, (1981), 
p231 . 
143 Ballara , (1986) , pl60. 
144 New Zealand Herald, 'Police Action On Overstayers Widely Backed', 
27 October (1976). 
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THE POLITICISATION OF PACIFIC ISLAND OVERSTAYERS 
During the 1975 election campaign the National Party had encouraged New 
Zealanders to look more closely at Pacific Islanders and something of a 
moral panic occurred whereby Pacific Islanders were held responsible for 
a series of problems, from unemployment to a decline in law and order. 
The reaction to Pacific Islanders, encouraged by the National Party and 
by already long-held racist community attitudes and stereotypes, reached 
a peak in 1976 when Pacific Island migrants were blamed for migrating to 
New Zealand in too large numbers and were held responsible for breaking 
New Zealand's immigration laws, for overstaying, and for putting New 
Zealand residents out of work. A series of historical, material and 
ideological factors merged with the result that the public perception 
came to be that 'Islander' and 'overstayer' was one and the same 
thing. 14 5 But if we unpack the events and rhetoric of the period, it 
becomes evident that Islanders were not an immigration threat to New 
Zealand, those who overstayed were only part of a much larger group of 
immigrants who were overstaying, and they were not taking the jobs of New 
Zealanders. 
One of the most constant complaints against Pacific Island overstayers 
was that they had broken the law, indeed, Gill, among others, had 
continually iterated that "we cannot tolerate the open flouting of our 
immigration laws" . 14 6 Yet the situation was not quite so simple. In the 
first place, the overstayers' offence was technical. Their crime did not 
harm persons, property or public order and they could be regarded in the 
same light, for instance, as people who failed to pay their television 
licence. The perception of Pacific Island overstayers as criminals, 
moreover, was strongly imbued with negative connotations which owed more 
to the general stereotypes about Islander-criminality and violence, to 
which the National Party had appealed so explicitly in its election 
14 5 Spoonley, (1990), pp158-159. See also Chapter Five. 
14 6 de Bres and Campbell, ( 1976b) , p14. 
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campaign, than it did to any real understanding of the Immigration Act 
or the material circumstances which compelled these labour migrants into 
overstaying . 
In addition, New Zealand's structurally racist immigration laws made 
illegal for Pacific Islanders acts which for immigrants of other 
nationalities were perfectly legal . For instance, Britons and Canadians 
who had migrated to New Zealand before April 1974 and who had continued 
to stay in New Zealand, unlike Tongans or Samoans who did the same, could 
not be classified as overstayers . Technically, an overstayer was a 
person who had been granted temporary entry to New Zealand for a limited 
period who then failed to leave at the expiry date of that period. Prior 
to 2 April 1974, however, citizens from the United Kingdom and Canada 
were automatically granted permanent entry on their arrival in New 
Zealand. 147 Similarly, while it was illegal for Tongans and Western 
Samoans on visitor ' s permits to stay in New Zealand more than one month, 
for immigrants of most other nationalities, stays of three to six months 
were acceptable. 
Moreover, the law for which Islanders were being pursued was not one 
which was administered justly. While Pacific Islanders made up only a 
proportion of overstayers in New Zealand at any one time, the immigration 
campaigns during the 1970s targeted them to the exclusion of almost 
anyone else. Indeed , while Island overstayers were being tracked down , 
deported , or made to sign official registers, other 'white' overstayers 
were given the opportunity by the Immigration Department to regularise 
their status without fuss , without publicity and without 
recrimination . 148 
Furthermore, in stark contradiction to the stereotype that all Pacific 
147 Evening Post, 'Discrimination warning from Samoan PM - unless 
Europeans held', 25 October (1976). See also Chapter Three. 
148 Interview, "Chris", 10 November (1992). 
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Island immigrants in New Zealand were overstayers, and hence 'criminals', 
the great majority of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand at any one time 
were legal immigrants and residents . In the 1976 census there were 
61,354 Pacific Island Polynesians recorded as living in New Zealand. 14 9 
Even if Gill's 1976 estimates of 10,000 to 12,000 Pacific Islan d 
overstayers resident in New Zealand had actually been accurate (which 
they were not), that figure would only have accounted for, at the most , 
less than twenty percent of all Pacific Islanders in New Zealand. In 
addition, of the seventy percent of registered overstayers from 197 6 who 
were granted provisional permanent residence , many were entitled t o 
permanent residence anyway as they were already married to a New Zealand 
citizen or permanent resident. 150 Moreover, the subordination of 
different Islanders' identities to the general appellation of 'Pacific 
Islander' , meant that subsumed within , and made invisible, by this 
umbrella stereotype of 'all Pacific Islanders' , were Niueans, Tokelauans , 
and Cook Islanders who were all New Zealand citizens by right, as well 
as all New Zealand-born Pacific Islanders. For Western Samoans in New 
Zealand in 1976, this accounted for 8,165 or approximately twenty-nine 
percent of all Samoans in New Zealand . 151 
The number of Pacific Island immigrants in New Zealand was an important 
ingredient in the moral panic that developed over Pacific Islanders in 
the 1970s . The image was one of ' brown hordes invading' New Zealand, and 
the hype about 'hordes' of overstayers fitted neatly into that context. 
Yet, Pacific Island migrants were only ever a minority of immigrants 
entering New Zealand . The great majority of immigrants to New Zealand 
were , in fact, from the United Kingdom and Australia . 152 Even by 1986, 
those born in the Commonwealth Pacific Islands made up only fourteen 
1 49 Quoted in Bedford, ( 1984) , p117. 
150 Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 'Outcome of Overstayer Review', New 
Zealand Foreign Affairs Review , Vol.27, No . 2, (1977) , p72. 
151 Pulotu-Endemann and Spoonley, ( 1992), p84 . 
152 AJHR, Vol.3 , G.34, (1974). 
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percent of the New Zealand resident immigrant population, compared with 
more than fifty percent who were British . 153 Even as temporary migrants, 
of whom Pacific Islanders made up a more substantial proportion, they 
still comprised a small proportion of the overall migration flow into New 
Zealand. The largest proportio n of the temporary migrant flow ever 
reached by Island migrants was only 50.4~ in the 1966/1967 year, the only 
time in the ten years from 1966 to 1976 that they ever formed the 
majority of migrant workers . 154 Even in the peak years of New Zealand 
immigration, 1973 to 1974, Fijians, Tongans and Western Samoans made up 
a mere 2.7 ~ of permanent immigrants to New Zealand and only 40 . 6~ of 
temporary migrants, in comparison to 29~ and 32. 3~ respectively for 
Australian immigrants. 155 Still yet, for the 1976 year, net migration 
from the Pacific accounted for only 1,352 immigrants, a mere twenty-six 
percent of the total migration gain for that year of 5, 192 . 156 
Significantly, throughout the period under discussion open entry to New 
Zealand for Australians continued, and for the year ended 31 March 1977 
alone, more than 222,000 Australians visited New Zealand (nearly as many 
as the total populations of Tonga and Western Samoa put together) , making 
the figures for Islanders in New Zealand small, and that for Island 
overstayers insignificant. 157 
More importantly, Pacific Islanders comprised not only a minority of all 
immigrants to New Zealand, they made up a minority of overstayers, too. 
In 1976 Gill made plain that of the 10, 000 to 12, 000 overstayers he 
estimated to be in the country, they were virtually all Pacific 
153 Ongley, (1990), p120. 
154 Evening Post, 'The migrant population', 3 November (1976). 
155 de Bres and Campbell, (1975), p446. 
156 Bedford, ( 1984), p121. 
157 Department of Statistics, (1979), p828, and de Bres, (1976a), p2. 
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Islanders. 158 Moreover, in 1 978 the Immigration Department gave the 
ratio of Islanders to non-Islanders appearing in the courts as 
overstayers for the preceding year as twenty-five to one. 1 59 In actual 
fact, however, the Labour Department in 1976 had little idea of how many 
overstayers were in the country at all, let alone how many overstayers 
were of Pacific Island descent. The estimates given by Gill and his 
department, of 10, 000 to 12, 000, were no better than guesstimates; 
indeed , they were called into serious question when , in fact , only 5,307 
Pacific Islanders in total came forward in 1976 to sign either of t h e two 
registers. 1 60 The estimate of about 3,500, given by Island community 
leaders in April of 1976 , was more accurate, especially given that at the 
end of the first register about 4, 600 signed. Island leaders had 
reckoned that they had contact with about eighty percent of overstayers, 
and as their estimate of 3, 500 subsequently accounted for more than 
seventy-five percent of the total who actually registered in the first 
stay of proceedings, the accuracy of their smaller estimate, as opposed 
to Gill's, seems even more likely. 161 Most significantly of all , 
however, when computer figures of actual overstayers became available in 
early 1978, only forty-eight percent of the total figures for overstayers 
for the preceding year were actually Pacific Islanders . The majority of 
overstayers, in fact, were British , American or of nationalities other 
than Tongan, Western Samoan or Fijian, and there is no reason to suppose 
that this was not also the case in 1976. 162 
158 Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 'Immigration: Overstayers' , New 
Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.27, No.1, (1977), p64, and New 
Zealand Herald, 29 January (1977). 
159 Auckland Star, ' ' Get all overstayers' says Islanders' man ', 22 
April (1978). 
160 Evening Post, ' The migrant population', 3 November (1976), and 
Annual Report, Department of Labour, AJHR, Vol.5, G.1, (1977) , p16. 
161 Survey, March 1976, quoted in de Bres and Campbell, ( 1976) , p10. 
162 Auckland Star, '4, 000 overstayers here at a time', 1 November 
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The racially selective campaigns of 1974 and especially 1976, wherein 
Pacific Islanders were almost exclusively targeted, made invisible those 
overstayers who were from regions other than the Pacific and, in a self-
perpetuating cycle, reinforced the stereotype that it was only Pacific 
Islanders who were overstayers. It would appear that when overstayers 
from countries such as America or Britain did come forward, they were 
diverted from the process with which Pacific Islanders were being dealt, 
so that they tended not to appear on the overstayers register. 1 63 Of 
course, this meant that for those who were watching closely the register 
became a self-fulfilling prophecy with regards to Pacific Island 
overstaying. This was compounded by the fact that the register was 
signed largely by Pacific Island overstayers under the encouragement and 
advice of both the government and their community leaders. 
On the other hand, for those European or American overstayers who chose 
not to come forward, it was relatively easy to avoid detection by the 
authorities. In the first place the police were not looking for them. 
In the random check campaign in Auckland, for instance, 
instructed instead to look for Pacific Island overstayers. 
police were 
In addition, 
visitors from regions other than the Pacific generally had more money and 
were therefore more able, than comparatively poorer migrants from the 
Islands, to lie low and bide their time to avoid detection. Moreover, 
under the different entry arrangements for Pacific Islanders and other 
migrants, those not from the Pacific were advantaged in that they 
generally provided less detailed information about themselves and their 
intended whereabouts than did Island migrants. Pacific Islanders had to 
provide detailed information for their visas which, for instance, 
Americans, under New Zealand's visa-free arrangement with the United 
States, were not required to provide. Similarly, under the sponsorship 
guarantee, Pacific Island migrants, who were the predominant users of the 
scheme, had to provide detailed names and addresses for themselves and 
their sponsors while other migrants generally entered with sufficient 
163 Interview, "Chris", 10 November (1992). 
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funds so that they were able to avoid furnishing the same information. 1 6 4 
Furthermore, the overstayers who signed the 1976 registers, who were 
predominantly Pacific Islanders , had to provide detailed information 
about themselves, including addresses of employment and two photos , by 
filling out a twenty-one question application form. By this means the 
government obtained further important information. Not only did the 
questions establish full files for these overstayers, but they provided 
the Immigration Department with photos which would assist in future 
identification and detection if the overstayers attempted to disappear 
again if their applications failed. 165 As many European and other non-
Islander migrants did not sign the register, they were again advantaged 
in that they were less vulnerable to detection . 
The other major criticism levelled at Pacific island overstayers was that 
they were a burden on the economy and deprived New Zealanders of jobs. 
But this stereotype was simply not true. Firstly, as a general rule, 
immigrant workers tended to have higher than average rates of economic 
activity, and made tax contributions to health, unemployment and pension 
insurance far in excess of their demands on such schemes . 1 66 Most 
Pacific Island migrants (excepting those who were New Zealand citizens, 
such as Tokelauans, Cook Islanders and Niueans) had little or no 
entitlement to government benefits, such as the unemployment benefit, and 
relied instead upon their family networks for what support they 
needed. 167 British migrants, by comparison, resided in New Zealand in 
substantially greater numbers and with a large proportion of dependants, 
unlike Island migrants who tended to come to New Zealand without 
164 See Chapter Four. 
165 de Bres , ( 1976b) , p8. 
1 66 Castles and Kosack , (1972) , p10 . 
167 Cas aloma Ahokovi, quoted in Geoff Chapple, 'Through the eyes of 
the Islander', Listener, Vol.80, No . 1873, (1976), p17. 
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dependants, and they were entitled to welfare services and benefits. 1 6 8 
Secondly, Islanders did not take the jobs of New Zealanders. Instead, 
they occupied the low-skilled, low-status, low-paid jobs to which 
employers had difficulty attracting industrious, stable, loyal local 
workers . 169 11 For years, 11 one Auckland manufacturer said, 11 industry 
needed all the Islanders it could get for the unskilled drudge jobs that 
no-one else wanted. 11 170 Labour was so scarce that some firms sent 
employment officers to the Pacific Islands to recruit workers, and others 
paid employees $10 if they found a new worker . 1 71 Indeed, large numbers 
of immigrant workers took up key positions in the productive process, so 
that even in the case of recession their labour could not be dispensed 
with. 172 The full extent of some companies' dependence on island labour 
had been made apparent when employers had lobbied the government to delay 
the repatriation of overstayers after immigration raids in 1974. 173 In 
1976 employers had expressed similar concerns, and a number of companies' 
performance and productivity were seriously disrupted as parts of their 
workforces were either removed or disappeared to avoid detection. 174 One 
company employing a largely Samoan workforce of some forty or more 
persons found that, during the overstayer investigation, as many as 
fifteen of its employees had been absent daily and the atmosphere within 
the factory had been uneasy. The manager had stated that if the 
investigation continued he would be unable to meet export contracts or 
168 de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), Part One, p3. 
169 Spoonley, ( 1990a) , p159. 
170 Auckland Star, 'Working their way up - from factory floor to 
white collar', 23 August (1979) . 
17 1 ibid. 
172 ibid., and Castles and Kosack, (1972), p6. 
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local demand and that his firm's economic survival was in doubt. 175 
Pacific Island migrants did not take the jobs of New Zealanders because 
they formed a separate secondary segment of the New Zealand labour force. 
They were forced into the unskilled jobs with low wages, unstable tenure, 
and poor working conditions that no-one else wanted , and that were 
characterised by disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities, women, 
youth, immigrant and illegal workers . 176 The continued use of Pacific 
Island labour during periods of high unemployment demonstrated that 
relative labour shortages still existed in the lower end of the labour 
market where jobs remained unattractive to local workers . The employment 
of Pacific Island immigrants did not greatly affect New Zealand workers 
because the immigrants were employed in a structurally separate segment 
of the labour market, in a Polynesian fraction of the working class . 177 
Recent findings suggest that because of this segmentation immigration 
does not , in fact, increase unemployment in general but actually 
improves, on average, the chances of an unemployed resident worker's 
obtaining a job . 178 
In fact , in terms of the problems of unemployment, inflation, and 
economic recession that were besetting New Zealand at this time, the 
immigration of Pacific Islanders was not the issue . Island immigrants 
were used by New Zealand governments as a smokescreen to deflect 
attention from their mismanagement of economic crises . In fact, despite 
the immigration cutbacks of the 1970s, the economy continued to 
175 ibid. 
176 Gibson, (1983), pp35-37. 
1 77 Ongley, (1990), pp111-112, and Terrence Loomis, Pacific Migrant 
Labour, Class and Racism in New Zealand: Fresh off the Boat, (Avebury, 
1990) 1 pp64-83 • 
178 Jacques Poot, Immigration and the Economy . A Review of Recent 
Australian Findings on the Economic Consequences of Immigration and the 
Relevance of these Findings for New Zealand , (Wellington, 1986), pp29-32. 
1976 Random Checks pl36 
deteriorate and economic stagnation persisted. 179 By December 1976 
inflation had risen to 16.9 percent and economic activity had contracted 
sharply. Moreover, unemployment continued to grow rapidly to reach 
22,300 by the end of 1978, and this was despite the large-scale 
emigration that had accompanied the economic downturn. 180 
Regardless of the fact that Pacific Island immigrants did not take the 
jobs of New Zealanders, that they were not all overstayers, and that they 
did not make up the larger proportion of all overstayers, the negative 
stereotypes continued unabated. 18 1 This was partly because neither 
political party, Labour or National, challenged the assumptions upon 
which these beliefs were grounded: that immigration was a problem, that 
Pacific Island immigration, involving as it did a 'problem race' was the 
biggest problem of all, and that immigration cuts were therefore the only 
solution. Indeed, their combined immigration campaigns against Pacific 
Island immigrants simply reinforced these assumptions. 
The media, moreover, did not effectively counter these assumptions or 
stereotypes. In many instances the media were dependant on information 
from 'expert' sources, generally government departments, and this was at 
times misleading. In 1976 the Immigration Department and Gill justified 
overstayer campaigns on the grounds that there were 10,000 to 12,000 
overstayers in New Zealand, but subsequent figures on the register were 
less than half this, and computer figures for the following year 
suggested that at any one time there were never more than 5,000 
overstayers in the country. 182 As well as publishing inaccurate figures 
to begin with, the media also gave unbalanced attention to the different 
figures. The early inaccurate estimates received considerably more press 
179 Alan McRobie in Rice, (1992), p393. 
180 ibid. 
181 See Chapter Seven. 
182 Auckland Star, '4, 000 overstayers here at a time', 1 November 
(1977), and' 'Get all overstayers' says Islander's man', 22 April (1978). 
1976 Random Checks p137 
coverage than the subsequently released actual figures. This was 
possibly because of sensationalism or possibly because the inaccurate 
figures were made by Gill, a public figure who attracted considerable 
media attention at the time, and they therefore made better press copy 
than subsequent corrections. Similarly, the media as a whole did not 
challenge the constant interchangeable use by politicians and officials 
of the terms 'overstayer' and 'Islander' as if they were one and the same 
thing. Indeed, most, even some of those papers which supported the 
overstayers' cause, supported the stereotype by using the terms in the 
same way. 183 
The media did play an impo rtant role in rousing public indignation 
against dawn raids and random checks, and embarrassing the government 
into ending these highly controversial practices. However, despite the 
fact that most newspapers condemned the government's campaigns, in terms 
of the stereotypes promoted about Islanders, their criticisms were 
outweighed by the sheer intensity and duration of the coverage they gave 
to the overstayer issue . 184 The saturated media coverage of the 
overstayer campaigns, especially of the random check campaign in October 
1976, inundated the public with images of Pacific Islanders associated 
only with overstaying and illegal immigration, and this ultimately served 
to support the negative myths about Pacific Islanders . It is significant 
that the media coverage at this time, the first extensive media coverage 
of Pacific Islanders, was of a negative content, and led to negative 
stereotypes. 185 
Constant front page headlines on major daily newspapers, for example 
183 See for example, Auckland Star, Editorial : 'The overstayers' , 8 
March (1976). 
184 See Auckland Star, Evening Post and Dominion for criticism of the 
government's handling of the immigration/overstayer issue. 
185 Finau 'Of a Kolo, 'An Incident in Otara: The Media and Pacific 
Island Communities', in Paul Spoonley and Walter Hirsh (eds), Between the 
Lines. Racism and the New Zealand Media, (Auckland, 1990), p120. 
--------- --- - --------
1976 Random Checks p138 
"Problem Of Overstayers", "Dawn raids start again for illegal Tongan 
migrants", "Islanders go to ground to escape expulsion", "Overstayer 
figure climbs past 12, 000", "Seven caught last night in Police net", 
"Permanent life here for many Island 'stayers'", "Islanders get notice", 
"Immigrant outsiders toe the line", "Police blitz on Islanders curb 
against overstayers" , and blanket coverage of the October random checks 
afforded a persistent negative image of immigration and Pacific 
Islanders. 1 96 The release of figures which revealed that the great 
majority of immigrants on the overstayers' registers were Pacific 
Islanders, without any critical discussion about the reasons for the 
relative absence of European and other overstayers, simply reinforced the 
media message; that Pacific Islanders were overstayers, illegal 
immigrants, and above all, trouble. This message was stated even more 
explicitly in newspaper editorials which supported a tough stance against 
Pacific Island immigrants. 197 Despite the fact that migrants from 
countries other than in the Pacific made up a majority of all immigrants 
to New Zealand, and a substantial proportion of overstayers , the term 
'overstayer' was politicised during the 1970s to the extent that it 
became synonymous with Pacific Islanders. 
This process of racialisation, in which Pacific Islanders were 
politicised as a 'problem' and scapegoated, was the result of a milieu 
of factors. For one, Pacific Islanders had always been regarded in New 
Zealand, before the 1970s, as different, as outsiders . Indeed, it was 
this general perception that was seized upon and enhanced by the National 
Party in its 1975 election campaign. It relied upon sharpening the 
1 96 New Zealand Herald, 12 March (1976), Auckland Star, 19 February 
(1976) and 9 October (1976), Dominion, 17 June (1976), Auckland Star, 23 
October (1976), Evening Post, 27 August (1976), Christchurch Press, 7 
October (1976), and Evening Post, 23 June (1976) and 23 October (1976). 
197 See for example New Zealand Herald, Editorial: 'Problem of 
Overstayers', 12 March (1976), Editorial: 'Getting Back to the Point', 
2 November (1976), Editorial: 'What is a Fair Go?', and to a lesser 
degree, Evenino Post, Editorial: 'Necessary to think again on 
overstayers', 23 October (1976). 
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categories of distinction between New Zealanders (including Maori) and 
Pacific Island migrants, by heightening the migrants existing negative 
typifications, and linking p opular perceptions of economic problems and 
social decline to the outsider group. 1 88 Hence, a process of 
differentiation which had begun beforehand, played a large part in making 
it easier for the state to scapegoat Islanders for its own political 
purposes, and for the general public to largely accept this later in 
1976. 189 
In addition, Pacific Island migrants in general belonged, because of the 
historical material consequences of their labour migrations to New 
Zealand and because of the ongoing reproduction of racism, to a social 
and economic class, a Polynesian fraction, which was materially 
disadvantaged . 1 90 On the one hand that meant that they belonged to a low 
socio-economic group that was already eagerly blamed for social problems 
such as crime and moral decline, and which was generally identified in 
the public perception as already being a 'problem' . Add to these 
attitudes, the ideology of 'race', and it was easy for others to believe 
that Pacific Islanders were responsible for all sorts of problems , such 
as housing shortages, unemployment and so on - it made common sense. 
On the other hand, the material position of Pacific Island migrants 
generally meant that as individuals they were not in a position to be 
able to easily protest against the immigration campaigns that they faced . 
Legal action , and indeed, public campaigning for support cost money that 
most did not have. The island governments were in a similar position. 
Their material dependence on New Zealand aid stifled strong criticism of 
the New Zealand government ' s internal affairs during this period. 1 9 1 
188 Loomis , (19 90), p126. 
1 89 See Chapter Two .. 
1 90 See Gibson, (1983), Loomis, (1990), and Ongley, (1990). 
1 9 1 See generally Ray Watters, 'Mirab Societies and Bureaucratic 
Elites', in Antony Hooper et al (eds), Class and Culture in the South 
Pacific (Auckland/Suva, 1987) . 
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Moreover, as well as being in a materially vulnerable position, Pacific 
Island migrants, and especially overstayers, were also in a politically 
exposed situation. Pacific Islanders' representation in the New Zealand 
state was limited. The first governmental body specifically concerned 
with Pacific Island interests was the Pacific Island Affairs Committee 
established to advise the minister of Pacific Island affairs in 1984. 
In addition, up until 1993 there had been no Pacific Island member of 
parliament and, as an immigrant minority, the concerns of Pacific 
Islanders were of low priority. 192 Moreover, as a minority, they also 
represented little political threat to a government that might 
intentionally scapegoat them. Pacific island overstayers were even more 
disadvantaged in that they had no political rights whatsoever. 
Set against these historical, political and material factors, which all 
served to circumscribe Pacific Islanders into a highly visible and 
vulnerable position, was the factor also of ideological relations. 
'Race' and 'race' /immigration ideologies were available to the public to 
explain the causes of and solutions to the economic recession and 
perceived social decline in the mid-1970s, and were reproduced by the 
media, and more deliberately by the state to promote this intellectual 
process. Racist ideas and stereotypes had already been used to explain 
and attribute to Pacific Islanders such social problems in New Zealand 
as crime and overcrowding. 193 They provided a manageable definition of 
changing realities, absolved individuals or groups from taking certain 
action, by apportioning blame on Islanders instead, and justified the 
taking of others. The Labour government, in 1974, acted upon these very 
ideologies in it's campaign against Pacific Island migrants. It accepted 
the assumption that Pacific Island immigration was a problem, more of a 
problem than immigration from Britain or Australia which was larger in 
volume, and it was the 'race'/immigration ideology that informed that 
assumption. 
192 Ongley, (1990), p208. 
193 See Chapter Two. 
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The Labour government's concern fitted into a long history of concern 
about the immigration of ' other races' , and that 'great question of 
assimilation and integration ' . 194 Pacific Islanders were not regarded 
as making ' good New Zealanders ' , because they tended to retain cultural 
and racial characteristics that were increasingly associated negatively 
with, among other things, crime, poor educational attainment, and 
material disadvantage . The Labour government's subsequent immigration 
campaign, of course, only served to reinforce the existing ideology about 
Pacific Islanders. It simply added to the list of problems for which 
Islanders were held responsible, overstaying, and in this way made it 
relatively easy for the National Party to further deliberately reinforce 
the 'race' /immigration ideology in its bid to win voters' approval in the 
election . On the one hand it needed a scapegoat with which to deflect 
attention from the more difficult issues such as the deteriorating 
economy and , on the other , it needed to appeal to some aspect of the 
public's view of the world. It was the ideology of racism, as it was 
expressed towards Pacific Island migrants, that provided them the vehicle 
for this political campaign. 
Thus, at the beginning of 1976, New Zealanders, in general, had already 
been persuaded that Pacific Islanders were a problem . Ideologically they 
had been primed for the immigration campaigns that were to occur later 
in 1976. Dawn raids and random street check campaigns were merely an 
extension of that ideology. If the problem was Pacific Island 
immigrants , especially overstayers, then the solution was only going to 
be how to get rid of them . Hence , the images and the rhetoric of 1976 
which politicised Pacific Island migrants as criminals, as economic 
burdens, as problems, merely reiterated old and well-entrenched 
stereotypes. The 1976 campaigns merely reproduced already existing 
racist attitudes towards Pacific Islanders and by giving them greater 
expression, legitimated and further entrenched them. It was not at all 
out of place, then, for the minister of immigration , Frank Gill, in 1977 
1 9 4 See Chapter Three. 
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to talk about Pacific Island overstaying as being an "epidemic", 
conjuring up images and associations of life-threatening plagues with the 
implication that overstaying was as much a threat as any "communicable 
disease". 195 He revealed not only the attitudes that allowed the 
immigration campaigns to occur in the 1970s, but also heralded the 
attitudes which were to continue to shape events well into the 1980s. 
195 New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 'Overcoming the "Overstayer" 
Problem', Vol.27, No.4, (1977), p56 . 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE IDEOLOGICAL LEGACY 
Although the very public and controversial immigration campaigns of the 
mid-1970s had ended, the issue of Pacific Island immigration continued 
to be the subject of public and official concern into the 1980s. The 
stereotypes that had been created in the previous decade, those of the 
'overstaying Islander', the 'lawbreaker', and the 'immigrant who took New 
Zealanders' jobs', continued to influence people's perceptions of Pacific 
Islanders. A newspaper series on Islanders in 1979 maintained that it 
was common for Pacific Islanders in New Zealand to be stereotyped as 
poor , dirty, unhealthy and heavy boozers. 1 
Prejudice does exist . A woman turns down an emergency house 
because Islanders live next door; high school kids in Otara tell 
how they are automatically branded as gang members; a Niuean boy 
is picked up by police as he walks a city street at night and 
wonders if it would have happened to a palagi. 2 
The image of overstaying remained particularly strong . In 1980, in the 
first visit by a New Zealand prime minister to Western Samoa since its 
independence, Prime Minister Muldoon addressed the Samoan Legislative 
Assembly with a speech that talked at length about the 'worries' of the 
immigration flow from Western Samoa to New Zealand and the "problem of 
lawbreaking overstayers". 3 That politicians continued to give it such 
attention was an indication of how entrenched that image of Island 
1 Auckland Star, 'The Islanders in '79. Multi-cultural base lies in 
the schools', 29 August (1979). 
2 ibid. 
Ministry of 
Legislative Assembly 
Review, Vol.30, No . 3, 
Foreign Affairs, 'Prime Minister's Address to 
of Western Samoa' , ~N~e~w~~z~e~a~l~a!.!.n::.d~~F~o~r~e"-'1:..:. g""n~..:A~f~f~a==-=.i=.r~s 
(1980) 1 pp26-28. 
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immigrants had become. 
The speech by Muldoon was interesting also for his vision of the strong 
bonds underpinning New Zealand-Western Samoan relations: 
We are secure in the knowledge that our friendship is within the 
family, we are part of each other's aiga. We can call on each 
other for help, confidant that support will be forthcoming. 4 
He even went further to assert that New Zealanders would continue to 
welcome Samoans to their shores. 5 These sentiments are intriguing, for 
less than two years later the bonds between the two countries that 
Muldoon described were sorely tested by the New Zealand government's 
continued prejudices against Pacific Island immigrants. Then, old 
stereotypes and racist attitudes played a significant role in closing 
immigration doors on New Zealand's Samoan 'family'. 
LESA AND THE CITIZENSHIP (WESTERN SAMOA) ACT, 1982 
In July 1982 the highest court in the New Zealand law system, the Privy 
Council, ruled that Falema'i Lesa, a Western Samoan facing prosecution 
in the New Zealand courts as an overstayer, was in fact under earlier 
legislation a natural-born British subject and hence a New Zealand 
citizen. Lesa's defence case was based upon section 7(1) of the British 
Nationality and Status of Aliens (in New Zealand) Act of 1928. 6 In their 
consideration of the meaning of this and other Imperial Acts of the 
United Kingdom deemed to be part of the law in New Zealand, the Lordships 
declared that: 
In Their Lordships' view, there is no escaping that s7(1) of the 
Act of 1928 means what it so emphatically and unequivocally says; 
a person born or resident in Western Samoa is to be treated in the 
same manner in all respects for all the purposes of the Act of 1928 
4 ibid., p32. 
5 ibid., p28. 
6 Copy of the complete judgement of the Privy Council in, 'Lesa v 
Attorney General', New Zealand Law Journal, August (1982), p276. 
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as if he had been born or resident in New Zealand proper. 7 
The court's decision effectively meant that all Samoans born in Western 
Samoa between 1928 and 1 January 1949, together with all the children of 
Samoan fathers born within that period, estimated to involve 100,000 
Western Samoans, or two-thirds of Western Samoa's population, were New 
Zealand citizens. 8 
The decision came as a shock to political and legal establishments and 
sparked off a virtual panic in New Zealand at the imagined prospect of 
a sudden flood of Islanders into New Zealand, bringing in their wake the 
kind of "social pressures and disturbances that marked the arrival in 
Britain of the great waves of West Indians and Pakistanis during the 
1950s". 9 New Zealanders, responding to images and stereotypes that had 
been created in the previous decade, were haunted by the fear of a new 
'invasion' of brown immigrants. 10 The old images and stereotypes, of the 
'socially inferior brown immigrant', and the 'violent overstaying 
Islander taking our men's jobs' which in particular had been reproduced 
so vociferously in the 1970s, still powerfully shaped most New 
Zealanders' understanding of Pacific Islanders. New Zealanders in 
general perceived immigration from the Pacific in terms of the 
'race' /immigration ideology, with all its cliches of 'invasions', 'alien 
floods', and related social 'problems'. Thus, the New Zealand government 
over-reacted and panicked at what it perceived to be a major threat to 
New Zealand society; a perception that was based more upon myth and 
prejudice than it was upon fact. 
7 ibid., p278. 
8 Ballara, (1986), p161, and Barrie Macdonald, 'The Lesa Case, and 
the Citizenship (Western Samoa) Act, 1982', in A.D. Trlin and Paul 
Spoonley (eds) , New Zealand and International Migration. A Digest and 
Bibliography, Number One, (Palmerston North, 1986), p73. 
9 Dominion, Editorial, 'Calmer view on Samoans', 2 August (1982). 
10 Ballara, (1986), p161. 
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Despite the figures of 100,000 that were bandied about as the likely 
number of Samoans who would come to New Zealand, and the political scare-
mongering about the great stress the sudden arrival of many thousands of 
outsiders to New Zealand would cause, the fact was that the spectre of 
an exodus and a Samoan elbow at every porthole had no substance. 11 
Samoan leaders assured the New Zealand government that surveys made in 
Samoa showed that most Samoans had no desire to emigrate to New 
Zealand . 1 2 Samoans could generally only afford to migrate to New Zealand 
when the economy was buoyant and there were jobs. There was no reason 
to suspect that there would be a sudden influx of migrants when, in the 
worsening recession, jobs were scarce. 13 Indeed, in the two years 
previous to the Privy Council decision there had been a net outflow of 
Samoans from New Zealand. 14 Western Samoans were pleased to learn that 
they were New Zealand citizens , not necessarily because of the advantages 
of New Zealand entry which such rights bestowed, but because it both 
confirmed an historical association and their membership of a wider 
community . 15 One Samoan explained: 
We have always been close to New Zealand, for good or for bad, and 
this was just another step closer. It doesn't mean we were 
indifferent - citizenship is a birthright and a source of status 
and such things are of great importance to Samoans . But it did not 
change the fact that there are no scholarships or airfares or jobs 
to go to in New Zealand. We did not see why we should suddenly all 
want to go to New Zealand. 16 
11 J.K. McLay, 'The Reactio n to Lesa - Two Views. The Western Samoa 
Bill - Background and Explanation', New Zealand Law Journal, October 
(1982), p353, and Peter MacAlevey, 'Letter from Apia', New Zealand Law 
Journal, November (1982), p382 . 
12 Dominion , 'PM tells Samo a to deter migrants', 14 August (1982). 
13 NZPD, Vol.446, (1982) , p3119 . 
14 New Zealand Coalition for Trade and Development, (1982), p27. 
15 MacAlevey, (1982), p383 . 
16 Quoted in Pamela Stirling, 'Rights and Wrongs', Listener, Vol.102, 
No.2234, (1982), p19. 
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The real issue in 1982 was not so much about the capacity of the New 
Zealand economy to absorb new immigrants as it was about New Zealanders' 
perceptions of themselves and others . It was about most New Zealanders' 
continued desire to maintain cultural and physical homogeneity. It was 
about most New Zealanders' belief in an ideology that had for many years 
characterised Pacific Islanders as a threat to that homogeneity and all 
else that New Zealanders might hold dear. The events of the 1970s had 
entrenched racist attitudes and had politicised the issue of Pacific 
Island immigration to the extent that it became a flashpoint for 
prejudice and panic. The potency of the stereotypes that had been fixed 
in the immigration campaigns of a decade before was revealed in the 
government ' s haste to overturn the Privy Council decision. There was no 
immediate reason for the government to act as it did, or so fast . No 
convincing evidence was produced to suggest that those Samoans still in 
Western Samoa would have used their newly-discovered New Zealand 
citizenship in a manner imminently detrimental to the social or economic 
well-being of either country. 17 It is difficult to see any other reason 
which could justify the extreme haste with which the government moved to 
nullify the court ' s decision, other than in its conviction in the 
ideology of 'race ' /immigration and all the frightening, misrepresentative 
images that it involved. 
The New Zealand government reacted immediately to what they described as 
a "constitutional bombshell" . 18 As soon as the Privy Council decision 
was announced in mid-1982 the New Zealand Government placed an immediate 
ban on the issue of all visas and permits for Samoan immigrants, and the 
New Zealand prime minister, Robert Muldoon, cabled his counterpart in 
Samoa , Va'ai Kolone, to arrange detailed talks immediately following the 
South Pacific Forum meeting scheduled to be held in New Zealand in early 
17 Rupert Glover, 'The Reaction to Lesa - Two Views. The Western 
Samoa Bill Background and Unanswered Questions', New Zealand Law 
Journal, October (1982b), p357. 
18 NZPD, Vol.446, (1982) , p2513 and p2520 , and Dominion , 'Samoa 
pro tocol ready ' , 20 August (1982). 
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August. 1 9 At their meeting Muldoon said he gave the Samoan delegation 
a list of options aimed at resolving the "headache" arising from the 
Privy Council decision. 20 
Although the Samoan representatives made clear that they were opposed to 
any New Zealand moves to legislate against the court decision, at no time 
did the New Zealand Government, or the parliamentary opposition for that 
matter, advocate accepting the Privy Council ruling. It was later 
revealed that, in talks in Wellington, Muldoon had secretly told the 
Samoan Government to produce a plan to prevent mass Samoan migration to 
New Zealand or else it would act to prevent it itself. 21 The New 
Zealand Government sought a guarantee that Samoans would not flock to New 
Zealand following the court decision, and gave the Samoan Government 
about a week to come up with a plan that would avoid the need for New 
Zealand legislation. H Muldoon made it clear that "if Samoa did not 
agree to the New Zealand proposal then the New Zealand Government would 
act anyway. " 23 A week later, the New Zealand attorney general and 
minister of justice, Jim McLay, flew to Samoa to sign a Protocol to the 
Treaty of Friendship which in effect stripped the majority of Samoans of 
their newly realised New Zealand citizenship rights. 24 
The Protocol was signed on 21 August in Apia and, only a few days later, 
on 24 August, legislation implementing the Protocol and revising the 
effect of the Privy council decision was introduced to the New Zealand 
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Western Samoa: Citizenship Issue', 
New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.32, No.3, (1982), p24. 
20 Dominion, 'Samoan talks delayed', 12 August (1982). 
2 1 Dominion, 'PM tells Samoa to deter migrants', 14 August (1982). 
22 ibid 0 
23 ibid 0 
24 Dominion, 'Samoa protocol ready', 20 August (1982). 
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Parliament. 25 While the Bill confirmed the New Zealand citizenship of 
Falema'i Lesa, on whose behalf the original action had been brought, it 
asserted that all other Western Samoans who had similar claim to be 
British subjects and therefore New Zealand citizens were deemed never to 
have been New Zealand citizens. 26 Having denied citizenship to persons 
whom the Privy Council had declared New Zealand citizens, it then granted 
rights to citizenship to all Western Samoans who happened to be in New 
Zealand on the day before the date on which the Act was to take effect. 2 7 
This provision confirmed the right to claim citizenship, but not 
citizenship itself, on the basis only of the location of the individual 
concerned on a specific date. 28 The Bill also granted the immediate 
right to citizenship to Western Samoans subsequently granted the right 
to enter and reside in New Zealand, instead of their having to wait 
several years for citizenship as had formerly been the case. Moreover, 
the Bill quashed the convictions for overstaying of more than 750 Samoans 
who had been deported since 1968, thereby removing their status as 
prohibited immigrants. 29 Overstayers who had left the country 
voluntarily had subsequently had their names and those of their relatives 
put on an administrative list of persons who were effectively denied re-
entry to New Zealand for a period of five years. 30 Likewise, under the 
provisions of the Bill, that list was to be abolished. 31 
Following its introduction, the Bill was referred almost immediately to 
the Select Committee for hasty consideration. Submissions were called 
25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Western Samoa: Citizenship Issue', 
New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.32, No.3, (1982), pp24-25. 
26 NZPD, Vol.446, (1982), p2513. 
27 ibid. 
28 Barrie Macdonald, (1986), p77. 
29 NZPD, Vol.446, (1982), p2514. 
30 ibid., pp2514,1516. 
31 ibid • 1 p2514 • 
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for on Wednesday 25 August, the deadline for which was noon the following 
Monday, 30 August. The public had effectively only two days to prepare 
and post submissions. 32 The dispatch of the committee's sittings was 
explained as being out of a concern not to further delay the 
inconvenience of the ban on Samoan migrants wishing to enter New Zealand. 
Subsequent reports, however, indicated that such haste was merely a 
result of the government's own self-interest. Initially, it had wanted 
the Bill passed through all its stages a week earlier, before it was 
decided to send the Bill to committee. 33 
The submissions heard by the committee were apparently unanimous in their 
opposition to the Bill. 34 The legislation was seen as an "affront and 
a gross insult" by many Samoans, and the New Zealand Human Rights 
Commission, though it retreated somewhat later, submitted that the Bill 
(by depriving citizens of their citizenship on the basis of ethnic 
origin) had "an unfortunate racist implication". 35 Despite this, the 
Bill was passed into law with only minor amendments on 14 September. 
The passage of the Bill was stormy, with the Labour Party criticising the 
government's handling of the negotiations with the Western Samoan 
Government and the speed with which it had passed the resulting 
legislation through parliament. However, when the final vote was taken 
only five Labour MPs voted against the Bill, despite the fact that the 
Labour Party's ruling executive had asked all of its MPs not to support 
it. 36 Indeed, from the start, the Labour opposition had agreed with the 
32 Dominion, 'Submissions deadline set', 26 August (1982). 
33 Dominion, 'Samoa bill set for quick hearings', 31 August (1982). 
34 Dominion, 'Samoan bill brings outcry', 1 September (1982). 
35 ibid., and NZPD, Vol.446, (1982), p3055. 
36 Dominion, 'Labour split over Samoa', 11 September (1982), and 
'Samoan marchers too late', 15 September (1982). 
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government that the Privy Council decision should be reversed. 3 7 The 
fact that the court's decision had been immediately interpreted by 
politicians on both sides of the house as being a problem, revealed the 
extent to which the old images and stereotypes of the 'race' /immigration 
ideology pervaded political thought, and the degree of consensus that 
continued to exist between the two major political parties on the issu e 
of Pacific Island immigration. 
The New Zealand government's handling of the Western Samoan citizensh ip 
issue was questionable, and its solution unnecessarily arbitrary and 
discriminatory. 38 Pressure applied by the New Zealand Government clearly 
played a major role in securing the citizenship agreement with Western 
Samoa. The deadline imposed by the Muldoon government on negotiations 
with Samoa did not allow for wide enough consultation in Samoa, or for 
a consensus to be reached. Samoan Cabinet MP, Le Mamea Ropati, admitted 
that that the deadline had been difficult and had not given his cabinet 
enough time to reflect on the full implications of the court judgement, 
or to consider the protocol agreement. 39 As it was the Samoan cabinet 
sat through a marathon debate on the protocol to meet the deadline, from 
9 . 30 a.m . until midnight , and even then split four votes to three on 
approving the agreement. 40 According to the secretary to the Samoan 
Government, Maiave Iuali Toma, however: 
even apart from the fact that we were given a deadline, there 
seemed little point in asking Samoans what they thought, because 
we knew all along that the decision was not for us to make. It was 
very clear that New Zealand would not leave the thing alone, 
37 Dominion, 'Samoa protocol 
defuse Samoa bombshell', 25 
pp2516 , 2518-2519. 
ready ' , 20 August (1982), 'Bill aims to 
August (1982), and NZPD, Vol.446, 
38 Glover, (1982), p357, and Dominion, Editorials , 'Samoan New 
Zealanders', 24 August (1982), and 'Rushing to stay calm' , 1 September 
( 1982) . 
39 Dominion , 'Racist label marks protocol' , 23 August (1982) . 
4 0 Dominion, 'Samoan says fear led to protocol', 2 November (1982). 
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regardless of what the Samoan people might request. 41 
A senior Samoan government source later said that the delegation he went 
with to Wellington was told by the New Zealand Government that it had 
already prepared a bill completely overturning the Privy Council 
decision, and that that legislation was ready to go in to parliament. 42 
A Western Samoan cabinet minister involved in considering the Protocol 
stated that: 
There was definite pressure. When Va'ai returned (from talks in 
Wellington) he said he was told by Mr Muldoon that unless there was 
a definite answer they would go ahead with whatever the (National 
Party) caucus decided. That I viewed as an ultimatum. 4 3 
Throughout the negotiations with New Zealand an undercurrent of resigned 
acceptance and bitter criticism pervaded the Samoan response. 44 
Resentment over the Protocol was widespread. A petition circulated in 
Samoa opposing the Protocol collected, in only a week, more than 22,000 
signatures, representing more than twelve percent of the Samoan 
population and making it the largest petition in Western Samoan 
history. 45 A subsequent meeting of all Western Samoan mayors was also 
far from overwhelming in its support for the Protocol. 46 One group even 
tried through the Western Samoan Supreme Court to have the Protocol 
declared null and void because it contravened the constitutional rights 
of Western Samoans. 47 Such protests gave strength to claims made in Apia 
that, despite Prime Minister Muldoon's assertions that the issue had been 
41 Quoted in Stirling, (1982), p19. 
42 Dominion, 'Samoa saw little choice', 24 August (1982). 
43 Dominion, 'Samoan says fear led to protocol', 2 November (1982). 
44 Dominion, 'Racist label marks protocol', 23 August (1982). 
45 Dominion, 'Petition arrives', 9 September (1982). 
46 Dominion, 'Samoan mayors hear racist claim', 1 November (1982), 
and 'Muldoon errs on protocol count, says Tupuola Efi', 3 November 
(1982) . 
47 Dominion, 'Samoans file against protocol', 4 November (1982). 
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handled in "the Pacific way" and "discussed .. . carefully and in a relaxed 
manner, with no ultimatum being given and no time limits being set", the 
decisions of the New Zealand Government were racist, ill-considered and 
had been foisted not only on to a small, weak and economically dependant 
nation but also on to a government made doubly vulnerable by a domestic 
political cris is. 48 "Whereas before," said Fogi Retzlaff, a spokesperson 
for the protest group Taga-i-Lima: 
if you had asked Samoans to raise their hands if they wanted to 
take up the rights of citizenship you would have very few 
responders, now if you asked how many of them felt their rights had 
been violated they would all stand up. We felt it was not just an 
injustice to some but a gross insult to the Samoan people in the 
way it was handled. 49 
The inter-governmental negotiations had come at a time of political 
crisis in Western Samoa where the survival of Va'ai Kolone's government 
was under threat because of disputed electoral returns. 50 In the event, 
the government fell to opposition leader, Taisi Tupuola Efi, who tried 
to have the Protocol set aside. 51 The New Zealand Government's response 
was to threaten the Western Samoan Government with a full renegotiation 
of the Treaty of Friendship if they set the protocol aside, and to 
secretly freeze all Samoan applications for permanent residence. 5 2 
In keeping with the spirit of the citizenship legislation immigration 
minister, Aussie Malcolm, had begun issuing permanent residence permits 
to about two hundred Samoans wishing to fly home for Christmas as an 
48 NZPD, Vol.446, (1982), p2517 quoted in Barrie Macdonald, (1986), 
p78. 
49 Quoted in Stirling, ( 1982) , p19. 
50 Dominion, 'Kolone bribe hearing starts', and 'Judge chides Samoan 
political way', 25 August (1982) . 
51 Dominion, 'Citizenship issue raised', 23 September (1982). 
52 Dominion, 'Samoans favour commission idea', 25 October (1982), and 
'Samoan residency hopes frozen', 27 October (1982). 
Ideological Legacy pl54 
interim measure while they waited for New Zealand citizenship, which 
could take up to six months to obtain . 53 However, reacting to Efi' s 
challenges to the protocol, the New Zealand Government attempted to halt 
the proposed legal review by arbitrarily and without justification 
freezing Samoan permanent residence applications. 54 One political 
commentator was prompted to quip that Muldoon ' s much vaunted "Pacific 
way" was obviously to "talk softly and carry a big carrot and threaten 
to hit people with it, or remove it altogether if you don ' t get your own 
way. 11 55 
Figure 7.1 All in the same boat , Tom Scott, Listener, 1982 . 56 
53 Dominion, ' Samoan residency hopes frozen' , 27 October (1982), and 
'Clamp hits Samoan Christmas' , 28 October (1982). 
54 Dominion, ' Sour in Samoa ' , 1 November (1982) 
55 Tom Scott , 'All in the same boat', Listener , Vol.102, No . 2234, 
(1982) 1 pl3 • 
56 Tom Scott, 'All in the same boat', Listener, Vol.l02, No.2234 , 
(1982) 1 pl3 . 
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It was an entirely sorry affair which only served to further damage New 
Zealand's strained relations in the Pacific. 57 Tupuola Efi was to later 
describe the protocol as: 
a friendly agreement between two friends to express in the 
friendliest manner the unfriendliest of intentions of one towards 
the other. 58 
What was made patently clear throughout the whole affair was the depth 
of fear New Zealanders felt towards Pacific Island immigrants. Past 
events and stereotypes had created a spectre of the immigrant 'threat' 
from the Pacific and it was to this image that New Zealand politicians 
reacted. Their response to the Privy Council decision could only have 
further entrenched it. The consensus between the two parties, the haste 
with which the government reacted to the court decision, and the lengths 
to which it went to prevent Western Samoans obtaining New Zealand 
citizenship must have only served to convince the public that there was 
indeed a problem, and that that problem was, once again, 'the Island 
immigrant' . 59 
While on the one hand the government's legislative measures did not 
challenge the prevailing ideological orthodoxy about Pacific Island 
immigrants nor, on the other hand, did it change the longstanding 
discriminatory basis of the immigration of Western Samoans to New 
Zealand. In particular the restrictive thirty day visitor's permit was 
retained and the annual Samoan quota for those seeking permanent 
residence was held at 1, 100. It did nothing to clean the slate of 
residual problems in other areas of Pacific Island immigration either -
especially those affecting Fijians and Tongans. Nor did it establish 
either policy or procedures that would eliminate the immigration problems 
57 Dominion, Editorial, 'Bruised image', 6 November (1982). 
58 Quoted in Stirling, ( 1982), p19. 
59 See consecutive editorials in the Dominion, (1982), for an example 
of media acceptance of the appropriateness of overturning the Privy 
Council decision. 
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which had regularly strained New Zealand's relations with its island 
neighbours. 60 
IMMIGRATION POLICY 
Other events served to highlight the deficiencies of the existing New 
Zealand immigration legislation as well as practice. 6 1 Following a 
departmental review, the minister of immigration, Aussie Malcolm, 
introduced a new Immigratio n Bill in December 1983. 62 While the proposed 
revision was held to apply to all persons, it was immediately criticised 
by Pacific Islanders, and by Western Samoans in particular, as racist. 6 3 
The Bill was to rationalise procedures; decriminalise most immigration 
offences; add to the grounds for deportation; and limit appeal against 
deportation orders. 6 4 The Bill also required employers and educational 
institutions to keep records on the immigration status of employees or 
students, and, in a move which echoed the worst abuses of the immigration 
campaigns of the 1970s, it required non-citizens to carry permits, with 
any refusal to produce documentation proving citizenship or lawful 
presence being sufficient grounds for the assumption that an offence had 
been committed. It also gave immigration officers the right of arrest 
and provision to random search private homes. 65 
When introducing the Bill, Malcolm made clear that it was to target 
people in New Zealand unlawfully - overstayers: 
These people prey on our society. They are like the uninvited 
guest, or the guest who outstays his welcome in our home. By his 
60 Barrie Macdonald, ( 1986) , p79. 
61 Barrie Macdonald, ( 1986) , p79 . 
62 NZPD, Vol.455, ( 1983 ) , pp4961-4962. 
63 Barrie Macdonald, ( 1 986) , p79. 
64 ibid. 
65 ibid., and NZPD, Vol.471, (1986), p3927. 
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presence he makes a mockery of our careful policies that are 
designed to enhance opportunities for New Zealanders. 66 
Given the past associations of overstaying with Pacific Islanders, it was 
not surprising that Islanders perceived this legislation to be strongly 
targeted, despite assurances that it was to cover all immigrants, towards 
them. In fact, subsequent events gave them good grounds for believing 
that those past stereotypes and attitudes would indeed have coloured the 
implementation of the proposed legislation. 
The Bill died with the Muldoon government in July 1984, but not before 
it had soured relations between· New Zealand and its island neighbours, 
and not before it was revealed that judgements about 'race' continued to 
play a part in the practice of New Zealand's immigration policy. 67 In 
May 1984 a complaint from a prominent American Samoan businessman sparked 
off an embarrassing diplomatic row for New Zealand. Fritz Kruse had 
flown to New Zealand with his two sons, both of whom were born in 
American Samoa and were holders of American passports, whereupon his sons 
were told to leave New Zealand because they lacked visas, despite the 
fact that American visitors did not need visas to enter New Zealand. One 
son was given a thirty-day entry permit on his American passport while 
the other was given a day to quit the country, only after he had shown 
the immigration officers an outward-bound air ticket. The boys were 
treated in this way apparently because of their ethnic identity. 68 
Newspapers in America and Western Samoa seized on the incident and 
proceeded to blast New Zealand immigration policy as racist. The 
Governor of American Samoa published a criticism of New Zealand policy 
in a United States government publication, while American Samoa's 
congressman, Foto Sunia, took a formal complaint to the American 
Secretary of State, George Schultz, and to the New Zealand Embassy in 
66 NZPD, Vol.455, (1983), p4961. 
67 Barrie Macdonald, (1986), p79. 
68 Warren Berryman, ''Racist' claims rile Malcolm in Samoan visa 
row', National Business Review, Vol.15, No.16, Issue 574, (1984a), pp4-5. 
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Washington. 69 
New Zealand's immigration minister, Aussie Malcolm, continued to deny the 
charges of racism, claiming that the boys were treated differently from 
other American visitors because they were American nationals and not 
citizens. However, his own immigration officers bore out claims that New 
Zealand did indeed make distinctions between Samoans and other American 
citizens based on 'race' Officers at Auckland airport admitted that one 
American passport looked like another and the only way to distinguish 
between American nationals and citizens was by the colour of the holder's 
skin and his or her place of birth. 7 0 The debacle highlighted, once 
again, the racist assumptions within New Zealand's immigration practice. 
Racism and the Immigration Department 
Two years later, in a report on New Zealand's immigration practices which 
illustrated the positive role the media could have in challenging racist 
practices, Auckland Star journalist, David Mcloughlan, revealed 
disturbing trends in overstayer prosecutions and deportations. 71 He 
found that while Pacific Islanders accounted for less than a third of 
9500 alleged overstayers, they were virtually the only ethnic group 
arrested, prosecuted and deported for the offence. The biggest 
proportion of those overstaying temporary entry permits consisted of 
North Americans, Britons and continental Europeans, but they were rarely 
sought by immigration officials. 72 In response to these allegations, the 
Labour government's minister of immigration, Kerry Burke, requested the 
69 ibid., and Warren Berryman, 'Samoan migration row taken to 
Washington', National Business Review, Vol.15, No.25, Issue 583, (1984b), 
p5. 
70 Berryman, (1984b), p5. 
71 Auckland Star, 'Overstayers: The Big White Lie', 23 March (1986). 
72 Auckland Star, 'Migrant officials at centre of row', 24 March 
( 1986) . 
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Race Relations Conciliator to investigate, and the subsequent report by 
the Race Relations Office confirmed the practice of racial discrimination 
within the Immigration Department . 73 Significantly, the office found 
that the racism involved in stereotyping and targeting Pacific Island 
groups during the overstayer campaigns of 1974 and 1976 had remained a 
dominant influence in the department. 74 It submitted that the situation 
wherein Pacific Islanders constituted a minority of overstayers but a 
majority of those prosecuted was "a residue of the 'White New Zealand ' 
policy" and practises as exemplified by nineteenth century anti-Asian 
immigration legislation and more recently in late twentieth century 
racially discriminatory criteria in immigration policy. 75 It found that 
while the immigration law no longer contained explicit racial bias that 
"particular philosophy of the past continues to influence current policy 
and practises. " 76 
The report found that Pacific Island immigrants were discriminated 
against in several ways. Firstly, approximately ninety percent of the 
estimated 600, 000 people who visited New Zealand annually entered without 
a visa. Under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement and other inter-
governmental visa-abolition agreements, visitors from a large number of 
countries were exempt from visa requirements . 77 This, however, was not 
the case for visitors from the Pacific Islands, who were seen to be among 
the most likely to overstay their permits . 78 An anomaly clearly operated 
to the disadvantage of Pacific Island immigrants in the requirement to 
73 Race Relations Office, Investigation into Allegations of 
Discrimination in the Application of Immigration Laws in New Zealand, 
(Wellington 1986). 
74 ibid. 1 pS . 
75 ibid. 1 ppS-9 . 
76 ibid . 1 p9. 
77 ibid . 1 p11. 
78 ibid . 1 pp11 113 • 
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obtain a visa. The more stringent conditions applied to, and more 
detailed information obtained from these visitors made it easier to 
apprehend and prosecute them at the later point of expiry of their 
permits. 79 
Moreover, the limit imposed on their entry permits also operated to 
disadvantage Fijian, Western Samoan and Tongan visitors in comparison to 
other visitors. The stated purpose of this limit was to discourage 
breaches of the law involving working and/or overstaying, yet no such 
deterrent was stated with regard to any other groups entering New 
Zealand. 80 Other procedures operated within the department, such as 
providing separate computer print - outs for Fijian, Samoan and Tongan 
suspected overstayers, which also appeared to target this group in 
preference to others. 81 The image of overstaying established in the 
1970s, in the 1980s became the justification for discriminatory 
activities within the Immigration Department. 82 
Similarly, the sponsorship system, despite its stated purpose to assist 
Pacific Islanders to enter New Zealand was seen as discriminatory, and 
to be operated in such a way as to impose post-entry controls on Pacific 
Island immigrants. 83 The sponsorship system was stated by both 
immigration officers and Pacific Islanders to be the reason why more 
Islanders than any other groups was prosecuted for overstaying. The 
information collected under the sponsorship guarantee provided reliable 
contacts through which people might later be located, whereas non-
sponsored visitors may only record the address of the hotel or motel at 
79 ibid., pp13,15. 
80 ibid . ' p61. 
81 ibid., p61. 
82 Spoonley, (1990b), p31. 
83 Race Relations Office, ( 1986) , pp20-21. 
Ideological Legacy pl61 
which they were to stay on their first night in New Zealand. 84 
The Race Relations Office also found that pervasive and prejudiced 
attitudes, incompatible with the department's own objective for an 
immigration enforcement which made no distinction between national 
groups, existed at all levels within the department . It was widely 
believed by immigration staff that Pacific Islanders actually comprised 
the majority of overstayers, that they overstayed longer than any other 
groups, that they were less likely to leave the country voluntarily, and 
that they were more likely to take their case through the appeal s y stem 
and "clutter up" the courts. These beliefs, the report stated, were an 
important reason for the more vigorous pursuit of Pacific Island 
immigrants than any other group. 85 
The effect of these practices, the office found, meant that more time and 
resources were applied to the apprehension and prosecution of Pacific 
Island immigrants than of any other overstayers. As a result, citizens 
of Fiji, Western Samoa and Tonga comprised a minority, approximately one-
third , of the total number of overstayers in New Zealand, and at the same 
time a large majority, over eighty-six percent, of the prosecutions for 
overstaying under the Immigration Act . 86 The report stated that this 
discrimination was on the one hand the logical outcome of New Zealand's 
discriminatory immigration policy and law , and on the other hand the 
result of discriminatory attitudes and erroneous beliefs. 87 These 
attitudes, stemming from old misconceptions and fears about Pacific 
Island immigrants, were responsible for the creation of a circular 
problem . The higher number of convictions that resulted from 
84 ibid. 
as ibid. 1 p35 . 
86 ibid. 1 p60. 
87 ibid. 1 pp60-62. 
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discriminatory attitudes, actually reinforced the original beliefs. 88 
Hence , it can be seen that the overstaying images of Pacific Island 
immigrants that had been promoted in the 1970s had serious repercussions 
for Pacific Islanders. Not only did they cause Pacific Island immigrants 
to be unfairly targeted in subsequent immigration enforcement practices, 
they also created a self-perpetuating situation, wherein the stereotypes 
sustained themselves. The continued belief in the 'overstaying 
Islander', and the actioning of policy based upon that belief, simply 
served to reproduce and continually reinforce the old 'race' /immigration 
ideology. 
Recommendations that arose from the Race Relations inquiry were 
subsequently embodied in the Immigration Bill 1986, which represented an 
important departure from previous migration policies. 89 In particular 
it was proposed that visitors from Tonga, Fiji and Samoa should no longer 
need visas, as other nationalities were not obliged to produce them; that 
the offence of overstaying be decriminalised; and that an offender should 
have the right of re-entry after five years, where previously they had 
been barred for life . 90 These recommendations were accompanied by 
changes to the definition of 'immediate family' under family 
reunification clauses, the liberalisation of the family size rule, and 
the removal of national origin as a factor in immigration selection. 91 
The liberalisation of measures particularly seen to be associated with 
Pacific Islanders, however, did not escape opposition. National party 
politicians criticised what they saw as an imbalance in the future 
BB ibid. 1 p62 • 
89 Richard Bedford, 'Immigration Policy and Migration to New Zealand 
from the South Pacific, 1986-87', New Zealand Geographer, Vol.43, No.1, 
(1987) 1 p36 • 
90 Toft, (1990), pll4. 
91 
'Review of Immigration Policy August 1986', AJHR, Vol.8, G.42, 
(1987) 1 pp6-7. 
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immigrant composition if immigration from the Pacific Islands was 
favoured in these ways. 92 Said one MP: 
Traditionally, as immigrants from lower socio-economic countries 
do, they are starting to work their way up through the socio-
economic scale. At this stage they are moving up to the taxi 
driver rank, when we need people to open businesses and to employ 
people who traditionally come from lower socio-economic areas. 93 
Others opposed the liberalisation of rules relating to overstayers, who 
were still believed to be predominantly Polynesian despite the recent 
inquiry findings. 94 One National MP even went so far as to say that such 
a proposal discriminated against 'New Zealanders': 
I find it careless and dubious of the Government ... that it should 
soften up the country's traditional approach to overstayers. They 
are persons unlawfully in New Zealand at a time when our own people 
are undergoing increasing pressure and competition for places at 
work and for social services. 95 
Obviously, attitudes towards Pacific Island immigrants in some quarters 
at least, were still coloured by past events and stereotypes. Islanders 
were still regarded as undesirable immigrants and as potential 
overstayers . Subsequent events proved also that despite the Labour 
Government's preparedness to liberalise some of the rules which 
discriminated against Pacific Island immigrants it , too, was ultimately 
moulded by the same prejudiced attitudes. 
ABOLITION OF VISAS 1986-1987 
In December 1986 the Labour Government extended the visa-abolition scheme 
that had existed for Western Europeans, Japanese and North Americans 
since 1985 to Fiji, Western Samoa and Tonga, and standardised the initial 
period of stay for visitors from the Pacific and Europe alike at three 
92 See NZPD, Vol. 471, (1986), pp2347, 3934-3935. 
93 NZPD, Vol.471, (1986), p3937. 
94 NZPD, Vol.471, (1986), p3928. 
95 NZPD, Vol.471, (1986), p393l. 
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months with the right of applying for an extension of up to twelve 
months. 96 From 1 December 1986 Tongan, Western Samoan and Fijian 
visitors could enter New Zealand for an initial three months without 
visas. However, before the first three months had even passed the visa 
exemption for Pacific Islanders was abolished. 97 
As early as the beginning of February concern had begun to be expressed 
about the numbers of Pacific Islanders entering New Zealand under the new 
scheme. The parliamentary opposition claimed that the freer immigration 
rules had merely opened the way for a "new generation of overstayers" 
taking jobs from New Zealanders. 98 Immigration officers were reported 
to be inundated with Pacific Islanders applying for permit extensions, 
and phonecalls from local employers checking whether they could employ 
Pacific Islanders applying for jobs. 99 It was in response to claims that 
insupportable numbers of Islanders were entering New Zealand that the 
visa-free scheme was ended on 17 February 1987, just ten weeks after it 
had begun. "The sheer force of pressure from people rushing here," the 
minister of immigration explained, "has caused the Government to say, 
'this is not good enough' . " 100 He said that a welter of evidence had 
emerged to show that the new arrangements were being abused. More than 
a hundred students, he said, had sought to enrol at Auckland schools 
without the necessary permits. Planes had returned to the islands with 
dozens of empty seats. Visitors had arrived on chartered planes with 
return tickets valid only for the plane they came on, but the planes had 
96 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.36, No.3, 
'Immigration Policy', New Zealand 
(1986), p63. 
97 Annual Report, Department of Labour, AJHR, Vol.10, G.1, (1987), 
pp36-37. 
98 New Zealand Herald, 'Tongans In Exodus Seeking Jobs In NZ', 4 
February (1987). 
99 New Zealand Herald, 'Visa Office Rush by Islanders', 5 February 
( 1987) . 
100 New Zealand Herald, ''Rush' Shuts NZ Door Smartly', 18 February 
(1987) . 
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left Auckland and had not been scheduled to return. Employers reported 
that large numbers of visitors had been seeking work without the 
necessary permits, and Fijian, Samoan and Tongan communities in New 
Zealand, he asserted, were finding it difficult to cope with the "waves" 
of visitors from the islands. 101 What had been a potentially superb 
entry policy had been "corrupted" by people arriving in large numbers on 
temporary entry and seeking to stay permanently, the minister said. 1 02 
Figure 7.2 Shut the door ... , Minhinnick, New Zealand Herald, 1987. 1 03 
Such accusations, however, had less to do with any actual abuses of the 
system than negative stereotypes about Pacific Island immigrants and the 
expectations that New Zealanders had of immigrants based on those 
stereotypes. The government acted merely on the basis of old fears and 
prejudices towards Pacific Island migrants. The three-month period for 
the first visitors had not even expired. Any accusations about Islanders 
101 New Zealand Herald, ''Rush' Shuts NZ Door Smartly', 18 February 
(1987). 
102 ibid. 
103 Minhinnick, 'Shut the door ... ', New Zealand Herald, 19 February 
( 1987) . 
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overstaying were quite spurious. Moreover, given the large number of 
Islanders who were, quite legally and within their rights, applying for 
extensions to their three months stay, the fact that return airfare 
bookings to the islands were not being taken up was not at all out of the 
ordinary and certainly represented no cause for alarm. Pacific Islanders 
who entered New Zealand under the scheme were still free to apply for an 
extension of their visitors' permits for up to another nine months. 104 
Pacific Island community representatives denied claims that their 
communities had complained of the strain of hosting extra visitors. 
Tanuvasa Yandall, a Samoan advisor to the minister of Pacific Island 
affairs, explained that Island communities coped every Christmas with an 
influx of holidaying relatives, and this Christmas period was no 
different. 105 In fact, the Government was not able to produce anything 
to back up its allegations. 106 
Similarly, the minister's accusations about chartered flights proved also 
to be misdirected. When police investigated the issue of charter 
flights, it was revealed that far from orchestrating an elaborate scheme 
to stay in New Zealand as had been insinuated, Pacific Islanders were in 
fact the victims of disorganisation in the airlines concerned. 107 They 
had paid for what they genuinely believed to be a two-way fare, and had 
actually attempted to leave New Zealand on their return tickets. The 
fault was with the airline which had failed to organise return flights 
for them. 108 Yet despite the police findings, the government placed a 
104 New Zealand Herald, 'Visa Office Rush by Islanders' , 5 February 
(1987), and 'Airlines Say Blame Unfair', 19 February (1987). 
105 New Zealand Herald, 'What Proof? Demand Angry Islanders' , 18 
February (1987) 
106 ibid. 
107 New Zealand Herald, 'Police Check Agents', 19 February (1987). 
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ban on all further charter flights from Fiji, Western Samoa and Tonga. 1 09 
The greatest fear, from the outset, was about the numbers of Pacific 
Is landers arriving in New Zealand under the scheme. "Insupportable 
numbers" of Islanders were contended to be "flocking" to New Zealand in 
"waves", and exorbitant figures were proclaimed about the number of 
Samoans and Tongans entering the country. 1 10 One television news team 
estimated that 25,000 Islanders had entered under the scheme before it 
was finally axed. 1 11 But, as the airlines explained, demand for flights 
to New Zealand over the Christmas holiday period was always high. Both 
Air New Zealand and Polynesian Airline's extra flights over the December-
February period had been planned long before the New Zealand Government 
introduced its visa abolition scheme . 112 The scheduling of increased 
normal and charter flights was merely part of the regular seasonal trend. 
"We have always done this at this time of year for the last 10 years," 
a Polynesian Airline spokesman said. 1 1 3 Of the thirteen charter flights 
out of Samoa over the Christmas period, Air New Zealand confirmed, only 
two had been a result of demand after the visa restrictions had been 
lifted . 114 The fact was that Islanders simply could not afford to come 
to New Zealand in the great numbers for which they were accused. 
Significantly, when the decision was made to end the visa-abolition 
scheme the government in fact had no idea how many Pacific Islanders had 
109 New Zealand Herald, 'Airlines Say Blame Unfair' , 19 February 
(1987) . 
110 See New Zealand Herald February (1987) 
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actually entered New Zealand up to that point . 115 Their decision was 
made from estimates, of about 11,500 - 12,000, which were based on an 
assessment of aircraft capacity for 1987 and a count of arrival cards for 
the month of December only, which took, therefore, no account of the 
those who might have since left the country or any subsequent decrease 
in numbers. 116 Hence, the government, having only ten weeks before 
placed Pacific Islanders on a par with other immigrants to New Zealand, 
reimposed former discriminatory sanctions in response to what were 
incomplete and inaccurate immigration figures. In the months that 
followed it was revealed that immigration division officials had actually 
used figures that were more than double the actual number of visitors for 
that period. 117 In fact, thousands of non-Polynesian visitors entered 
the country under the same conditions during the same period and yet 
there were no concerns ever expressed about them. While the combined 
total of arrivals of visitors from Western Samoa, Fiji and Tonga for the 
three months was less than 15,000, in the same period more than 90,000 
Australians, 54,000 Americans and 17,000 Britons entered New Zealand.ns 
Anxiety over the numbers of Pacific Islanders migrating to New Zealand 
was unjustified given the vastly larger numbers of other migrants 
entering the country at the same time. But then the issue was never 
really about numbers, the real or even imagined figures - just as it had 
never been about the supposed stresses being placed on Pacific Island 
families resident in New Zealand. Rather the government and public's 
overreaction to Pacific Island immigration in 1987 was the product, once 
again, of past racist stereotypes and beliefs. The government acted to 
end the visa scheme, not because Islanders were overstaying, but because 
115 New Zealand Herald, '12, 000 Island Visitors Entered in 10 Weeks' , 
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it believed that it was inevitable that they would overstay. As one 
newspaper explained, the government had- been "stampeded" into the visa-
abolition scheme because of "fuss" in 1986 over the discrimination 
against Pacific Island visitors highlighted by the Race Relations 
inquiry: 
The spectre of racism raised at that time swamped attempts by 
immigration officers to explain that, unlike most travellers, 
Islanders are generally desperate to stay. It should not have 
taken this experience to vindicate the previous procedures. 1 19 
People believed the old stereotypes about 'overstaying Islanders', 
regardless of the fact that it was unwarranted to assume that Islanders 
were overstaying when the three month visiting period had not even 
expired when the scheme was abolished. The myth, the ever-present 
ideology of 'race'/immigration, was more compelling than the reality. 
Indeed, the government's actions merely legitimated that myth. The fact 
that it acted to end the scheme was seen by many as proof that Pacific 
Island migrants generally were indeed a threat to the New Zealand economy 
and society . 120 
THE REPRODUCTION OF RACISM 
These prejudices and beliefs continued to reinforce one another 
throughout the 1980s. For instance, at its June conference in 1988, 
the Local Government Association added its voice to growing calls for 
relaxed immigration criteria so as to attract more skilled and semi-
skilled workers to New Zealand. 121 In deference to the generally 
negative feelings about Pacific Islanders at the time, however, the mover 
of the remit, a provincial deputy mayor, felt moved to assure those 
present that he was not, in calling for greater immigration, advocating 
119 New Zealand Herald, Editorial, 'As You Were, On Entry', 18 
February (1987) 
120 Loomis, (1990), p126. 
121 Sian Robyns, 'The Numbers Game', More, December (1988), p100. 
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throwing open the doors to half the Pacific Islands. 122 Fears about the 
threat of Pacific Island immigration and the belief that it was genuinely 
destructive continued to prevail. 
In 1989, the Labour Government's prime minister, David Lange, raised the 
prospect of terminating the Western Samoan quota which had long been a 
symbol of New Zealand's 'special relationship' with Western Samoa . Since 
the immigration campaigns of the 1970s, Pacific Island immigration had 
come under regular scrutiny. The belief in the negative effect Island 
immigrants had in New Zealand ensured that Pacific immigration was a 
perpetual focus for debate. In June 1989 the minister of foreign affairs 
was sent to Apia to review immigration issues with Samoan government 
officials. The outcome was a decision to retain the quota but both 
governments agreed to use existing immigration policies to encourage a 
return to more traditional levels of immigration of around 2,000 Western 
Samoan citizens a year . 123 The effect of this decision was reflected in 
the immigration figures of subsequent months. The number of Western 
Samoans granted visas and permits to reside in New Zealand between 1 
April 1989 and 31 March 1990 totalled 1,215, compared with a total of 
4, 082 for the previous March year . 124 Yet the tap was screwed down to 
reduce the flow of Pacific Islanders into New Zealand at a time when 
official encouragement was being given to much higher levels of net 
immigration overall. In October 1989, the Minister of Immigration was 
talking of net gains of 10,000 people annually and significant changes 
to both immigration policy and law were being mooted early in 1990 to 
this end. 125 The government wanted immigrants, but obviously Pacific 
122 ibid. 
123 Richard Bedford and Wendy Larner, 'Pacific Islanders in New 
Zealand in the 1980s', in A. D. Trlin and P. Spoonley (eds), New Zealand 
and International Migration . A Digest and Bibliography, Number Two, 
(Palmerston North 1992), p65. 
124 ibid. 
125 ibid. 
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Island immigrants were not among those invited. 
Also in 1989, the Auckland Star, reported a respected High Court judge 
as saying, of Pacific Island immigrants: 
the people of New Zealand are fed up with you coming and taking 
what you can get and then claiming the benefit of what you prefer 
to have from your own way of life . 126 
In this particular case, the Samoan family he was directing his comments 
to were being sentenced for some serious offences. What is significant, 
however, is how the judge was able to express his own perception of 
Pacific Islanders, and then through the media reinforce popular negative 
beliefs. It is an illustration of how the 'system' and the media 
unknowingly continued to conspire to foster negative myths and 
prejudices. 127 
In 1991, fifteen years after the overstayer campaigns of the 1970s, old 
stereotypes and attitudes continued to be reproduced through the media. 
In a Pacific Islands Monthly article, significantly entitled 'When 
visitors are not welcome' , the old ideology was reasserted when Islanders 
and 'overstayers' were written about as if they were one and the same 
thing. The terms were continually confused as if all Pacific Islanders 
were 'overstayers' and all 'overstayers' , Pacific Islanders . 12 8 The 
author's remarks about the "effrontery of lawbreakers" were similarly 
exclusively directed towards Pacific Islanders: 
It really comes down to legal observance and the presence of 7000 
Western Samoan overstayers does not say much for their regard of 
the law. It also shows abuse of New Zealand's special quota that 
allows 1100 Western Samoa migrants entry each year .... And Tongan 
overstayers could reflect on their abuse of the family 
126 Auckland Star, 19 June (1989), quoted in Samasoni, (1990), p134. 
127 Samasoni, (1990), pl34. 
128 David Barber, 
Monthly, Vol.61, No.8, 
'When visitors are not welcome', Pacific Islands 
(1991) f p27 . 
reunification 
anybody .... 129 
scheme, which benefits 
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them as much as 
The 'race' /immigration ideology that shaped responses to Pacific Island 
immigration in the 1970s continued, in the ensuing decade of the 1980s, 
to reproduce itself. The public and politicians continued to explain 
events according to that racist ideology and old stereotypes continued 
to provide powerful common-sense explanations about Pacific Islanders and 
immigration. There were some important exceptions in the media, for 
instance, when racism was highlighted and criticised in the Immigration 
Department in 1986, and when the government's high-handed management of 
the Western Samoan citizenship issue was roundly criticised in 1982. 
However, while some practices were challenged, the general underlying 
philosophy in most cases was not. While the media criticised the way the 
government handled itself in 1982, it accepted that there was a 'need' 
to overturn Western Samoan citizenship. Moreover, in 1987, it was the 
media that helped to promote panic about the number of visitors arriving 
in the country from the Pacific. The spectre of competition for jobs, 
and the inflated immigration figures and images of 'hordes' of Islanders 
that were generated by the media only served to support and further 
entrench negative stereotypes. 
The continued belief in old ideologies was self-perpetuating . Islanders 
were believed to be overstayers and subsequent action based on that 
belief merely proved that, indeed, they were. They were believed to 
represent all manner of dangers to the country, and action taken in 
response to that conviction merely legitimated the belief, and in a 
round-about way proved it to be true. When an event occurred involving 
Pacific Island immigrants, it was continually explained by the 
stereotypes of the 'race' /immigration ideology, and action was taken in 
accordance with that ideological position. In a circuitous way this was 
then seen to prove that the event had actually been a 'race' /immigration 
problem in the first place. The pattern was cyclic. It was the response 
129 ibid. 
Ideological Legacy p173 
to an event that ultimately defined the occurrence. When the next event 
occurred it was again explained and actioned according to those same 
negative ideological expectations. Hence, the more the stereotypes and 
misconceptions of the 1970s were used to explain and define realities in 
the 1980s, the more entrenched they became. Any issue or event 
concerning Pacific Island immigration merely provided the opportunity for 
the reproduction and reinforcement of the old categorisations 
'Islanders are overstayers', 'Islanders are lawbreakers', 'Islanders take 
our jobs' . The fears and prejudices that peaked in the 1970s remained 
powerfully effective in circumscribing the lives of Pacific Islanders in 
the 1980s. As long as that ideology of 'race' /immigration remains 
unchallenged, it is to be assumed that it will continue to be just as 
potent in the 1990s. 
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CONCLUSION 
The labour migrations of Pacific Islanders to New Zealand in the post-war 
era was not unique. In many respects they mirrored the international 
labour migrations of other groups, such as the movement of migrants from 
the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent to Britain in the 1950s, or the 
movement of millions of other immigrants to Germany, France and 
Switzerland in the same period . 1 Their motivations for migration were 
primarily economic. They moved from areas where they were unemployed or 
underemployed to developed industrial countries where there was a 
shortage of labour and where wages were relatively high. The migrations 
corresponded both to the desire of the migrants themselves for higher 
incomes and to the need of New Zealand employers for additional labour 
to allow expansion. 2 Historical ties between New Zealand and the Pacific 
Islands laid the political framework for this process. 
Pacific Island labour migrants, as with labour migrants to Europe, 
characteristically held a subordinate position on the labour market, 
forming as it were a distinctive fraction of the working-class . They 
generally undertook the low paid, low status, semi-skilled or unskilled 
work that New Zealanders did not want. They tended to concentrate in 
particular urban areas, such as Otara in Auckland or Porirua in 
Wellington, and settled in poor, cheap housing accommodation in the run-
down areas of inner-city decline or state housing estates. 
The status of Pacific Island migrants in New Zealand, however, was not 
1 See Castles and Kosack, (1985). 
2 ibid . , p3. See also Ongley, (1990), Chapter Three and Chapter 
Four. 
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determined solely by production relations or the migration process. Nor 
can the events of the 1970s be explained solely by the tenuous material 
and political position of the labour migrants. Rather, racism should 
be conceived of as an important ideological dimension of the migrants' 
position in social relations. The historical record of prejudice toward 
Pacific Island immigrants and the politicisation of Pacific Islanders, 
therefore, is significant when examining the Island immigrant situation 
in New Zealand. 
THE RACIALISATION OF PACIFIC ISLANDERS 
Concerns about Pacific Island migrants emerged as early as the 1950s, and 
throughout the 1960s they were defined increasingly with relation to 
various social problems. Hostile attitudes towards Islanders grew in 
intensity and peaked in the 1970s, a decade which was marked by 
persistent ideological and political campaigns against Pacific Island 
immigrants. Having established in earlier chapters the existence of 
opposition to Pacific Island immigration and the Pacific Island presence 
in New Zealand at this time, it was necessary to consider its nature and 
foundation, that is, was it accompanied by the ideology of 'race'? 
Evidence suggests that those concerned about the Island presence did 
indeed conceptualise Pacific Islanders as a 'race'. They were conceived 
of as a separate type, and were attributed with a range of negative 
social and cultural characteristics. Islanders were associated with 
violence, drunkenness, theft and held responsible for overcrowding, and 
the spread of disease. Those particular claims came to be generalised 
in the 1970s and a predominant element in this political and ideological 
reaction to Pacific Island immigrants became the claim that Pacific 
Islanders were directly responsible for both the material and the moral 
deterioration of New Zealand at that time. 
A number of ideological constructs were potentially available, each with 
its own history, to label and to exclude Island migrants: 'race' was one. 
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Where the idea of 'race' was linked deterministically with other 
negatively evaluated characteristics as was the case here, we can talk 
of racism. The context, however, which allowed the idea of 'race' to be 
employed in this way requires explanation. 3 
THE FOUNDATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL REACTION 
The racist stereotypes and ideological rhetoric of the 1970s were first 
of all the products of a colonial heritage. By virtue of coming from 
societies which had, until recently, been parts of the British or 
Commonwealth Empire, Pacific Island migrants were understood 
ideologically in terms derived from colonial history. Paternalism and 
hostility were two of the common reactions, and both were mediated 
through the idea of 'race' . 4 Furthermore, colonial settlement within New 
Zealand itself in the nineteenth century was accompanied by political and 
ideological conceptions of 'race'. The idea of 'race' was central to 
European settlers' self-identity and to defining those who were 
supposedly biologically and culturally inferior. 5 The racism that was 
expressed towards Maori had implications for the migrants of the 
twentieth century in so far as aspects of those ideological relations 
were applied to them also. 
Closely allied to the colonial sense of racial superiority was the 
British settler desire to maintain racial and cultural homogeneity. They 
held a concept of New Zealand culture as a white, British, morally 
conservative essence, and they sought to eliminate everything else that 
contaminated it. 6 Difference was associated with threat, and the idea 
3 Miles, (1984a), p240. 
4 ibid., p232. 
5 ibid., p238. 
6 Bill Willmott, 'Introduction: Culture and National Identity', in 
David Novitz and Bill Willmott (eds), Culture and Identity in New 
Zealand, (Wellington, 1989), p6. 
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of 'race' became associated with conflict and problem. 7 The solution, 
in so far as it related to groups other than Maori, was sought in the 
limiting of migration. The early debates about Asian immigration and 
subsequent anti-Asian legislation heralded the first ideological 
construction of the 'race' /immigration problem in New Zealand. This 
desire for a 'white New Zealand' was institutionalised into policy and 
New Zealand immigration became governed by a deep awareness of and 
hostility towards 'alien cultures' and 'other races'. 
The dialectic between ideological and material relations played a further 
part in the categorisation of Pacific Island migrants as 'undesirable'. 
The material disadvantage of, at first the Maori, and the new Polynesian 
immigrants was interpreted through the idea of 'race' . The 
characteristics of poor housing and low paid unskilled work became 
negatively associated with Maori and Islanders, and the migrants' 'race' 
came to be seen as the cause of their material disadvantage. More than 
that they were seen to contaminate others with these attributes so that 
in the area of housing, for instance, it was considered a disadvantage 
to have Islanders as neighbours. 8 
Moreover, these ideological constructs often had a regenerative effect, 
such that in the 1970s they combined to create new ideological 
constructs, that is, the stereotypes of the 'overstaying Islander' and 
'illegal immigrant'. The 'race' /immigration ideology reproduced itself 
in new form when, in the 1970s immigration campaigns, Pacific Islanders 
were associated with overstaying and overstaying was cast as a 
substantial social problem for New Zealand. The ideology gained its own 
momentum when the image became public folklore, justifying discriminatory 
practice into the 1980s . 9 
7 ibid., p15, and Miles, (1984a), p232. 
8 See Chapter Two. 
9 Spoonley, ( 1990b) , p32. 
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THE NATORE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL REACTION 
In a study of this limited scope the complexity of the reasons for the 
racialisation of Pacific Islanders in the 1970s is necessarily over-
simplified. However, significant processes can be explored, and general 
groups singled out as important in the reproduction of 'race' ideology 
at this time. 
The Working Class 
The majority of Pacific Island labourers migrated to a site of class 
relations which was definitely manual working-class. However, this 
addition to the working-class required infra-structural provision, 
notably housing, for which neither the state nor employers were prepared 
to take responsibility. Consequently, a section of the existing working-
class, which was already having to cope with sub-standard housing and 
other services, was joined in these circumstances by migrant workers 
(and, later their families) . 1 0 Those migrants who joined that particular 
environment were seen by the existing working-class to make it more 
difficult for them to escape those conditions, and indeed, as migrants 
of a different 'race', with all the inferior qualities that that implied, 
were seen in many instances to have actually helped create such 
conditions. Hence, despite the fact that the urban areas of central 
Auckland had been in decline before Pacific Island migrants began to 
settle there in large numbers, they quickly became identified as the 
cause of that decline. The problem areas of the major cities, especially 
the state housing suburbs of Otara and Porirua, were also associated with 
the presence of Pacific Islanders. Because Islanders were so readily, 
physically identifiable, they became obvious scapegoats for problems 
wherever they settled. 
Moreover, the arrival in large numbers of Pacific Island migrants in the 
10 Miles, ( 1984a), p232 . 
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late 1960s and early 1970s corresponded with a gradual economic decline 
in New Zealand. Housing shortages were rife, the threat of unemployment 
became more real, and New Zealanders began to sense the threat of a 
decline in their general living standards. Pacific Islanders, because 
they were such visible recent additions within the community and so 
easily identified and categorised as outsiders, both by virtue of their 
migrant status and by the application of 'race' ideas, were readily seen 
as causing such problems. It made 'common-sense' that the group whose 
presence coincided with these problems, and which had already been 
associated with similar problems, should be the cause of such decline. 
Likewise, that association was stretched to explain the causes of moral 
decline. Crime, violence , drunkenness, and a fall in moral standards 
were all linked to the racial character of the 'outsiders', Pacific 
Islanders. 
The 'race' /immigration ideology appealed to the working-class because it 
was a simple, convenient ideology which could readily explain their 
material and political circumstances. The working-class interpreted 
their experience in combination with dominant ideas, through the idea of 
'race', to simply rationalise their place in an increasingly complex 
world. The answers such an ideology provided made 'common-sense'. They 
easily categorised a whole variety of circumstances, and more importantly 
absolved the holder of any responsibility for either the problems 
identified or their solutions. 
The State 
Within the state apparatus were individuals, government politicians, 
public servants, government department officials and so forth, each of 
whom brought to their job their personal fears and prejudices, and who 
unwittingly or otherwise helped to shape and influence relations towards 
Pacific Islanders. Politicians and immigration officials who believed 
that because Pacific Islanders were a separate 'race' and an 'alien 
culture' they were problematic immigrants, unconsciously perpetuated 
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negative ideas about Island migrants by formulating policy that was 
interpreted as protecting New Zealanders from the 'threat' of the 
Islanders' presence. 
Similarly, their racist attitudes and belief in racist stereotypes in the 
1980s, for instance, confirmed the 'threat' implied in earlier policy and 
legislation. Acting out of a belief in the stereotype of the 
'overstaying Islander', Pacific islanders were targeted by the 
Immigration Department almost to the exclusion of all other migrant 
groups, and it was largely Islanders, as a result, who were brought 
before the courts and prosecuted. Hence, the understanding created was 
that Pacific Islanders did indeed comprise the majority of overstayers 
because they comprised the majority of those arrested and prosecuted for 
the offence. 
Likewise, politicians' erroneous beliefs continued to reinforce this 
image when in 1987 the Labour government axed its visa-free scheme with 
the Pacific Islands. Acting upon their belief in a racist stereotype, 
the politicians confirmed and reproduced it. Their panicked actions 
merely gave substance to the myth about the 'overstaying Islander' and, 
by a circular process, legitimated the stereotype. 
these individuals unconsciously perpetuated the 
Island people were a blight on New Zealand society. 
Via their actions, 
notion that Pacific 
The continued belief 
in these stereotypes, by politicians and others, highlights the potency 
of the ideology, that is, the 'race' /immigration tradition. 
Racist ideas were also reproduced in a more deliberate manner by the 
state. In the 1970s National Party politicians deliberately and 
unashamedly attempted to identify Pacific Islanders as the cause of the 
New Zealand economic decline. They were made the scapegoats for 
unemployment, a deterioration in law and order and other problems in the 
major cities. Economic and social problems for which the state was 
responsible, were laid directly at the feet of Island migrants. It was 
blatant political manoeuvring on the part of National politicians: a neat 
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sidestep to escape accountability for their own economic mismanagement. 
It was also an astute electioneering bid. Rather than be seen to avoid 
dealing with the complex and pressing social problems that concerned the 
New Zealand public, the party hit upon a means of appeasing voters by 
deftly attributing the cause of such problems to Pacific Island migrants. 
Instead of hitting at the real causes of such problems, which would have 
been too politically contentious or difficult, but at migrants, the 
National Party found a way to offer up a simple solution to all of New 
Zealand's problems, that is, to limit Pacific Island immigration. In 
that way they could be seen to be doing something to deal with the 
problems (whatever those problems were), and could do so without 
alienating too many voters. For the party had selected a perfect 
scapegoat: one which had already been blamed in the public's mind for 
many of society's problems. 
Aside from the question of whether or not the Labour and National parties 
marginalised Pacific Islanders deliberately, the simple fact that they 
reached an implicit consensus about Pacific Island migrants ensured that 
ideological constructs associated with them were not only reproduced, but 
entrenched. Both parties, especially when in government, pursued 
policies founded in a belief in the 'race' /immigration ideology. Both 
legitimated the hostile stereotypes about Pacific Islanders, through 
their immigration campaigns and the political rhetoric associated with 
them, and thus gave them a respectability they did not deserve. The 
actions of both parties, in the 1970s and beyond, perpetuated racist 
ideologies and continued to marginalise Pacific Island migrants. 
The Media 
The role of the media in racialising Pacific Islanders throughout this 
period has been a complex one and deserves closer study. That the media 
can and does influence what people think and do directly has been 
:.;. 
' . ~ . 
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confirmed on many occasions. 11 The effect of the media, however, arises 
more indirectly out of the overall role of the mass media in selecting 
and providing social knowledge. In a modern society, wherein people live 
fragmented and divided lives, we are forced to rely on the media for our 
knowledge about the rest of society. The media provide and select images 
about other people, and it is through the media that a picture of overall 
society can be gained. 12 
More than face to face experience, or any other social institution 
(including schools), it is the media which entertain and inform. 
They 'define reality' and 'set agendas' : they decide what the 
important issues of the day are, who should be listened to and who 
should be marginalised, ignored, ridiculed, and stereotyped. 
Further, the agenda the media construct is overwhelmingly oriented 
towards the status quo of the world. 13 
There is no doubt that the New Zealand media, for the most part, remain 
very close to the middle ground of everything. In the production of 
ideas and images the media have generally reinforced the majority view 
and marginalised others. 14 Hence, the media have selected and reproduced 
images of Pacific Islanders generally in accordance with the 'race' 
ideology. 
Quite routine and often unconscious factors shape this process. News 
editors, chief reporters, reporters and sub-editors all bring to their 
job their own beliefs and prejudices and, while paying lip-service to 
objectivity, unwittingly help to mould, shape and influence our attitudes 
in a variety of ways. 15 Because those in media get to choose what does 
II Maharey, (1990) 1 pl4. 
12 ibid. 1 p16. 
13 ibid . 
14 ibid. 1 pp19 120. 
15 Samson Samasoni, 'Pacific Island Responses 
Media', in Paul Spoonley and Walter Hirsh (eds), 
Racism and the New Zealand Media, (Auckland, 1990), 
to Our Monocultural 
Between the Lines. 
pl35. 
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and does not get into print, on radio or television, they become 
gatekeepers, often reflecting the values that they have through their own 
perception of events. 1 6 Moreover, 'newsworthiness' is judged according 
to general criteria such as the news' simplicity or drama, or according 
to themes and continuity. For instance, a particular event is more 
newsworthy if it is contiguous with previous events. Events are 
recognised as stories because they fit with common themes so that a 
possible story about Mongrel Mob members visiting a marae may be bypassed 
in favour of a retailer's complaint that gang members congregated outside 
his or her shop. 17 Similarly, events linked with Pacific Island 
overstaying in the 198 Os were 'news' because the theme of Island 
overstaying had already been politicised and made topical by the earlier 
events of the 1970s . 
Hence, in these ways the media will reflect and appeal to commonly held 
values to varying degrees. 
Media coverage of Pacific Island news and events is usually 
inadequate and tends to reinforce a negative image of Pacific 
Islanders, who are regularly portrayed in the pages of New Zealand 
dailies and weeklies as criminals, overstayers, rapists, unemployed 
dole bludgers, streetbrawlers, and so on. Rarely are there 
positive stories about Pacific Islanders to balance these images. 1 8 
The media's power to 'create' facts and confirm values makes them a 
significant, if not the significant, factor in influencing public 
opinion. But there are also certain limitations to the media's 
influence. People are not passive, and while the media reinforces 
prejudice, they seldom create it. 19 Similarly, there is no guarantee 
that everyone will take the same intended meaning of a programme or item. 
Audiences need not and do not necessarily accept what they are given, 
16 Maharey, (1990), p21. 
17 ibid. 1 pp21 - 22 • 
18 Kolo, (1990), pl20. 
19 Spoonley, ( 1990b) , p31. 
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although in a modern society they are increasingly reliant on the media 
for information. 20 
Moreover, the media, particularly with regard to the reproduction of 
racism, are not necessarily always generators of negative images. The 
media played an immensely important role in creating government 
embarrassment and bringing an end to the immigration campaigns in the 
1970s . Similarly, Auckland Star journalist, David McLoughlan, uncovered 
racist trends in overstayer prosecution and deportation in 1986, and 
rigorously challenged the Immigration Department's practices and 
policies, thereby helping to alert the public to the racism of particular 
departments . 
Paradoxically, however, despite the fact that the media have in some 
instances challenged the state's racist practices, their extensive 
coverage of the 'overstayer issue' has still led to the creation of a 
widely held stereotype of Pacific Islanders as 'overstayers' and illegal 
immigrants. Media interest in Pacific Islanders, particularly in the 
1970s, has focused almost solely on immigration 'problems', including 
overstaying. There have been few positive images to balance this out. 
It is significant that the first extensive coverage of Pacific Islanders 
was not only of a negative event, that is the 'problem' of overstaying, 
but that it also led to the creation of negative stereotypes. 2 1 
The media have played two different roles in the debate over overstaying. 
Media reporting has roused public indignation against dawn raids and 
random checking, and has challenged government departments on ~ the 
treatment of Pacific Island overstayers . In these instances the media 
have demonstrated their ability to exercise power to raise public 
consciousness in the interests of greater social justice for migrants. 
However, media reporting has also continued to associate Pacific 
20 Maharey, (1990), p25. 
21 Kolo, (1990), pl20. 
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Islanders with 'overstaying', which in turn has been defined as a social 
problem, and in this respect has represented more conservative Pakeha 
interests. More than a third of Pacific islanders in New Zealand are New 
Zealanders because they are Cook Islanders, Tokelauans or Niueans, and 
more than half of the Pacific Island population are New Zealand-born. 
Yet as a result of media coverage all Pacific Island people continue to 
be lumped together and associated in the public mind with 
'overstaying' . 22 It has been the media role in reproducing racism, 
rather than their role in challenging it, that has been the most 
influential. Thus it is no surprise that it is the image of the 
uneducated, non-English-speaking 'overstaying Islander' which remains 
strong in the minds of many New Zealanders 
contradicted by reality. 23 
THE IDEOLOGICAL PROCESS 
too strong to be 
The reproduction of racism as it was expressed towards Pacific Islanders 
in and subsequent to the 1970s needs to be understood as the product of 
a dialectical interaction between various social processes and groups. 
The need for an economic and political scapegoat in the 1970s arose in 
a society which had also developed commanding 'race' stereotypes and an 
ideology which had long had the ability. to rna~ a complex world more 
straightforward. The cohesion of these c1rc~tances gave the ideology 
of 'race' a new and particular authority. 
Likewise, the interests of different groups fused at this time to ensure 
that Pacific Islanders were an inevitable target for political and 
ideological hostility. Politicians deliberately reproduced 'race' 
stereotypes to deflect attention from their own mismanagement of the 
economy. The media reproduced racist images, or highlighted instances 
of racism, in order to sell a story. Other individuals held to a 'race' 
22 Samasoni, (1990), pp134-135. 
23 ibid • 1 p134 • 
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ideology simply in order to understand their place in the new world 
and/or to explain and defend the loss of resources or their standards of 
living. The National Party, for instance, appealed to racist ideas it 
already knew to exist, the media translated and reported these back to 
the public, and public attitudes were reinforced, extended and 
entrenched. Hence, it was in this way, as various groups turned for 
various reasons to the 'race' ideology, that a consensus of racism was 
attained. 
The effect was cumulative. Each event that was racialised or politicised 
built upon itself and created the context in which the next event could 
be defined and explained. Each event that was defined racially provided 
justification or proof of the veracity of the 'race' stereotype, making 
it evermore potent and entrenching it even further, and shaped the social 
climate for it to be used again and again. The more the 'race' ideology 
was used to explain the world, the more it was able to fashion it in the 
future. 
The reproduction of racism in the 1970s was part of a pattern in New 
Zealand wherein, during periods of economic recession or decline, society 
has focused upon nationalistic, chauvinistic attitudes in order to 
provide simple answers to problems. 24 Preceding the 1970s 'overstayer 
cris~s', for instance, was the period of the so-called 'Yellow Peril'. 
This period of political and ideological campaigns against Asians in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly during the 
economic recession of the 1880s and the economic uncertainty following 
World War One, were part of this ideological pattern. The hostility 
towards Asians was closely associated with the economic fears of New 
Zealanders and their desire to maintain the New Zealand dream, and was 
expressed strongly in terms of the ideas of 'race' and national 
character. Similarly, the 1970s immigration campaigns against Pacific 
Islanders spiralled out of a deteriorating economy and a period of great 
24 Paul Spoonley quoted in Television New Zealand, One Network News, 
19 July (1993). 
' 
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social and economic uncertainty. The subsequent targeting of Pacific 
Island immigrants was also, in part, a reflection of the continued 
uncertainty felt in the face of radical economic restructuring and record 
unemployment in the 1980s. 25 Those perceived as different and as 
outsiders become obvious targets for hostility during recessionary 
periods when people fought to protect their few resources. When that 
difference is defined according to 'race' ideas, that hostility will 
inevitably be expressed racially. 
The continued economic and social hardships of the early 1990s have also 
provided the terrain upon which new patterns of racism are being 
reproduced. The immigration of Asians, for instance, has once again 
become the focus of negative attention. 
The New 'Race' /Immigration Cycle 
Immigration became a national issue in April, 1993, when a two-page 
spread in Auckland's suburban Eastern Courier newspaper, headlined 'The 
Inv-Asian', tapped into fears and folklore that ran deep in New Zealand 
history by reporting that galloping immigration was transforming Auckland 
into the "Taipei/Hong Kong/Seoul of the South Pacific" . 26 In the story, 
an unidentified Chinese landlord was accused of seeking "lent leviews", 
while an unnamed tenant attacked an unnamed Asian landlord for raising 
his rent. It was grimly reported that "a number of Newmarket properties 
are now owned by Asians", and that Asian landlords could be "bad news" 
for all tenants. 27 An unnamed real estate agent was quoted suggesting 
that Chinese were greedy landlords taking over parts of New Zealand. 2 8 
25 Gibson, (1983), pp37-38. 
26 Eastern Courier, 'The Inv-Asian', 16 April (1993), cited in 
Dominion, 'Migration row hounds PM on eve of Asia tour', 8 May (1993), 
and 'A new home turns hostile', 15 May (1993). 
27 Eastern Courier, 'The Inv-Asian', 16 April (1993), cited in 
Dominion, 'A new home turns hostile', 15 May (1993). 
28 Eastern Courier, 'The Inv-Asian' , 16 april ( 1993) , cited in 
Dominion, 'Articles on Asians provoke outrage', 1 May (1993). 
Conclusion p188 
The familiar litany about Asian kids at the best schools and their 
parents in the best houses was also rehearsed, while references were made 
to elderly Chinese in "coolie hats". 29 
While the Asian community prepared to meet the Race Relations Conciliator 
to discuss the articles, delegates at the National Party's Auckland 
conference gave the debate a new twist by asking the government to 
require immigrant children to take part in intensive language courses 
before they could enrol at school. Former immigration minister, Bill 
Birch, even mused about ways of charging immigrants to achieve this. 
Although the remit itself did not specify Asian children, speakers in 
support made clear that they were the target. 30 
The issue gained momentum after claims were made that Asian immigrants 
were prone to carry tuberculosis and Maori academic, Ranginui Walker, 
called for New Zealand to stop taking migrants altogether. "We have a 
good lifestyle here and it's a moot point as to how long we can continue 
to shift people into this country and maintain that lifestyle," he 
said. 31 Elsewhere he repeated his concerns: 
Our government needs to believe in its own people ... if we provide 
people with training in the skills that our own economy needs than 
we can sustain a reasonable lifestyle in this country. 32 
The remit was seen as evidence of the concern some felt about the growing 
numbers of Asian migrants. Recent Asian immigration had for some time 
been a subject of conversation and resentment. Complaints about 
Polynesians stripping all the shellfish on New Zealand coastlines had 
29 Easter Courier, 'The Inv-Asian', 16 April (1993), cited in 
Dominion, 'A new home turns hostile', 15 may (1993). 
30 Dominion, Editorial, 'Looking after our Asians', 5 May (1993). 
31 Ranginui Walker, cited in Dominion, 'Migration row hounds PM on 
eve of Asia tour', 8 May (1993). 
32 Ranginui Walker, quoted on Television New Zealand, Primetime, 5 
May (1993). 
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given way to accusations that Asians were the new culprits. Early in 
1993 when two Auckland beaches were closed due to overfishing, the first 
time a blanket ban had been placed on a New Zealand beach, it was Asians 
who were blamed. Auckland regional councillor, Paul Walbran, who chaired 
dozens of meetings to discuss the overfishing of inner-city beaches said, 
"For lots of people, the solution is to send them (the Asians) home."~ 
When it comes to poor driving also, Asians have picked up the mantle of 
abuse that once fell to women. 34 Asians in expensive cars have been an 
easy target, especially when Auckland BMW dealers say that more than half 
of their sales in recent years have been to Asians. 35 Middle-class New 
Zealanders have also had to adjust to the academic success of Asian 
children. Throughout the Auckland region they have moved effortlessly 
into the top places of the country's schools -much to the consternation 
of many otherwise liberal parents who feel that the pressure on education 
means that their children miss out. 36 This resentment was inflamed in 
1992 with the discovery by McLeans College principal, Allen McDonald, 
that several of his students were being left at home alone while their 
parents looked after business interests in Asia. 37 Kim Lao, spokesman 
for the Howick-Pakuranga Chinese parents Association, has said that this 
is extremely rare, yet the antagonism persists. 3 8 People will tell you 
that the comfortable eastern suburb of Hawick, where recent Chinese 
settlement has been highest, is now called 'Chowick' . 39 
33 Bronwen Reid, 'Barren 
International, Vol.141, No.120, 
Times for 
( 19 9 3 ) 1 p4 0 • 
Race Relations', 
34 Dominion, 'A new home turns hostile', 15 May (1993). 
35 Reid, (1993), p41. 
36 ibid. 1 p41. 
37 ibid. 1 p41. 
38 Cited in Dominion Sunday Times, 'Hawick. District in Change', 13 
June ( 1993) . 
39 Dominion, 'A new home turns hostile', 15 May (1993). 
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Figure 8.1 Sale of Wairakei Golf Course to Japanese, 
Tom Scott, Evening Post, 1991. 40 
Calls to public talkback radio have demonstrated the depth of prejudice 
felt by New Zealanders in this new wave of anti-Chinese racism. One 
caller said, "It's as though we're aliens in our own country. And we 
feel that we're just not ... we're not New Zealanders. 
over. "41 Another exclaimed: 
They're taking 
We're sick of the Asians. They don't integrate. We don't want 
them. We've got our own people to look after. I'm so against it. 
They're creeping in. It's silent invasion. They're creeping in. 
Next minute ... you know, twenty years down the track, they're going 
to say 'well, we own your country ' . 42 
Still yet another talkback caller, typical of the many, said firmly, 
"They will own us. And I don't want an Asian boss, thank you very much. 
No way would I work for an Asian. You know, I'm sorry. I'm not a racist 
40 Reproduced in 
Cartoons and Comments, 
Tom Scott, In a Jugular Vein. 
(Wellington, 1991), p52. 
A Collection of 
41 Radio Pacific Talkback, May (1993), cited in Television New 
Zealand, Frontline, 13 June (1993) 
42 ibid. 
Conclusion pl91 
person, but against the Asians, yes, I'm beginning to be like that." 43 
Anti-Asian feeling has reached such a peak in some areas that it has even 
led to violence against immigrants. In two incidents in Nelson a group 
of anti-Asian skinheads threatened an Asian restaurant owner in the inner 
city with a rifle, while a cross with an effigy was burned on the front 
lawn of a house in which three Asian students, two Taiwanese and one 
Japanese, lived. 44 Another group of pseudo-skinheads, who targeted 
anyone without white skin, were responsible for other incidents in the 
city where Asian students were being harassed in the streets, or had been 
subjected to racist remarks. 4 5 
There is more than simply anecdotal evidence of increasing anti-Asian 
racism. In 1992 a Time Morgan poll detected 44% opposition to 
immigration among New Zealanders, but found also that 53% objected 
specifically to Asian immigrants. 4 6 Politicians have begun to reflect 
this mood. The National Party remit had already been seen by some as an 
election year appeal to anti - Asian rednecks. 47 Subsequent comments by 
New Zealand First party leader, Winston Peters, revealed more clearly 
xenophobic attitudes. When announcing policies to tighten immigration, 
he labelled immigrants as 'aliens who don't speak our language' . 4 8 
Clearly he was not talking about British or Australian immigrants who 
comprise the majority of immigrants to New Zealand, but Asian immigrants. 
43 ibid. 
44 Dominion, 'Racism blamed for violent incidents', 26 October 
(1993), and 'Crackdown follows racist incidents', 27 October (1993). 
4 5 Dominion, 'Crackdown follows racist incidents', 27 October (1993). 
4 6 Reid, ( 1993 ) , p41. 
47 Television New Zealand, Holmes, 2 May (1993). 
48 Winston Peters quoted on Television New Zealand, One Network News, 
19 July ( 1993) . 
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The recent 'race' /immigration debate is not dissimilar to the racist 
campaigns against Pacific Islanders in the 1970s. Then, Pacific 
Islanders were welcomed in to the country when their labour was needed, 
but a particular combination of ideological and economic circumstances 
led subsequently to their racialisation. Today, in contrast to the 
formerly severe restrictions on Asian immigration, Asians are being 
welcomed into New Zealand because they, too, are needed in the current 
economic climate. Several years ago New Zealand set its mind to attract 
entrepreneurs with skill and capital to spur the economic recovery. The 
National government forced the pace by setting an annual target of 25,000 
new migrants. The closest source of wealth and skills, as it has turned 
out, has been Asia. 49 Since the system began in November 1991, Asian 
migrants have poured nearly $200 million into the New Zealand economy and 
the money continues to stream in at an average of $2 million a month. 
Taiwan community leaders estimate that the 2,000 Taiwanese families that 
have settled in New Zealand since 1987 have added $1 billion to the 
economy . Most Asian families have brought with them at least half a 
million dollars. 50 Some parts of Auckland have experienced a mini-boom 
in real estate, and Asian businessmen have invested in a range of joint 
ventures, from exporting the Kiwi meat pie to building retirement 
villages. 51 As well as welcoming the capital that new Asian migrants 
have brought into the country the government has valued, as further 
resources for New Zealand business to tap into, the access back to Asian 
markets and the links with home countries and knowledge of Asian ways 
which the immigrants have also brought with them. 52 
Similar to the events of the 1970s, although the number of Asian 
immigrants has increased rapidly, the 'invasion' by these migrants so 
49 Reid, (1993), p40. 
50 Reid, (1993), p40. See also Rosemary McLeod, 'China Girl. The 
Hard Won Victories of Mai Chen', North and South, August (1993), pp86-95. 
51 ibid . 
52 Dominion, Editorial, 'NZ destiny as part of Asia', 12 July (1993). 
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widely spoken about has been overstated. In 1992 New Zealand received 
49,010 permanent and longterm arrivals, of whom 7887 were from Hong Kong, 
Japan, Malaysia and Taiwan. This was lower than either Australia's 
13,189 or Britain's 11,227. 53 While, in the past six years, the Asian 
population in New Zealand has almost trebled to more than 50,000, Asians 
still make up less than two percent of the total population. 54 
Although the New Zealand's doors have been opened to Asian immigrants, 
New Zealanders' attitudes towards this new migrant group have been, at 
best, ambivalent. As with Pacific Islanders in the 1970s, Asian 
immigrants have been viewed generally with distrust and disaffection. 
They have been welcomed in by the government and business for their money 
(with Pacific Islanders it was their labour) . The growing perception is 
that it is only for their money that they are welcome. There has been 
an easy assumption that the Asian presence is to be measured purely in 
terms of financial gain, and certainly government statements only confirm 
that view. Seeing new arrivals simply as people has not yet entirely 
caught on. 55 Most New Zealanders would seem to view the arrival of these 
new migrants warily. The degree of antagonism felt towards Asian 
migrants is illustrated simply by the fact that the arrival of a small 
group of migrants, both in comparison to other migrant groups and to the 
size of the New Zealand population as a whole, can have been described 
at all as an "invasion". It strongly echoes New Zealand's earlier 
virulent anti-Chinese traditions, and highlights the degree to which 
those old prejudices still exist. 
53 Dominion, 'Hawick. District in Change', 13 June (1993). 
54 Reid, (1993), p40. 
55 Reid, ( 1993) , p41, and Dominion, 'A new home turns hostile', 15 
May (1993). 
Conclusion pl94 
· ~;; ..... · .. ' 
rt' : I~H r • ,t? 
.. :, : .. . ' . 
· .. 
BAN WOGS FROfl\ 
UPPER HVTT Ill 
-. 
I Jl.1 NarAAW;T.lD 
oB1tCT" TO TAIWANESE 
MIGRANTS EVEN 
If THEY CAME FROM 
HOLLAND, SPAIN, OR 
MADAGAScAR •.. 
Figure 8.2 Ban Wags From Upper Hutt, Tom Scott, 
Evening Post, 1991. 56 
.,..;-
· - ,,p 
1 
I 
This latest ideological cycle reveals, among other things, the potency 
and persistence of stereotypes. Anti-Asian sentiment has obviously 
remained strong within New Zealand, and many of the old stereotypes have 
not lost their influence. Concerns about the Asian immigrants' supposed 
inability to integrate, fears that they are taking over (whether 
economically, culturally or 'racially') and rhetoric about their 
potential as carriers of disease draw strong parallels to the debates of 
the late nineteenth century . Significantly, the new stereotypes, about 
driving BMWs for instance, reveal the ability of the 'race' ideology to 
subtly transform to fit new circumstances and situations while retaining 
it's essential features, and more importantly, it's authority. There can 
be seen in the current debate an inversion of some of the old 
stereotypes. Last century the Chinese were attacked as immoral and lazy, 
56 Reproduced in Scott, ( 19 91) , p6 2 -
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whereas now they are attacked for being over-achievers. "In the past 
we were criticized for being ignorant and poor," Dr Man-ying Ip, lecturer 
at Auckland University's school of Asian studies, commented, "Now we're 
satirized for being smart and rich. Maybe the simple fault is being 
Chinese. " 57 
The current racist revival also reveals many of the patterns of the 
'race' ideology. Much of the concern expressed over Asian immigration 
is expressed, as it was for Asians and Pacific Islanders at other times 
in New Zealand's past, in terms of competition for resources. Whether 
the new immigrants are seen as threatening shellfish resources or New 
Zealanders' access to a good education, they are typically perceived as 
an outside threat with less right to New Zealand's resources than other 
New Zealanders. The rhetoric, too, is similar to that used in other 
debates. The language and images of "invasion" echo images of the 'brown 
hordes' and last century's 'yellow peril'. The common factor in all of 
this is the definition of groups as outsiders, both in terms of their 
'race', and by virtue of their migrant status. Ideology has played a 
convenient role in categorising these groups differently. By separating 
them out from the 'real New Zealanders', and generally by defining them 
as inferior as well as outsiders, a situation has been created so that 
during periods of economic recession when competition for resources is 
heightened, there are some groups that can immediately be pushed to the 
back of the queue. 
Significantly, the move in focus of the 'race' /immigration ideology, from 
Pacific Islanders in the 1970s and 1980s to Asians in the 1990s, may 
reveal important clues about the future of that particular ideology. A 
majority of New Zealand's Pacific Islanders in the 1990s are New Zealand-
born, and the Pacific Island population in New Zealand is a population 
that is becoming increasingly established as Islanders reach their second 
57 Man-Ying Ip quoted in Reid, (1993), p41. 
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and third generations of family born in New Zealand. 58 Moreover, it is 
a population that is not only increasing at a faster rate than other 
groups in New Zealand, but it is doing so by natural increase as opposed 
to migration. 59 The Pacific Island population in New Zealand, by virtue 
of these changing population characteristics and the increasing profile 
Islanders have in sports such as rugby which have traditionally defined 
the New Zealand cultural and national identity, have become more 
established as a part of New Zealand, if not as New Zealanders. 60 They 
cannot any longer be easily conceived of simply as immigrants, and the 
argument that they somehow do not 'belong' has lost much of its 
authority. 
By comparison, however, Asians comprise a smaller proportion of the New 
Zealand population, less than two percent; they have a lower profile in 
the national identity; and more than two thirds of the Asian population 
in New Zealand are indeed migrants to the country. They, more readily 
than Pacific Islanders, can be labelled as outsiders. The 
'race' /immigration ideology has lost some of its usefulness or 
explanatory significance as Pacific Islanders have become a more 
entrenched feature of New Zealand society. That particular ideology, to 
be useful, has had to be redirected to another 'outsider' group, hence, 
the focus has moved to Asian immigrants. 
The question of course is what will the pattern of the 'race' /immigration 
ideology be in the future? If the Asian population in New Zealand 
becomes as established as the Pacific Island population, will that signal 
the advent of a new ideological focus? That particular ideological 
strand, the 'race' /immigration ideology, could be redirected, as it was 
58 
Spoonley, 
See Bedford and Larner, 
(1992), p82. 
59 See Ongley, (1990), p123. 
(1992), p66, and Pulotu-Endemann and 
60 See Tom Hyde, 'White men can't jump. The Polynesianisation of 
sport', Metro, September (1993), pp62-69. 
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from Islanders to Asians, towards a new immigrant group. Or it could 
be transformed into a new strand of ideology, wherein immigration plays 
a less crucial role. Indications are that the latter may already be 
happening to a small degree. Pacific Islanders, who were formerly 
defined as distinct from Maori while they could be defined as outsiders , 
are becoming more closely associated with the other 'race' stereotypes 
ascribed to Maori . The general racial classification of 'Polynesian' is 
beginning to take on more significance ideologically than it once did, 
supplanting in some respects the old migrant stereotypes that had been 
reserved for a period for Pacific Islanders alone . 61 
That is not to say that the 'race' /immigration ideology as it was 
expressed towards Pacific Islanders has disappeared, nor will disappear. 
There is no reason to suppose that the old ideological images and 
stereotypes will lose all value . The rhetoric and prejudices that had 
marginalised Asians in the nineteenth century, for instance, have proved 
a century later to continue to hold some usefulness and authority. 
Likewise, the image of the 'overstaying Islander' may once again prove 
useful in explaining different circumstances at some other time in the 
future. The demand in the Pacific for access to employment and 
settlement opportunities in New Zealand is unlikely to diminish. New 
Zealand is still perceived as a land of opportunity by Pacific Islanders 
in spite of the contemporary economic recession . 62 Migration from the 
Pacific is an ever present possibility. Moreover, demands for entry into 
New Zealand may in the future become more urgent given the current 
population pressures in Tonga or the predictions of environmental 
devastation to low-lying island states such as Tuvalu should global 
warming establish as a climatic trend , for instance. New Zealand could 
again be faced with pressing issues about the restricted entry and 
61 This ideologic al transformation is not without its limitations. 
In the current climate where biculturalism (as opposed to 
multiculturalism) and the rights of the tangata whenua are emphasised , 
Pacific Islanders are still 'outsiders' to a large extent. 
62 Bedford, ( 1984) , p135 . 
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immigration of Islanders to the country. It is likely that within such 
a debate the old ideological constructs would again surface. 
As New Zealanders attempt to define themselves and their place in the 
world in the future, the challenge for them will be to move away from the 
ideological traditions of their past. For New Zealand as a whole to move 
towards becoming a truly multicultural society, the old ideologies about 
'race' and cultural difference must be challenged. Examining more 
closely the patterns of racism and prejudice in New Zealand's past, and 
identifying the processes through which those prejudices have developed 
is a crucial part of that maturation process. This present work is an 
invitation to the reader to correct and deepen, by critical reading, his 
or her understanding of those processes. It is vital that a more 
thorough and critical understanding of New Zealand history is reached, 
for the view which New Zealanders have of their past will help in turn 
to shape their future . 
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